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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j)? as this 
matter is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Third District Court. (R. 8108-11.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues Presented 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
(collectively "Holme Roberts"), alleging breach of the duty of confidentiality. 
This issue turns on whether Plaintiffs submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Holme Roberts actually disclosed Plaintiffs' 
confidential information to Defendant PacifiCorp or otherwise used any of Plaintiffs' 
confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit. 
2. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claim against Holme Roberts for breach of the duty of loyalty. 
This issue turns on whether Plaintiffs submitted evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether (a) Holme Roberts breached the duty of loyalty, 
and (b) Plaintiffs suffered any compensable harm or injury as a result of any alleged breach. 
Standard of Review 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Western Water, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Defendants Jody Williams and Holme Roberts, and their Representation of 
the Plaintiffs. 
Jody Williams is a water lawyer who has been licensed to practice in Utah for over 
thirty years. (See Affidavit of Jody Williams, Addendum Exhibit 2 hereto, Tflf 1-2, R. 
9817.) In July 2002, she became a partner at Defendant Holme Roberts, leaving her 
former firm, Kruse Landa & Maycock. (Id f 11, R. 9818.) 
In May 2001, Ms. Williams and Kruse Landa were retained by Plaintiffs1 to assist 
them in obtaining water rights for use at potential power generation sites in Utah. (Id. 
Tf 3, R. 9817.) Ms. Williams informed Plaintiffs that she had been a water lawyer in Utah 
for a number of years, that she had previously worked for Defendant PacifiCorp, and that 
she felt her experience "would be exactly what [Plaintiffs] were looking for in order to 
obtain water resources." (Deposition of Ted Banasiewicz ("T. Banasiewicz Dep."), R. 
1982-83.) Plaintiffs hired Williams because she had substantial experience in water law; 
specifically, Plaintiffs believed her to be "familiar with what was going on in the State of 
Utah" and expected her to know the general range of the price of water rights in the area. 
(See Deposition of David Graeber, R. 9745; T. Banasiewicz Dep., R. 9737-38.) 
Plaintiffs intended to build a power plant and then sell either the assets or power to 
the California market. (Deposition of Jody Williams at 57, R. 10096.) They did not dis-
cuss selling either the assets or the power to PacifiCorp. (Id.) Indeed, as of August 2002, 
There are three plaintiffs in this matter, but it is not necessary to distinguish 
between them for purposes of this appeal. 
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Plaintiffs had sent a "marketing package" to nine potential buyers, none of which were 
PacifiCorp. (USA Power Partners Mgmt. Report, R. 8544-45.) 
Plaintiffs initially focused on Vernal and Nephi as potential sites, and Ms. Wil-
liams investigated potential water rights for use in those areas. (See Williams Aff, Add. 
Ex. 2, If 7, R. 9817.) Thereafter, in the fall of 2001, Plaintiffs identified real estate owned 
by Michael Keyte near Mona, Utah, in Juab County, for potential purchase, for what 
became known as the "Spring Canyon" project. (Id.) Ms. Williams and David Hansen of 
Hansen Allen and Luce, Plaintiffs' water engineers, then investigated water rights for use 
near Mona. (LI f 8.) From public sources, Ms. Williams identified Mr. Keyte and Blake 
Garrett as owners of water rights near Mona. (See id. f 9, R. 9818.) 
That Keyte and Garrett owned water rights in Juab County was a matter of public 
record. (Id.) In fact, the identity of all water rights owners in Utah is a matter of public 
record, available, among other places, on the Utah Division of Water Rights website. 
(See id. fflf 5, 9, R. 9817-18.) The State Engineer is also conversant with who owns water 
rights and who may be willing to sell, and freely supplies such information. (Id f 6.) 
When she was hired by Plaintiffs, Ms. Williams already knew how and where to identify 
water rights owners, how to learn who may be interested in selling water rights, and the 
general price of water rights in Utah. (Id. f 4.) Williams had discussed such matters with 
the State Engineer's office on many occasions. (Id f 6.) 
On May 30, 2002, Plaintiffs entered into an option and purchase agreement with 
Mr. Keyte, which granted Plaintiffs a renewable option to buy Mr. Keyte's right to use 
163.22 acre-feet of water, subject to the State Engineer's approval of Plaintiffs' plan to 
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allow the water to be diverted for use at the Spring Canyon site. (Id f 10; Water Right 
Option and Purchase Agreement (Williams Aff. Ex. A), R. 9823-26.) On August 5, 
2002, Plaintiffs entered into a similar agreement with Mr. Garrett. (Garrett Agreement, 
R. vol. 6, Ex. G (sealed); Williams Aff. ^ 14, R. 9818.) The water rights options Plain-
tiffs acquired from Mr. Keyte and Mr. Garrett were never exercised and have since ex-
pired. (Deposition of Lois Banasiewicz (L. Banasiewicz Dep.) at 125-128, R. 9766.) 
In July 2002, Ms. Williams and her associate, Steven Vuyovich, left Kmse Landa 
and joined Holme Roberts. (Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2, f 11, R. 9818.) At Plaintiffs' 
request, their files were transferred to Holme Roberts. (Id 1f 12.) After the option agree-
ments with Mr. Keyte and Mr. Garrett were finalized in August 2002, Holme Roberts' re-
maining assignments for Plaintiffs consisted of the limited tasks of filing change applica-
tions to change the water rights' point of diversion, place of use, and nature of use, and 
finalizing (i) a letter regarding the Keyte and Garrett water rights and transactions (the 
"water letter"), and (ii) certain memoranda addressing the due diligence undertaken 
regarding the water rights ("due diligence memoranda"). (Id % 16, R. 9819.) The water 
letter and the due diligence memoranda were completed on September 18, 2002, and 
September 30, 2002, respectively. (Id | 17.) The change applications were also com-
pleted and filed with the Utah Division of Water Rights in September 2002. (Id ^ 18.) 
At this point, Holme Roberts' work for Plaintiffs was essentially complete; no one for-
mally protested the change applications, and the State Engineer did not hold a hearing, 
issuing written decisions approving the applications on December 13, 2002, and January 
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22, 2003. (Id m 19-22; Affidavit of Steven E. Clyde, Add. Ex. 3, at R. 25/84892; Notice 
of Approved Change Applications, Add. Ex. 4, R. 10031-39. ) 
The change applications were a matter of public record. (Williams Aff. f 20, R. 
9819.) Notice of the applications was published in the Nephi Times News. (Id.) The 
State Engineer's decisions approving the applications were also a matter of public record. 
(Id.; see also Approval Notices, Add. Ex. 4.) These decisions specify the exact quantity 
of water to be diverted by Plaintiffs (547.22 acre-feet), the quantity of water to be 
depleted (300.1 acre-feet), and the purpose for the diversions: "[F]or steam generation at 
the Spring Canyon Project with a rated capacity of 530 megawatts . . . in the NE1/4SE1/4 
of Section 23, T11S, R1W, SLB&M." (Add. Ex. 4, R. 10032, 10037.) 
Mr. Vuyovich spoke with Plaintiffs' principal Lois Banasiewicz on January 9, 
2003, regarding the approval of first change application, and on January 24, 2003, regar-
ding the approval of the second change application. (See Affidavit of Steven J. Vuyovich 
Tf 3, R. 10093; see also L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 151, R. 9767.) It is undisputed that from 
January 25, 2003, through September 9, 2003, Holme Roberts performed no legal ser-
vices for Plaintiffs; Ms. Williams did not even talk to Plaintiffs during these many 
months. (See Supp. Aff. of Jody L. Williams, Add. Ex. 5, ^ 2, R. 24/8297; Holme 
Due to what appears to be a misnumbering in preparing the appellate record, 
volumes 24 and 25 were marked with overlapping page numbers. The pages in volume 
24 were marked 8169-8507, and the pages in volume 25 were marked 8170-8554. 
Accordingly, citations to those portions of the record include both the volume and the 
page number: "25/8489" refers to volume 25, page 8489. 
3
 The approved change applications were filed as part of an exhibit that was sealed 
because it contained confidential business information. The notices and rulings on the 
applications themselves are public record, however. Accordingly, copies of those 
documents are included in the Addendum as Exhibit 4. 
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Roberts Invoices, Jan.-July 2003, R. 24/8299-8320; Deposition of Jody Williams at 243-
44, R. 24/8324.) On September 10, 2003, however, Ms. Williams received a phone call 
out of the blue from David Graeber, one of Plaintiffs' principals, who purportedly had a 
question about air credits. Ms. Williams referred the inquiry to another Holme Roberts 
attorney, who responded on September 17, 2003. (Williams Dep. at 243-44, R. 24/8324; 
Holme Roberts Invoice, October 2003, R. 24/8325-28.) 
Holme Roberts did not perform any further or other legal services for any Plaintiff. 
(See Williams Supp. Aff 1f 3, R. 24/8297.) 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim that Ms. Williams was part of Plaintiffs' "manage-
ment team," Ms. Williams' non-water rights work was limited to a few discrete tasks, 
including (1) potential annexation of property in Mona, Utah, which terminated in 
December 2001 (See Kruse Landa Invoices, Nov.-Dec. 2001, R. 24/8277-86); (2) assis-
ting with an option to purchase certain real property from Michael Keyte in January 2002 
(Invoice, R. 24/8287-88); (3) preparing Articles of Organization and an Operating Agree-
ment for Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, in February 2002 (Invoice, R. 24/8289-91); 
(4) transmitting a letter to Juab County regarding a conditional use permit in May 2002. 
(Invoice, R. 24/8292-93.)4 Holme Roberts' invoices to Plaintiffs indicated that the sub-
ject of the representation was "General Water Consultation." (Holme Roberts Invoices, 
4
 Also, in May 2002 (while Ms. Williams was still at Kruse Landa), she had 
referred Plaintiffs to Blaine Rawson at Holme Roberts to assist Plaintiffs in preparing a 
memorandum regarding air modeling issues for the Utah Division of Air Quality. That 
work was completed by the end of June 2002. (T. Banasiewicz Dep., R. 24/8189-92.) 
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Jan.-July 2003, R. 24/8299-8320.) Plaintiffs themselves considered Ms. Williams to be 
their "Utah Water Attorney." (L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 130-32, R. 6496.) 
Further, it is undisputed that when Plaintiffs entered into discussions with Pacifi-
Corp about a potential sale of power and/or assets, Plaintiffs were not represented by 
Holme Roberts, but rather by other attorneys: Michael Zimmer, a power industry expert 
with Baker & McKenzie in Washington, D.C., and David Ringer, from Dallas, Texas. 
(L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 78-81, R. 24/8209; Graeber Dep. at 121-23, R. 24/8204; T. 
Banasiewicz Dep. at 611-13, R. 24/8194-95.) In fact, Ms. Williams had told Plaintiffs in 
the fall of 2002 that she would not represent them in any transaction with PacifiCorp (or 
vice versa). (Williams Dep. at 88, R. 6499.) 
Ms. Williams and Mr. Vuyovich both treated all information they received from 
Plaintiffs as confidential, did not communicate it to PacifiCorp, and did not use any infor-
mation obtained from Plaintiffs in any subsequent water rights work. (See Vuyovich Aff. 
114, R. 10093; Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2,1f 24, R. 9820; Williams Dep. at 60, R. 10096.)5 
B. PacifiCorp and the Development of the Currant Creek Plant. 
Defendant PacifiCorp is in the business of generating and selling electricity to 
customers in several western states, including Utah. Since at least 2000, PacifiCorp has 
maintained a separate department whose charge was to develop new generation re-
sources, including acquiring and building new power plants, to meet the company's com-
mitment to supply electric power to its customers. (See Deposition of Rand Thurgood at 
5
 Similarly, Blaine Rawson never shared any confidential information regarding 
Power Partners with anyone. (Deposition of Blaine Rawson, R. 9844.) 
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15-19, R. 24/8330-31.) The head of that department at all times relevant to this action 
was Rand Thurgood, Managing Director of Resource Development. (Id.) 
By June 2001, Mr. Thurgood had considered the possibility of acquiring assets in 
the Mona area for a power plant. (IdL at 113-15, R. 24/8332.) On June 19, 2001, Mr. 
Thurgood was approached by Panda Nebo Energy ("Panda") with respect to potentially 
buying power from a plant Panda planned to build in Mona, on a 240-acre site Panda had 
acquired (via an option) adjacent to PacifiCorp's Mona substation. At the time, Mr. 
Thurgood indicated that PacifiCorp was interested in acquiring Panda's power develop-
ment assets, but not power from a proposed plant. (Id at 140-141, R. 8330-31.) Sub-
sequently, in July 2002, Panda indicated its willingness to sell its Mona project assets to 
PacifiCorp. (See id; Deposition of David J. Barlow at 78, 142-53, 229-30, R. 24/8342-
47.) Negotiations ensued, and PacifiCorp and Panda entered into a Letter of Intent in 
January 2003. (R. 24/8348-56.) PacifiCorp ultimately closed on the purchase of Panda's 
Mona assets in February 2003. (Purchase and Sale Agreement, R. 24/8357-88.) Those 
assets included an option on the 240-acre lot, environmental reports addressing the suita-
bility of a power plant at the site, one year's worth of audited ambient air data collected 
on the site (necessary to obtain an air permit from the Utah Division of Environmental 
Quality ("UDEQ")), and related reports and files. (Id at R. 24/8370.) 
C. PacifiCorp's Dealings with Plaintiffs. 
On August 22, 2002, after PacifiCorp had begun negotiations with Panda, Plain-
tiffs and PacifiCorp first met concerning the potential of PacifiCorp purchasing Plaintiffs' 
Spring Canyon assets. (T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 604, 24/8193.) Plaintiffs' attorney 
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Michael Zimmer reviewed, revised, and marked up a term sheet that Plaintiffs took with 
them to a September 11, 2002, meeting with PacifiCorp to discuss a potential asset sale 
or power purchase agreement. (L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 78-81, R. 24/8209; T. Bana-
siewicz Dep. at 611, R. 24/8194.) Mr. Zimmer also prepared a draft of an agreement that 
was sent to PacifiCorp in October 2002, assisted Plaintiffs with potential option agree-
ments, and generally consulted with Plaintiffs concerning their negotiations with 
PacifiCorp through the end of 2002. (T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 613, R. 24/8194; Graeber 
Dep. at 121, R. 24/8204; L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 78-81, R. 24/8209.) Plaintiffs' other 
attorney, David Ringer, reviewed term sheets relating to the Spring Canyon Project. 
(Graeber Dep. at 121-23, R. 24/8204.) 
Importantly, before PacifiCorp met with Plaintiffs, PacifiCorp had already ob-
tained extensive and detailed information about Plaintiffs' planned power plant: In Feb-
ruary 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) with UDEQ, seeking an air permit for 
their plant. (NOI, R. 4141-71.) PacifiCorp obtained a copy from UDEQ on August 15, 
2002. The NOI revealed, among other things, that Plaintiffs intended to build a com-
bined cycle plant on their site (driving directions to the site were included), and laid out 
many details of the proposed plant, including the exact model gas turbine to be used, the 
plan for heat recovery steam generators, that the plant would involve supplemental duct 
firing, the source of gas for the project, the capacities of the planned generators, and the 
fact that the plant would be air-cooled instead of water-cooled. (See, e.g., R. 4143-46.) 
Further, at the September 11 meeting, Plaintiffs provided PacifiCorp with at least 
two volumes of information they deemed confidential relative to their proposed plant 
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development. (Second Amended Complaint (SAC) f 26, R. 765; Thurgood Dep. at 300-
01, 323, R. 10116-18; T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 172, 180-83, R. 9711-15; Graeber Dep. at 
328-29, R. 9760-61; L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 222-24, R. 9712 ; R vol. 6, Exhibits G, L 
(sealed).) These volumes detailed Plaintiffs' development of the Spring Canyon project 
concept over the preceding two years, including "proprietary details of the power plant 
design, source of water, cooling technology, turbine design, fuel sources and electric 
transmission path, as well as engineering drawings of site plans and elevation drawings 
for critical plant components." (SAC f 26, R. 765.) Volume II of the information con-
tained Plaintiffs' option agreements with Mr. Keyte and Mr. Garrett. (See Thurgood 
Dep. at 326, R. 10119; R. vol. 6, Ex. G (sealed) at 235-248, 257-270.) The Keyte and 
Garrett Agreements specified the purchase price for the water rights and the option fees 
for the water rights to be paid by Plaintiffs. (Id.) Volume II also contained the water 
letter, which set forth the purchase price for the water rights and the option fees, and the 
due diligence memoranda. (See Thurgood Dep. at R. 10120-23; R. vol. 6, Ex. G (sealed) 
at 191-194, 197-203,217-221.) 
According to Plaintiffs themselves, the information they provided to PacifiCorp 
included the following: 
(1) the exact site of the power plant, (2) the source of the fuel, (3) the 
method of combustion, (4) the air-cooling technology, (5) the trans-
mission path of the fuel arriving at the plant and the electricity leaving the 
plant, (6) the source and negotiated price of land and water rights, 
(7) the build-out design of the plant, including engineering drawings of 
the turbines, transformers and generators, (8) the estimated costs to 
develop, construct and operate the plant, (9) the pro forma economic pro-
jections of the completed project, and (10) the level of community 
tolerance for such an intensive industrial use. 
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(SAC 1 83, R. 779-80 (emphasis added).) 
Between August 2002 and mid-February 2003, Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp had 
several conversations, both by telephone and in person, and Plaintiffs sent PacifiCorp 
drafts of proposed agreements. (See, e.g., SAC ffi[ 23, 27, 35-36, 38, R. 764-68.) As she 
had indicated, Ms. Williams did not represent or advise Plaintiffs in any negotiations with 
PacifiCorp, nor PacifiCorp in negotiations with Plaintiffs. (Williams Supp. Aff., Add. 
Ex. 5, If 4, R. 24/8297.) 
On February 27, 2003, PacifiCorp sent Plaintiffs a nonbinding expression of 
interest in purchasing the Spring Canyon assets for $2 million. (R. 24/8202-06.) Plain-
tiffs countered PacifiCorp's offer with an offer to sell the assets for $6.5 million. (R. 
24/8407-08.) Negotiations continued for a few weeks,6 but on March 19, 2003, Pacifi-
Corp met with UDEQ to discuss, among other things, whether PacifiCorp could use 
Plaintiffs' minor air permit on the real property it had acquired from Panda next to the 
Mona substation. (Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Rand Thurgood at 29-34, R. 24/8397-98.) 
At that meeting PacifiCorp learned from UDEQ that it could not use Plaintiffs' minor air 
permit, which was for a plant only half the capacity PacifiCorp was seeking and based on 
a location three-fourths of a mile from the Panda site. (Id.) Based on this, and based on 
PacifiCorp's determination that (i) it had already acquired from Panda the key assets, i.e., 
6
 Plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp subsequently countered with a $3 million offer 
and the potential of a long term consulting agreement. PacifiCorp denies doing so. 
Plaintiffs also claim they agreed to PacifiCorp's $3 million offer to buy the Spring 
Canyon assets on March 14, 2003. However, Plaintiffs do not contend in this action that 
PacifiCorp breached any agreement to purchase assets from them. 
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the land next to the Mona substation, the air quality monitoring data, and the related 
information, (ii) Plaintiffs wanted too much money, and (iii) Plaintiffs' 40-acre site was 
too small, PacifiCorp determined to withdraw from discussions with Plaintiffs over the 
purchase of the Spring Canyon assets. (Id. at 29-30.) Accordingly, on March 30, 2003, 
PacifiCorp notified Plaintiffs that "PacifiCorp has decided for our own business reasons 
that we will no longer continue discussions with you on the possible purchase of your 
Spring Canyon, LLC project and that we will not enter into an agreement concerning that 
potential purchase with USA Power Partners." (Thurgood E-Mail, R. 24/8409.) Pacifi-
Corp also indicated, however, that it welcomed a response from Plaintiffs on a Request 
for Proposals that was in the works. (Id.) 
D. The RFP Process, the Next Best Alternative (NBA), and PacifiCorp s Decision 
to Build the Currant Creek Plant. 
PacifiCorp's need to go through a regulatory "Request for Proposal" (RFP) pro-
cess to obtain approval for a power purchase agreement was apparent no later than 
February 2003. (Deposition of Stacey Kusters at R. 24/8413-14.) On March 21, 2003, 
PacifiCorp conducted a workshop for potential bidders to the RFP. Plaintiffs' principals 
attended this workshop. (T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 301, R. 24/8178; see RFP Workshop 
Slides, R. 24/8415-36.) On June 6, 2003, PacifiCorp issued RFP 2003-A seeking bids for 
power in several different categories (delivery periods) through PacifiCorp's eastern con-
trol area, including through PacifiCorp's Mona substation. (R. 24/8444-70.) 
7
 The statutes and regulations presently governing the RFP process are at Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 54-17-201 et seq. and Utah Admin R. 746-420. 
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In connection with the RFP process, PacifiCorp notified bidders that their offers 
would be compared against a cost-based self-build alternative to be developed by Pacifi-
Corp, known as a "Next Best Alternative" ("NBA"). (RFP at R. 24/8455; SAC f 69, R. 
776.) An NBA is not a true "plan" for a power plant, but rather a set of cost and pro-
duction estimates, used to help PacifiCorp (and the regulators) assess whether the public 
interest would be better served by PacifiCorp building its own plant instead of buying 
either a plant or power from a bidder. (See generally Thurgood Dep. at 146-48, R. 
24/8335; Deposition of Mark Tallman at 111-16, R. 24/8440-41.) As the basis for the 
NBA, PacifiCorp projected the costs and benefits of building a plant on the site Pacifi-
Corp had acquired from Panda. (See Tallman Dep. at 111-13, R. 24/8440.) In April 
2003, PacifiCorp contracted with Shaw/Stone & Webster to perform a detailed project 
cost analysis for the contemplated alternative, which was to become Currant Creek. 
Shaw/Stone & Webster had recently designed and built a very similar plant, Apex I, in 
Las Vegas, Nevada. Shaw/Stone & Webster submitted its project cost analysis to Pacifi-
Corp on June 9, 2003. (Affidavit of Mark Green ffif 9-11, R. 24/8392-93.) PacifiCorp 
used that analysis, plus information gathered from third party vendors and from Pacifi-
Corp's own experience, to prepare the cost estimates for its NBA. (Deposition of Ian 
Andrews at R. 9446-50.) The NBA was finalized in late July 2003 and was reviewed by 
Navigant Consulting, the Independent Evaluator retained for the RFP. (Id at R. 9450.) 
PacifiCorp received approximately one hundred bids in response to the RFP, from 
thirty-seven bidders. (PSC Report, Add. Ex. 6, at R. 25/8413-15.) Plaintiffs submitted 
four bids in two separate categories. (R. 25/8178.) By August 2003, PacifiCorp deter-
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mined that none of the bids were more economic than PacifiCorp's NBA. (Deposition of 
James Schroeder at 43, R. 25/8176; Navigant Report at 42-43, R. 8495.2-8496; PSC 
Report at R. 25/8415.) Navigant9s final report lists the final ranking relative to the NBA 
of the various bids submitted. (Navigant Report at 42-43, Add. Ex. 7, R. 24/8495.2-
8496.)8 Plaintiffs' highest ranked bid, Bid 135, came in fourth among the outside bids. 
Accordingly, PacifiCorp decided to build the Currant Creek plant. PacifiCorp's 
Board of Directors approved construction on September 22, 2003. (Thurgood 30(b)(6) 
Dep. at 154-56, R. 24/8400.) On November 3, 2003, PacifiCorp filed an application with 
the Utah Public Service Commission for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Neces-
sity for the Currant Creek plant. (SAC f 69, R. 776.) By November 7, 2003, Plaintiffs 
had hired Callister Nebeker & McCullough to represent them. (Graeber Dep. at 133-34, 
R. 24/8205; CN&M Engagement Letter, R. 25/8395-96.) On November 12, 2003, 
Plaintiffs intervened in PacifiCorp's CCN proceeding, claiming that its Spring Canyon 
project with its existing permits and rights was more economical and feasible than 
Currant Creek. (SAC 170, R. 776.) 
On March 5, 2004, over Plaintiffs' strenuous opposition, the Utah Public Service 
Commission granted PacifiCorp a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for 
the Currant Creek plant. (Id, 11 71; PSC Report, Add. Ex. 6, at R. 25/8397-8424.) 
Rejecting Plaintiffs' allegation that "the bid evaluation process was unfair" and that 
8
 Plaintiffs' best-placed bid (Bid 135) came in behind Bids 401, 122, and 301. 
Because the Navigant Report is confidential and was filed under seal, the identity of the 
higher ranking bidders is not disclosed. However, redacted portions of the Report, 
including "Table J, Peaker Bid Category, Final Ranking Relative to NBA," are provided 
in Addendum Exhibit 7. 
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PacifiCorp "did not negotiate in good faith," the PSC noted that Plaintiffs were "the only 
one of thirty seven [bidders] who complained about the process." (R. 25/8407, 8422.) 
The PSC agreed with Division of Public Utilities that "the RFP process was fair and con-
sistent and managed in a matter that led to unassailable results." (R. 25/8406, 8418.) The 
PSC further concluded that "review of the alternative actions discussed above [including 
Spring Canyon] shows no better alternative at the present time than proceeding with 
building [the Currant Creek plant]." (R. 25/8423.) 
Ms. Williams was not involved in PacifiCorp's decision to conduct RFP 2003-A, 
in evaluating the bids received in response to RFP 2003-A, in PacifiCorp's decision to 
build Currant Creek, or in PacifiCorp's decision to seek approval from the PSC to do so. 
(Williams Supp. Aff., Add. Ex. 5, f 5, R. 24/8297.) Similarly, Mr. Thurgood was not 
involved in the RFP process. (Thurgood Dep. at 142-46, R. 24/8334-35.) 
E. Ms. Williams' and Holme Roberts' Representation of PacifiCorp, and 
PacifiCorp's Purchase of Water Rights Through WW Ranches. 
As noted above, Mr. Thurgood was responsible for developing the NBA to be 
used as part of the RFP process. Accordingly, in March 2003, after Ms. Williams had 
completed her work for Plaintiffs, Mr. Thurgood contacted "our water attorney," Ms. 
Williams, and asked her to help PacifiCorp evaluate and handle a proposed water rights 
purchase from Geneva Steel. (Thurgood Dep. at 209-12, R. 24/8336; Williams Dep. at 
147-50, R. 24/8322-23; Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2, % 23, R. 9819-20.) Mr. Thurgood had 
known Ms. Williams for "many years," through her prior employment at PacifiCorp. 
(Thurgood Dep. at 209-10, R. 24/8336.) Mr. Thurgood was aware, through his dealings 
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with the Plaintiffs, that Ms. Williams had previously helped Plaintiffs in connection with 
Spring Canyon, and she explained to him that she had no conflict of interest because her 
work for Plaintiffs was finished. (Williams Dep. at 148, R. 24/8322; Thurgood Dep. at 
216-19, R. 10109-112; Williams Aff. f 23.) Other than telling Mr. Thurgood that her 
work for Plaintiffs was complete, Ms. Williams did not discuss any aspect of Plaintiffs' 
project with Mr. Thurgood. (Thurgood Dep. at 218, R. 10111; Williams Dep. at 175, R. 
10101; Williams Aff4 23.)9 
When PacifiCorp retained Holme Roberts in March 2003, PacifiCorp's Assistant 
General Counsel, Michael G. Jenkins, was familiar with several other law firms and attor-
neys with water law expertise. If Ms. Williams had been unable to assist PacifiCorp, Mr. 
Jenkins was prepared to contact other Utah attorneys who he believed were "equally 
capable of assisting PacifiCorp with that assignment." (Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins 
1ffl 2-3, R. 25/8426.) PacifiCorp was clearly intent on acquiring water: In April 2003, 
PacifiCorp committed up to $16.2 million for water rights for a possible plant. (See 
Williams Dep. at 278-79, R. 2577-78; PacifiCorp Meeting Agenda, R. 25/8428.) Steven 
E. Clyde, Holme Roberts' expert witness, testified below that PacifiCorp did not obtain a 
competitive advantage by hiring Ms. Williams as its attorney. (Clyde Aff, Add. Ex. 3, at 
R. 8495.) Significantly, Plaintiffs presented no evidence below controverting Mr. 
Clyde's testimony. 
9
 Because PacifiCorp was looking at a possible acquisition from Geneva Steel, Ms. 
Williams had a conflicts check done to ensure that she and Holme Roberts had no con-
flict with Geneva Steel. (See Williams Dep. at 151-53, R. 24/8323.) She did not run a 
conflicts check with Plaintiffs because her work for them was complete and they were not 
involved in the transactions PacifiCorp was contemplating. (LI at 151.) 
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The proposed deal between PacifiCorp and Geneva Steel did not come to fruition, 
so over the next few months, Ms. Williams reviewed various potential sources of water 
rights for PacifiCorp. Her review did not include water rights belonging to Mr. Keyte or 
Mr. Garrett, however. (Williams Aff. 125, R. 9820.) 
In late July 2003, Williams became aware of a potential water rights source 
through WW Ranches, LLC ("WW Ranches"). (14127.) WW Ranches is a water right 
acquisition and sale business co-owned by Marc Wangsgard and Bill White, two experi-
enced Utah water lawyers, that deals in water rights primarily in Salt Lake County, 
Wasatch County, and Utah County. (Id f 26; Affidavit of Marc Wangsgard, Add. Ex. 8, 
fflf 2-4, 8, R. 10294.) WW Ranches' specialty was acquiring water from one location and 
changing the use and location of the water right to make it more valuable. (Wangsgard 
Aff. f 5.) Ms. Williams, who had previously worked with both Mr. Wangsgard and Mr. 
White, knew that they were in the business of buying and selling water rights and 
informed them that PacifiCorp needed water for a potential power plant at the Juab 
County site. (Wangsgard Aff. 1f 7; Williams Aff. f 27.) She left it up to WW Ranches to 
figure out how to supply the water PacifiCorp needed. (Wangsgard Aff. f 7.) 
WW Ranches came up with the idea of taking water rights originating in a dif-
ferent county, a different water right area, and from a different source, and changing the 
diversion point, place of use, and nature of use of those water rights to enable the water to 
be used at PacifiCorp's Mona location. (Wangsgard Aff., Add. Ex. 8, If 10, R. 10295; 
Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2, ffi[ 28-29, R. 9820-21.) Mr. Wangsgard and Mr. White had 
previously accomplished numerous similar transactions. (Wangsgard Aff. f 10.) Accor-
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dingly, on August 6, 2003, Mr. Wangsgard sent Ms. Williams a proposal to sell water to 
PacifiCorp for consumptive power generation use. (Williams Aff. % 28; Wangsgard Aff. 
19.) Ms. Williams had no role in coming up with WW Ranches' idea or in finding the 
water rights WW Ranches sold to PacifiCorp. (Wangsgard Aff. Tf 10.) 
On September 2, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered into a Water Rights 
Purchase Agreement. (Wangsgard Aff. f 12, R. 10295.) The agreement contemplated 
that WW Ranches would sell PacifiCorp 400 acre feet worth of shares in two mutual 
water companies (MWCs) with rights to water in and around Utah Lake. (Agreement 
(Wangsgard Aff. Ex. A), R. 10297-309; Clyde Aff., Add. Ex. 3, at R. 25/8490; Wangs-
gard Aff. }^ 25.) The MWCs had been taking the water from downstream locations and 
using it for irrigation in Salt Lake County and Utah County; the State Engineer therefore 
had to approve PacifiCorp's request to use the water at the Mona site. (Clyde Aff. at R. 
25/8490-91.) As part of the agreement, WW Ranches was required to obtain this appro-
val. (Agreement ffi[ 3-4, R. 10299-301.) Mr. Wangsgard and Mr. White - not Ms. 
Williams - handled the change application process for PacifiCorp, including representing 
the applicants before the State Engineer. (Thurgood Dep. at 235, R. 24/8337; Clyde Aff. 
at R. 25/8492.) Mr. White and Mr. Wangsgard were fully competent to handle this 
transaction. Once again, Mr. Clyde testified - without contradiction - that Mr. White and 
Mr. Wangsgard did not need Ms. Williams' assistance to obtain the necessary approvals. 
(Clyde Aff. at R. 25/8495.) 
WW Ranches set the price for the water rights it sold to PacifiCorp. (Williams 
Aff., Add. Ex. 2, f 30, R. 9821; Wangsgard Aff., Add. Ex. 8, ^  13, R. 10295.) That price 
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was not based on any information provided by Holme Roberts or Ms. Williams. (Wangs-
gard Aff. |^ 14.) Instead, the price was based on the price WW Ranches had paid for the 
water rights, how long it had held the rights, how risky the transaction was, the oppor-
tunity to market the water elsewhere, and what the market would bear. (Id. | 13.) Ms. 
Williams never even discussed with WW Ranches the price Plaintiffs had agreed to pay 
for their water rights (or any other aspect of Plaintiffs' agreements with Mr. Keyte and 
Mr. Garrett). Nor did Williams ever seek to acquire water rights for PacifiCorp from Mr. 
Keyte or Mr. Garrett. (Id If 15, R. 10296; Williams Aff. ffif 30-31, R. 9821.) 
On April 26, 2004, PacifiCorp and WW Ranches closed the purchase of Pacifi-
Corp's acquisition of stock in the two MWCs, which then gave it the right to use water 
owned by those companies. (Williams Supp. Aff, Add. Ex. 5, f 6, R. 24/8297.) Because 
these companies' rights were to water downstream from Mona, and because PacifiCorp's 
change application was junior in time to Plaintiffs', PacifiCorp's purchase had no impact 
on Plaintiffs' rights. (Id 1f 7; Wangsgard Aff. ffi[ 13-15, R. 10295-96; Clyde Aff. at R. 
25/8493-95.) The water rights options Plaintiffs acquired from Keyte and Garrett were 
not pertinent to, and had nothing to do with, the MWC stock PacifiCorp bought from 
WW Ranches. (Williams Supp. Aff. f 8; Clyde Aff. at R. 25/8491-95.) 
Neither Ms. Williams nor anyone else at Holme Roberts advised PacifiCorp regar-
ding any aspect of the Currant Creek project other than with respect to its water rights 
acquisition. (Williams Supp. Aff. f 9, R. 24/8298.) Similarly, neither Ms. Williams nor 
anyone else at Holme Roberts advised PacifiCorp concerning any potential transaction 
with Plaintiffs. (IdL TI10.) 
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F. Market Forces Doom Plaintiffs' Project. 
As of October 2002, Plaintiffs had substantially completed development of their 
Spring Canyon Project site. (Deposition of Carl Anderson at 51, 57, R. 25/8501-02; T. 
Banasiewicz Dep. at 559, R. 24/8188.) By this time, however, the power industry had 
just undergone a twenty percent (20%) expansion in existing generating capacity, resul-
ting in a steep decline in power prices. (Expert Report of John J. Reed, R. 25/8515; see 
generally id. at R. 25/8514-20.) As a result, many existing plants were unable to cover 
their debt service requirements and other fixed costs. (LI at R. 25/8516.) This, coupled 
with the Enron scandal and the state of the overall economy, forced many generators to 
respond to collateral calls, resulting in a severe tightening of capital markets and hesitan-
cy to lend to independent power producers. (Id.) The fallout from this sudden market 
downturn and lack of financing was that numerous projects were canceled or postponed. 
(Id. at R. 25/8517.) The combination of market forces, credit concerns, and lack of 
financing forced many power project developers to seek bankruptcy protection between 
2002 and 2004, including Enron, NRG, Morant, and PG&E. (WL at R. 25/8518-19.) 
Others took substantial debt restructuring actions, including AES, Reliant, Dinergy, 
Aquilla, Calpine, and the Williams Companies. (Id.) 
During this time period, the market was highly competitive, distressed, turbulent, 
and ripe with experienced, well-capitalized developers, many of which failed and lost 
millions, if not billions, of dollars. (Id. at R. 25/8519-20.) Numerous proposed projects 
were never developed, many projects underway were canceled, and many projects that 
were completed were not profitable. (Id.) The viability of the Spring Canyon Project 
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was directly and adversely affected by these market conditions. (Id; Graeber Letter, R. 
25/8540-41; Graeber E-Mail, R. 25/8542.) 
As noted above, Plaintiffs did not intend to sell either a power plant or power to 
PacifiCorp. Rather, Plaintiffs' original plan was to sell the Spring Canyon Project assets 
to one or more independent power non-investor owned utilities or non-regulated sub-
sidiary of an investor utility; i.e.: a merchant power company. (Graeber Dep. at 65-66, 
200, R. 24/8202, 8206.) Yet, those were the very types of companies that were most ad-
versely impacted by the adverse market conditions. (Reed Report, R. 25/8514-20.) 
Plaintiffs unsuccessfully marketed their Spring Canyon Project assets to numerous com-
panies. (Mgmt. Report., R. 25/8544-45; T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 641-43, R. 24/8197.) 
The Plaintiffs' business plan carried many risks, including the need for financing. 
(T. Banasiewicz Dep. at R. 24/8182-83.) In fact, except for financing, Plaintiffs had all 
the permits and governmental approvals needed to construct their proposed plant. (Id at 
878-79, R. 24/8198.) By March 2003, however, Plaintiffs had exhausted their operating 
funds. (L. Banasiewicz Dep. at 98-99, R. 24/8410.) Plaintiffs' principal David Graeber 
wrote to their money partner, Sooner Power Partners, that "USA could not have predicted 
this scenario that we find ourselves in when we began the project. I'm sure many com-
panies in North America could not have predicted the paradigm shifts in their respective 
industries over the past two years as well." (Graeber Letter, R. 25/8541.) 
In May 2003, Mr. Graeber admitted that "Ted and I have been in a defensive posi-
tion on the Utah project for some time because the power markets are non-directional in 
the Western United States as a result of the California fiasco. Who could have predicted 
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the fallout of that mess? While power reserves are still inadequate, all of the traditional 
'markers' that the power industry used in the past to determine what is good and what is 
not good have been deemed unreliable. Many major companies in the power world that 
previously could do no wrong have lost their balance sheets as well. That is no excuse 
for our ventures' difficulties. Poor timing for sure. Suffice to say that companies such as 
Calpine, Shell, El Paso, GE, Seamons, PacifiCorp, PG & E, Duke ... I could go on and on 
... had not interpreted the 'markers' to their advantage, either. No excuses, just the hard 
reality. 20/20 hind-site [sic] would surely have kept me from losing my cash, and my 
valuable time for other ventures as well." (Graeber E-Mail, R. 25/8542.) 
On August 16, 2005, in a proceeding before the PSC between PacifiCorp and 
Plaintiffs regarding a potential qualified facility contract, Mr. Graeber testified con-
cerning the adversity between Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp and stated that "Williams had 
very little to do with whether we were awarded the contract." (See PSC Hearing 
Transcript at 100, R. 25/8548.) 
G, This Litigation. 
After the market for power production crashed, and Plaintiffs ultimately were 
unable to persuade PacifiCorp or any other utility or power supply company to purchase 
either the Spring Canyon assets or power to be generated at Spring Canyon, Plaintiffs did 
the next best thing - they sued their lawyers. (Complaint, R. 1-21.) Plaintiffs claimed, 
without citing any evidence, that Williams and Holme Roberts communicated confiden-
tial information to PacifiCorp and otherwise breached their duties of loyalty, causing 
$250,000,000 in damages. (SAC Tj 104, R. 783-84.) Count Four of the Second Amended 
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Complaint purports to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. (SAC ffl[ 100-05, R. 
783-84.) Count Five alleges that Williams and Holme Roberts breached their duty of 
confidentiality by "disclosing to PacifiCorp, or using or disclosing on behalf of Pacifi-
Corp, confidential proprietary information of [Plaintiffs], including the terms of water 
agreements negotiated in Juab County on behalf of [Plaintiffs]." (SAC % 108, R. 784.) 
After unsuccessfully negotiating with PacifiCorp into mid-2005 for a smaller 
power supply contract, Plaintiffs added PacifiCorp to this action, asserting claims against 
PacifiCorp for misappropriation of trade secrets; breach of a Confidentiality Agreement 
the parties had signed during their negotiations; and related claims. (SAC fflj 82-99, 112-
22, R. 779-82, 785-87.) 
On January 30, 2007, Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts moved for partial sum-
mary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for misuse of confidential information, asking the 
Court to dismiss Count Five in its entirety and the portion of Count Four that was based 
on the alleged misuse of such information. (R. 1690A-1690B.) The moving parties 
pointed out that Plaintiffs' claim failed as a matter of law because Plaintiffs were unable 
to satisfy the elements of such a claim as set forth in three recent Utah cases addressing 
such claims: Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998); 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding (Kilpatrick ID, 2001 UT 107, 37 P.3d 1130; Shaw 
Resources Ltd. v. Pruitt Gushee & Bachtell 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 560. ([Holme 
Roberts'] Mem. Supp. Mot. for Partial Summ. J. Re Conf. Info. ("HRO Mem. (Confiden-
tiality)" at R. 1690S-T.) Specifically, Plaintiffs were unable to identify any confidential 
information that the movants had obtained from Plaintiffs, other than the terms of the 
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Keyte and Garrett water right option agreements, and the undisputed evidence showed 
that the movants had not "actually communicated" any confidential information to 
PacifiCorp. (Id atR. 1690T-Z.) 
Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts also moved for summary judgment on the 
remainder of Plaintiffs' claim for breach of loyalty (Count Four). (R. 4392-93.) They 
argued that as a matter of law, they had not breached the duty of loyalty because, among 
other things, their representation of Plaintiffs had been completed before they began 
representing PacifiCorp, and the representation of PacifiCorp - limited to helping 
PacifiCorp find water - did not involve a substantially related matter. ([Holme Roberts'] 
Memo. Supp. Motion for Partial Summ. J. Re Loyalty Claim ("HRO Mem. (Loyalty)"), 
R. 4107-4116.) Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts also pointed out that Plaintiffs could 
not prove that they suffered any harm as a result of any alleged breach, since (1) the 
evidence was undisputed that Holme Roberts' services to PacifiCorp were routine and 
that PacifiCorp did not derive any particular benefit from being represented Holme 
Roberts as opposed to any other law firm in Utah, and (2) Plaintiffs could not show that 
Holme Roberts' representation of PacifiCorp contributed to Plaintiffs' inability to sell the 
Spring Canyon Project. (Id at R. 4116-22.) 
In response to Ms. Williams' and Holme Roberts' motions, Plaintiffs adopted a 
strategy of obfuscation and misdirection. For example, Plaintiffs purported to "dispute" 
every single fact presented in the first motion (confidentiality). (Oppo. to [Holme 
Roberts'] Mot. for Partial Summ. J. re Conf. Info., R. 3931-72.) Plaintiffs even disputed 
facts that were taken nearly verbatim from Plaintiffs' own pleading. (See, e.g., id. at R. 
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3934 (disputing Holme Roberts Fact 4; compare with SAC f 4, R. 760.) In responding to 
the fact section of the second motion (loyalty), Plaintiffs submitted 48 pages of argument 
and mischaracterization - plus another 36 repetitive pages of their own version of the 
story, using the same tactics. (R. 5697-5782.) In all, Plaintiffs submitted over 170 pages 
of argument in response to the motions, in addition to a foot-high stack of deposition 
transcripts, affidavits, and documents. 
H. The Trial Court's Ruling. 
Judge Medley, however, was not cowed by Plaintiffs' attempts to bury him in 
paper. So, on October 15, 2007, after slogging through the hundreds of pages of the 
record, and sitting through more than a full day of oral argument, he issued a thorough 
and well-reasoned opinion granting the defendants' motions, almost in their entirety. 
(Memorandum Decision, Add. Ex. 1 hereto, R. 7599-7624.) The court unequivocally 
held that despite their desperate efforts, the Plaintiffs "have not identified any evidence 
which would support a reasonable inference that HRO used or disclosed confidential 
information. Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere argument based on speculation 
and conclusory assertions, without any material factual support." (Id at R. 7618-19.) 
Similarly, regarding Plaintiffs' claim for breach of the duty of loyalty, the court 
held that "the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could infer causation and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs." (Id. at R. 7620.) The 
court further explained that there was a "complete absence of evidence" that Holme 
Roberts' representation of PacifiCorp contributed to PacifiCorp's decision to decline to 
purchase the Spring Canyon assets or accept Plaintiffs' RFP bids: 
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Clearly, these scenarios are highly speculative and are based on conjecture 
that HRO's representation influenced PacifiCorp's decision with respect to 
its negotiations with the plaintiffs or affected the outcome and decision-
making process involved in the RFP. Each of the plaintiffs' scenarios of 
what could have been is based entirely on speculation unsupported by any 
record evidence. 
(Id. at R. 7620-21.) Judge Medley further noted that the undisputed facts established that 
"Holme Roberts' representation was not necessary for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights 
based upon the availability of equally capable water rights lawyers in Salt Lake City and 
PacifiCorp's budget commitment of $16.2 million for water rights in connection with the 
Currant Creek Power Plant." (Id at R. 7621.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly rejected Plaintiffs' attempt to blame Holme Roberts for 
the failure of Plaintiffs' Spring Canyon project. The evidence shows that Ms. Williams is 
a water lawyer, not a general power plant development lawyer. She helped one client 
find water and did a few other related tasks. Then, after those tasks were done, she 
helped a different client find water in a different area. This is not a tort, nor did it have 
any bearing on Plaintiffs' inability to profit from Spring Canyon. 
The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiffs failed to present evidence contro-
verting Ms. Williams' and Mr. Vuyovich's testimony that they kept Plaintiffs' informa-
tion confidential. Utah courts have clearly established that claims against attorneys must 
be based on actual evidence. See, e.g., Kilpatrick IL 2001 UT 107, f 68, 37 P.3d at 1144. 
Yet Plaintiffs' claims are based on nothing more than mere speculation. Plaintiffs insist 
that they have "direct evidence" that Holme Roberts misused confidential information, 
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but a review of that purported evidence shows that it does not support Plaintiffs' claims 
whatsoever. Plaintiffs also claim to have circumstantial evidence of such misuse, but 
again, this evidence (to the extent Plaintiffs even describe it accurately) is woefully 
insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Ms. Williams or Holme Roberts 
breached their duties to Plaintiffs. At best, this "circumstantial evidence" merely shows 
that PacifiCorp was aware of the general price of water in Juab County, and Plaintiffs 
have not even shown that this information is confidential, let alone that PacifiCorp must 
have obtained it from Holme Roberts. 
The Court can also reject Plaintiffs' argument that the trial court applied the 
incorrect legal standard by supposedly refusing to consider circumstantial evidence. 
Even a cursory reading of the Memorandum Decision reveals that the trial court was per-
fectly willing to consider circumstantial evidence. The problem was that Plaintiffs didn't 
have any evidence for their claims, circumstantial or otherwise. 
Similarly, the Court can reject Plaintiffs' request to allow juries to "presume" - in 
the absence of any evidence whatsoever - that attorneys act dishonorably and tortiously, 
and should be exposed to massive civil liability, whenever they represent successive 
clients in tangentially related matters. Rather, the law in Utah (and most other states) is 
clear that for a plaintiff to recover damages against an attorney for disclosure of con-
fidential information, there must be actual evidence of such disclosure. It would be 
grossly improper and unfair for an attorney to have to go to trial on a claim for damages 
when the undisputed evidence shows that the attorney did not in fact breach his or her 
duty to the plaintiff. 
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The trial court also correctly granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for 
breach of the duty of loyalty. Once again, there is simply no evidence to support this 
claim; rather, the undisputed evidence shows that Holme Roberts completed its work for 
Plaintiffs, then helped PacifiCorp find water - from a different source. The water rights 
PacifiCorp ultimately obtained (primarily through the efforts of WW Ranches, not Holme 
Roberts) did not conflict with, or otherwise affect, Plaintiffs' water rights options, and 
because of the stark differences between the types of water rights, the sources involved, 
and the location of use, information about Plaintiffs' water rights was not relevant to 
Holme Roberts' work for PacifiCorp. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs had no evidence that Holme Roberts' representation of Pacifi-
Corp harmed Plaintiffs in any way. Ms. Williams is good at what she does, but she was 
not the only good water lawyer around, and the evidence is undisputed that PacifiCorp 
easily could have and would have obtained water for its plant even if Ms. Williams had 
declined the representation (which was not ethically required). And finally, Plaintiffs 
simply have no evidence that Ms. Williams' work for PacifiCorp had any effect whatso-
ever on Plaintiffs' ability to market their Spring Canyon project. Rather, the evidence is 
undisputed that Ms. Williams had nothing to do with PacifiCorp's decision to use the 
RFP process instead of buying the Spring Canyon assets or PacifiCorp's choice to pursue 
the NBA instead of any of the RFP bids. And because Plaintiffs' bid ranked fourth in the 
RFP process among outside bidders, Plaintiffs cannot show that they would have pre-




THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY. 
Utah's appellate courts have issued three opinions in the recent past directly 
addressing claims for attorney misuse of confidential information: Gildea v. Guardian 
Title, 970 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1998); Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 2001 UT 107, 37 
P.3d 1130 (Kilpatrick II10); and, most recently, Shaw Resources Ltd. v. Pruitt Gushee & 
Bachtell. 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 560. These cases establish that to get to a jury on 
such a claim, a plaintiff must present admissible evidence that (1) the information was 
confidential and material; (2) the attorney obtained the information through its repre-
sentation; (3) (a) the attorney "actually communicated confidential information" to others 
who used the information, or (b) the attorney used the confidential information for 
another's benefit; and (4) if the attorney or other party had not misused the information, 
the plaintiff would have benefited.11 To show that the attorney communicated the con-
fidential information to a second client, the plaintiff must present evidence that the sec-
Two opinions were issued in the Kilpatrick case. See also Kilpatrick v. Wiley 
Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996) (Kilpatrick I). 
11
 For Element 1, see Kilpatrick II, 2001 UT 107, f 68, 37 P.3d at 1144; Shaw 
Resources, 2006 UT App 313, ^29, 142 P.3d at 567. For Element 2, see Shaw 
Resources. \ 29, 142 P.3d at 567 (citing Gildea, 970 P.2d at 1270). For Element 3, see 
Kilpatrick II. If 68, 37 P.3d at 1144; Gildea. 970 P.2d at 1270; Shaw Resources. \ 39, 142 
P.3d at 568. For Element 4, see Shaw Resources. f 46, 142 P.3d at 569 (quoting 
Kilpatrick I. 909 P.2d at 1291). 
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ond client had information "that only could have come from [the plaintiff]." Kilpatrick II 
f 68, 37 P.3d at 1144; see also Gildea, 970 P.2d at 1270. 
Thus, a claim against an attorney for misuse of confidential client information may 
not be based on mere speculation or unsubstantiated accusations. Further, such a claim 
may not be based on the mere allegation that an attorney represented two clients in the 
same industry, or that the attorney obtained confidential information from one client that 
would have been useful for the other. In short, a claim may not be based on what an 
attorney could have done with a client's confidential information; instead, a valid claim 
requires evidence of what the attorney actually did with such information. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs because the 
Plaintiffs did not even come close to furnishing evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements 
of their claims against Holme Roberts. 
A. Plaintiffs have not controverted Holme Roberts' testimony that its attorneys 
kept all information pertaining to Plaintiffs' water rights confidential. 
Holme Roberts submitted evidence below, including sworn deposition and affi-
davit testimony from Ms. Williams, Mr. Vuyovich, and Mr. Rawson, that all information 
pertaining to Holme Roberts' representation of Plaintiffs was kept confidential, was not 
disclosed to PacifiCorp, and was not used in Holme Roberts' subsequent work for 
PacifiCorp. (See R. 9820, 9844, 10093, 10096.)12 Accordingly, to raise a genuine issue 
12
 Because Holme Roberts' motion is supported by affirmative evidence, the 
Court's discussion in Orvis v. Johnson about burden-shifting and the applicability of the 
Celotex approach does not apply. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ffif 7-19, 177 P.3d 
600, 602-05. See also Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, % 53 (January 16, 
2009) (holding that moving defendant satisfied its initial burden under Rule 56 when it 
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of material fact sufficient to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs were required to present 
testimony or evidence that Holme Roberts actually did misuse or disclose Plaintiffs' 
confidential information. 
Plaintiffs appear to be claiming that they raised a genuine issue of fact regarding 
two categories of confidential information: the price Plaintiffs paid for their own water 
rights options, and information about the market for water rights in Juab County (i.e., the 
identity of potential sellers of water rights and the price range at which water was 
available). (See Opening Br. at 67-68.) Plaintiffs are wrong on both accounts. 
1. Plaintiffs did not present evidence that Holme Roberts misused 
or disclosed information about the price Plaintiffs paid for their 
water rights. 
(a) No direct evidence. 
In their brief, Plaintiffs claim that they presented to the trial court "direct 
evidence" that Ms. Williams, "in February 2003, disclosed to PacifiCorp the confidential 
purchase price USA Power paid for its water rights [among other things]." (See Opening 
Br. at 68.) To support this statement, Plaintiffs cite five passages from the appellate 
"asserted that [the non-movant plaintiff] had not demonstrated that he suffered damages -
an essential element of his fraudulent inducement claim - and therefore, there was no 
issue of material fact on the question of damages."). 
13
 Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint alleged only that Holme Roberts 
misused or disclosed "confidential proprietary information of USA Power, including the 
terms of water agreements negotiated in Juab County on behalf of USA Power." (SAC 
If 108, R. 784.) In opposing Holme Roberts' summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs did 
not identify any specific information they claim was misused; instead, they claimed that 
Ms. Williams "learned and advised USA Power about every stage of the entire power 
plant project." (Pis.' Oppo. Mem. (Confidentiality) atR. 3978.) 
On appeal, Plaintiffs are once again limiting their claim against Holme Roberts to 
misuse/disclose of water-related information. (See, e.g., Opening Br. at 68-69, 71-72.) 
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record: R. 2280-81; 2890; 7121-23; 7137; and 8167 at 29-34. The Court should flatly 
reject this argument, for two main reasons. 
First, the Court should not even consider Plaintiffs' argument about direct evi-
dence because Plaintiffs did not claim below that they had direct evidence that Ms. Wil-
liams or Holme Roberts disclosed Plaintiffs' purchase price to PacifiCorp. Rather, 
Plaintiffs argued that they were not required to present direct evidence, and that their 
claim was supported by circumstantial evidence (which consisted only of Plaintiffs' 
unsupported allegations that Holme Roberts represented both Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp, 
that PacifiCorp's Currant Creek plant was the "same project" as Spring Canyon, and that 
PacifiCorp supposedly "developed its project in an impossibly short amount of time"). 
(See Pis.' Oppo. Mem. (Confidentiality) at R. 3980-85.) 
To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must adequately raise the issue below. 
Specifically, "a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue." Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1996). To meet this requirement, the issue 
must be "raised in a timely fashion," the issue must be "specifically raised," and the party 
must "introduce evidence or relevant legal authority." Id. Plaintiffs' failure to argue 
below that they had direct evidence of misuse of their confidential information, and thus 
their failure to let the trial court rule on that issue (or allow Holme Roberts to make a 
record in response), precludes their attempt to make that argument on appeal. 
Second, Plaintiffs' record citations simply do not reveal evidence of any misuse or 
disclosure of Plaintiffs' price information. 
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Pages 2280-81 of the record consist of testimony by Ted Banasiewicz, one of 
Plaintiffs' principals, that Michael Keyte told him that another water right owner told Mr. 
Keyte that PacifiCorp had offered to buy water from that other owner for the same price 
Plaintiffs had paid Mr. Keyte. (R. 2280-81.) Even if this were admissible (see below), 
this testimony would not be "direct evidence" of anything (except that PacifiCorp made a 
certain offer). Instead, it would have to be considered as circumstantial evidence. Even 
then, however, it is not circumstantial evidence that Holme Roberts disclosed Plaintiffs' 
purchase price to PacifiCorp, since there is no evidence that PacifiCorp's alleged offer to 
the other seller was based on PacifiCorp's knowledge of Plaintiffs' option price. Indeed, 
the evidence below was undisputed that "the market value of water rights is generally 
understood by everyone" (Clyde Aff, Add. Ex. 3, at R. 8494); as such, an offer 
consistent with market price would not be evidence of wrongdoing. Mr. Banasiewicz's 
testimony also does not support the inference that any knowledge by PacifiCorp of the 
price of Plaintiffs' water options would have come from Holme Roberts, since, as ex-
plained in more detail below, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs themselves disclosed to 
PacifiCorp the price they paid for their water rights options. 
At any rate, the cited testimony is inadmissible hearsay: Plaintiffs are relying on 
testimony by Mr. Banasiewicz about what he supposedly heard from Mr. Keyte, who was 
reporting what he had supposedly heard from the other seller. Both the other seller's 
statements to Mr. Keyte and Mr. Keyte's statements to Mr. Banasiewicz are out-of-court 
statements, being used to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that PacifiCorp made a 
certain offer to the other seller). Accordingly, Mr. Banasiewicz's testimony is inadmis-
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sible double hearsay.14 Utah R. Evid. 801, 802. Plaintiffs may not rely on that testimony 
to defeat summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (testimony "shall set forth such facts 
as would be admissible in evidence").15 
The remaining record citations likewise do not evidence disclosure or misuse. 
Page 2890 is a page from a PacifiCorp document that merely states that water in the area 
generally runs "at $4,000-$4,500 per acre foot." (R. 2890.) Once again, this is not direct 
evidence that Ms. Williams disclosed Plaintiffs' purchase price to PacifiCorp, since the 
document does not mention Plaintiffs or their water rights and there is no evidence that 
Ms. Williams prepared the document (PacifiCorp did). Similarly, Page 7137 does not 
mention Plaintiffs, their water sellers, or the price Plaintiffs paid for their water. (R. 
7137.) (Page 7137 is also inadmissible, since Plaintiffs have presented no testimony or 
other evidence authenticating the document or laying a foundation for its admission.) 
The remaining pages Plaintiffs cite are not evidence at all, but rather Plaintiffs' written 
and oral argument below. (R. 7121-23, 8167 at 29-34.) 
In short, there is no direct evidence that Ms. Williams or anyone else at Holme 
Roberts disclosed to PacifiCorp the price of Plaintiffs' water right options. 
Further, Mr. Banasiewicz's testimony gives no basis to determine whether 
PacifiCorp's alleged offer to the other seller was for a specific dollar amount, or whether 
PacifiCorp offered something like "We will pay the same price [Plaintiffs] paid Mr. 
Keyte." Nor does the testimony give a basis to determine who figured out that Pacifi-
Corp's offer matched Plaintiffs' purchase price. One of the purposes of the hearsay rule 
is to avoid reliance on statements by a person whose perceptions, memories, and descrip-
tions cannot be explored on cross-examination. See, e.g., 30 Wright & Graham, Fed. 
Prac. & Proc: Evidence § 6324 (1997) (discussing "hearsay dangers"). 
15
 Holme Roberts did not move to strike this testimony below because, as noted in 
the text, Plaintiffs did not argue in its memorandum below that this testimony was direct 
evidence of Holme Roberts' alleged misuse of Plaintiffs' confidential information. 
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(b) No circumstantial evidence. 
The Court can also reject Plaintiffs' argument that they submitted circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material as to whether Ms. Williams or 
Holme Roberts misused their knowledge of the option price. Plaintiffs assert that their 
circumstantial evidence showed the following: 
1. That Holme Roberts supposedly "simultaneously and adversely" repre-
sented both PacifiCorp and Plaintiffs; 
2. That Ms. Williams was supposedly a member of Plaintiffs' "development 
team" and then a member of PacifiCorp's "development team"; 
3. That PacifiCorp allegedly obtained its water rights "in 20% of the time that 
it took [Ms. Williams] to acquire the same volume of water rights" for 
Plaintiffs; 
4. That Ms. Williams purportedly testified that she "did not know whether she 
had disclosed confidential information to PacifiCorp"; 
5. That PacifiCorp hired Ms. Williams (who had represented PacifiCorp on 
numerous prior occasions) "without ever considering any other water law-
yer"; and 
6. That Holme Roberts did not inform Plaintiffs that she had begun to 
represent PacifiCorp. 
(See Opening Br. at 71-72.) Once again, Plaintiffs' argument goes well beyond their 
argument below and should be disregarded. And once again, Plaintiffs' argument fails: 
Points one and two fail because there was no simultaneous representation and Utah law is 
clear that neither simultaneous nor successive representation is enough to support an 
inference that the attorney misused confidential information. The remaining points are 
similarly insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Ms. Williams or Holme 
Roberts told PacifiCorp how much Plaintiffs had paid for their water rights. 
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(i) Holme Roberts' alleged "simultaneous representation" of 
Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp does not support an inference 
that Holme Roberts disclosed Plaintiffs1 water rights 
agreements. 
First, the evidence is undisputed that Holme Roberts did not simultaneously repre-
sent Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp: Holme Roberts completed its outstanding work for 
Plaintiffs when the change applications for the water rights were approved on January 22, 
2003. (Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2, \ 19, R. 9819; Williams Supp. Aff., Add. Ex. 5,1ffl 2-
3, R. 24/8297.) Holme Roberts did not begin to represent PacifiCorp until March 2003. 
(Williams Aff. 1J23, R. 9819-20; Thurgood Dep. at 209-12, R. 24/8336.) Although 
Plaintiffs repeatedly insist that Holme Roberts "continuously represented" Plaintiffs until 
November 2003, they cannot point to any evidence of ongoing work by Holme Roberts 
after January 22, 2003. Rather, the evidence is undisputed that after January 2003, 
Holme Roberts performed no work at all, except to answer Mr. Graeber's single, isolated 
question about air credits in September 2003. 
Second, Utah law clearly holds that even where an attorney represents adverse 
clients at the same time, a plaintiff suing for breach of confidentiality must still provide 
evidence that the attorney misused or disclosed confidential information. For example, in 
Kilpatrick II, the defendant law firm simultaneously represented two clients - the MWT 
Company and Northstar Communications - which were actively competing for a single 
FCC license (for Channel 13 in Salt Lake City). See Kilpatrick II. 2001 UT 107, %\ 5-12, 
37 P.3d at 1133-34. Yet this Court held that the plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for 
breach of the duty of confidentiality unless they "present some evidence that Wiley Rein 
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and/or Richard Wiley actually communicated confidential information." Id. ^  68, 37 P.3d 
at 1144 (emphasis added). To meet this standard, the Court explained, the plaintiffs were 
required to show that Northstar "had financial information available to it beyond what 
plaintiffs had given it, financial information that only could have come from Wiley Rein 
and/or Richard Wiley." Id 
Further, in Shaw Resources, Defendant Pruitt Gushee simultaneously represented 
the plaintiff entities and Defendant Wind River, both of which were actively engaged in 
oil and gas exploration and development in the same area of the Ute Tribal Reservation. 
See Shaw Resources, 2006 UT App 313,ffif 3-4, 12-14, 142 P.3d at 563-64.16 Indeed, the 
Pruitt Gushee attorney who represented the plaintiffs owned stock in Wind River. Id. at 
If 14, 142 P.3d at 564. Yet, following Kilpatrick II and Gildea, the Court of Appeals held 
that to maintain a claim of misuse of confidential information, the plaintiffs were required 
For some reason, Plaintiffs insist that Shaw Resources did not involve "simul-
taneous adverse representation." (See Opening Br. at 73 n. 69.) This is false. In Shaw 
Resources, the defendant firm represented the plaintiffs from April 1999 into 2003, 
throughout the course of events on which the claims were based. See id. ffl[ 11, 56. The 
defendant firm represented the plaintiffs' competitor during that same period. See id 
1fl[ 14, 56. In fact, the entire case was litigated on the basis that the defendant firm had 
represented both the plaintiffs and their competitor simultaneously, and no one ever 
claimed that the defendant firm terminated its representation of the plaintiffs before 
starting to represent the competitor. 
Plaintiffs' assertion that the issue of simultaneous representation was "not before 
the Court" in Kilpatrick II is similarly misleading. As explained in the text, the case was 
based on Plaintiffs' simultaneous representation of the Plaintiffs and their competitors, 
and the defendants argued (successfully) that "proof of actual disclosure or misuse of 
confidential information is a prerequisite for a finding of a breach of the duty of con-
fidentiality." Kilpatrick II f 66, 37 P.3d at 1144. The Court, of course, expressly held 
that evidence "that [the defendant firm] actually communicated confidential information" 
was required to support a claim. Id. \ 68, 37 P.3d at 1144. 
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to present "nonspeculative [and] nonconjectural evidence" that the firm communicated 
the plaintiffs' confidential information to Wind River. Id f 29, 142 P.3d at 567. 
It would be especially unreasonable in the present case to infer that Holme Roberts 
used its knowledge of the price of Plaintiffs' water rights to benefit PacifiCorp, because 
PacifiCorp did not even buy its water rights from other sellers in Juab County. Rather, as 
explained in the Statement of Facts, it is undisputed that PacifiCorp obtained its water 
rights through an outside broker, WW Ranches, which was not involved in Plaintiffs' 
project, and that the water rights PacifiCorp ultimately bought were from a different 
water source, in a different county, represented by a different method of ownership. (See 
generally Wangsgard Aff., Add. Ex. 8, f 10, R. 10295; Clyde Aff., Add. Ex. 3, at R. 
25/8494.) Further, the evidence is undisputed that Holme Roberts had no role in coming 
up with WW Ranches' idea to obtain water from outside Juab County, that WW 
Ranches' price was not based on any information obtained from Holme Roberts, and that 
Holme Roberts did not discuss with WW Ranches the price Plaintiffs had paid for their 
own water rights. (See Wangsgard Aff. fflf 10-15, R. 10295-96.) Once again, Mr. 
Clyde's unrebutted testimony that Ms. Williams had very little to do with PacifiCorp's 
acquisition of water rights is devastating to Plaintiffs' claims. (R. 25/9494-95.) 
In short, there is no connection between the water rights options Plaintiffs bought 
in Juab County and the rights PacifiCorp bought from and through WW Ranches. Accor-
dingly, it would not be reasonable to infer - even if simultaneous representation were 
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assumed - that Jody Williams gave PacifiCorp any information about the price Plaintiffs 
paid for their water rights. 
Plaintiffs* claim here is simply a weaker version of the claims brought in Kil-
patrick II and Shaw Resources: Plaintiffs allege that Holme Roberts did transactional 
work for two companies in the same line of business. Simultaneous representation in 
such a case, however, was not sufficient to support an inference that the attorneys mis-
used confidential information in either Kilpatrick II or Shaw Resources. Plaintiffs1 
allegation of simultaneous representation is therefore not enough to raise such an 
inference here. 
(ii) Plaintiffs are wrong in arguing that the Court should 
presume Ms. Williams misused confidential information 
because PacifiCorp purportedly obtained its water rights 
faster than Plaintiffs did. 
The Court should also reject Plaintiffs' argument that Ms. Williams and Holme 
Roberts should be presumed to have breached their fiduciary duties because PacifiCorp 
supposedly obtained its water rights "in 20% of the time" that it took Plaintiffs to acquire 
their own water rights options. (Opening Br. at 71.) Once again, while Plaintiffs purport 
to cite several places in the record to support this argument, none of those citations con-
stitute actual evidence that PacifiCorp did in fact obtain its water rights in one-fifth the 
For similar reasons, even if Plaintiffs could somehow have shown that Holme 
Roberts disclosed to PacifiCorp the price of Plaintiffs' water rights options, Plaintiffs still 
would be unable to show that they were harmed by any such disclosure. As explained in 
the text above, PacifiCorp ultimately met its water needs by purchasing water outside of 
Juab County. Plaintiffs presented no evidence below explaining how knowledge of the 
terms of two water purchase agreements in Juab County - involving directly owned water 
rights - would have helped PacifiCorp obtain shares in mutual water companies with 
rights in Utah County. Plaintiffs are asking the Court to speculate. 
-39-
time that it took Plaintiffs to do so. (See R. 2334, 2818, 3495, 3729-31, 3826-30, 5088X, 
5189-90.) The only reference to the "20%" time frame is Mr. Banasiewicz's utterly 
unsupported and foundationless testimony to that effect. (R. 2334.) Such testimony fails 
to satisfy Rule 56(e)'s requirement that affidavits "be made on personal knowledge" and 
"show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). See, e.g., Mountain West Surgical Center v. Hospital Corp. of 
Utah, 2007 UT 92, f 14, 173 P.3d 1276, 1278 (upholding grant of summary judgment: 
because plaintiffs' employee had no personal knowledge of third party's decision-
making, his testimony was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact on causation). 
Further, even if PacifiCorp did manage to obtain water rights faster than Plaintiffs 
did, that fact would not support a reasonable inference that Holme Roberts misused or 
disclosed its knowledge of the price Plaintiffs paid for their water rights. For a fact to 
count as circumstantial "evidence" supporting a particular conclusion, the conclusion 
"must be a rational and logical deduction" from that fact. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 
461, 464 (Utah App. 1987) (emphasis added). This Court has recently explained that in 
applying the "genuine issue of material fact" standard of Rule 56(c), a court "is not 
required to draw every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Instead, it is required to draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party." IHC Health Servs. v. D&K Mgmt, 2008 UT 73, ^ 19, 
196 P.3d 588, 594-95 (italics in original). Circumstantial evidence does not include 
"evidence that is as consistent with the fact sought to be proved as with its opposite." 
Dept. of Econ. Dev't v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924 F. Supp. 449, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
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Here, there is simply no basis for Plaintiffs' suggestion that simply because one person 
manages to buy property faster than another, the person was more likely than not aided 
by the improper use of confidential information about the price the other paid for his or 
her property. 
(iii) The rest of Plaintiffs' purported circumstantial evidence 
is likewise insufficient. 
The rest of Plaintiffs' purported circumstantial evidence fares no better. Plaintiffs 
represent to the Court that Ms. Williams testified that she "did not know whether she had 
disclosed confidential information to PacifiCorp" (Opening Br. at 72), but yet again, 
Plaintiffs are misstating the record.18 Further, even if Plaintiffs could actually show that 
Ms. Williams could not recall exactly what she told PacifiCorp, that PacifiCorp hired Ms. 
Williams without considering other lawyers (which, given Mr. Thurgood's decades-long 
working relationship with Ms. Williams, is not surprising), and/or that Ms. Williams 
chose not to inform Plaintiffs that she began representing PacifiCorp after finishing her 
work for Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs still would not be able to avoid summary judgment on this 
point. No matter how many times Plaintiffs repeat their mantras, it is simply not reason-
able to infer from these purported "facts" that Ms. Williams breached her fiduciary duty 
Plaintiffs assert that their position is supported by record page 2543, a page from 
Ms. Williams' deposition. But Ms. Williams did not testify that she "did not know 
whether she had disclosed confidential information to PacifiCorp." What she said was, 
"In trying to recall the events of 3-4-03 I do not recall discussing the quantity of water 
for [Plaintiffs9] plant. And I can't tell you if for sure it wasn't discussed and I didn't 
recall it because I don't recall." (R. 2543 (emphasis added).) Moreover, the evidence is 
undisputed that as of March 4, 2003 (the date referenced in the deposition testimony), the 
quantity and intended use of Plaintiffs' water rights was a matter of public record, as 
Plaintiffs' Change Applications had already been approved in the two Memorandum 
Decisions issued by the State Engineer. (Add. Ex. 4, R. 10031-39.) 
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to Plaintiffs by either telling PacifiCorp how much Plaintiffs had paid for their own water 
rights or using her knowledge of the price to improperly aid PacifiCorp. And because it 
is not reasonable to draw such an inference, the testimony of Ms. Williams and Mr. 
Vuyovich that they kept the information confidential is uncontroverted. As such, there is 
no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ms. Williams or Holme Roberts misused 
or disclosed information about the purchase price of Plaintiffs' water rights options, and 
the trial court properly dismissed this portion of Plaintiffs' claim. 
(iv) Plaintiffs' own disclosure to PacifiCorp of their water 
rights agreements renders it unreasonable to infer that 
Holme Roberts disclosed the same information. 
Even if Plaintiffs could somehow submit evidence showing that PacifiCorp had, or 
used, any of Plaintiffs' confidential water rights information (which they have not), that 
would still not support a claim that PacifiCorp obtained that information from Holme 
Roberts, as opposed to from Plaintiffs themselves. See Kilpatrick II at f 68, 37 P.3d at 
1144 (plaintiffs must provide evidence that PacifiCorp had information that "could only 
have come" from the attorney); accord Gildea, 970 P.2d at 1270. This requirement 
ensures that an inference of attorney misconduct is drawn only when such an inference is 
reasonable. For example, assume Client B is shown to have information originally held 
by Client A. If that information could only have come from the attorney, then it may be 
reasonable to infer, under Gildea and Kilpatrick II, that the attorney disclosed the 
information, and summary judgment would be inappropriate. If, however, there is direct 
evidence that Client B obtained that information from someone other than the attorney, 
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then these cases hold that Client B's possession of that information does not provide a 
reasonable basis to infer that the attorney disclosed the information to Client B.19 
Applying this principle to the present case, Plaintiffs appear to be arguing that if 
they can show that PacifiCorp knew how much Plaintiffs paid for their water rights, and 
that Holme Roberts represented PacifiCorp after representing Plaintiffs, those facts alone 
would be enough to support an inference that Holme Roberts disclosed Plaintiffs' infor-
mation to PacifiCorp. But as Gildea and Kilpatrick II make clear, those facts would not 
be enough to support an inference that Holme Roberts breached its duty of confiden-
tiality, because there is direct evidence that Plaintiffs themselves gave PacifiCorp that 
information (and more). Therefore, even evidence that PacifiCorp knew how much 
Plaintiffs paid for their water rights would not constitute circumstantial evidence that 
Holme Roberts disclosed that information to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are, once again, left 
with mere conjecture and speculation. 
Plaintiffs asserted below that Kilpatrick II is distinguishable because Plaintiffs 
gave their information to PacifiCorp under a confidentiality agreement. (R. 3979.) But 
this argument misses the point. (Especially since Plaintiffs have also gone to great 
lengths to try to establish that PacifiCorp breached its confidentiality agreement and 
misappropriated that information.) Regardless of what promises PacifiCorp made when 
it received the information from Plaintiffs, the fact remains that PacifiCorp did receive 
information about Plaintiffs' water rights purchase from Plaintiffs, and as such it is not 
19
 Actually, under Gildea and Kilpatrick II, the inference of attorney disclosure is 
not reasonable as long as there is evidence that Client B could have obtained the 
information from a source other than the attorney. 
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reasonable to infer that PacifiCorp's possession of the information came from any other 
source, including Ms. Williams or Holme Roberts. 
(v) The trial court applied the correct legal standard. 
Finally, the Court can also reject Plaintiffs' argument that Judge Medley applied 
the wrong legal standard by stating that the Plaintiffs were required to present "actual" 
evidence of misuse or disclosure. (See Opening Br. at 69-71.) There is no reason to 
believe that by using the phrase "actual" evidence, Judge Medley was holding that direct 
evidence was necessary. Instead, Judge Medley plainly applied the correct standard, 
accurately concluding that (a) alleged simultaneous representation "is not sufficient alone 
to support an inference that an attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential 
information," and (b) "the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence that would support 
a reasonable inference that HRO used or disclosed confidential information. Rather, the 
plaintiffs have provided mere argument based on speculation and conclusory asser-
tions, without material factual support" (Mem. Dec, Add. Ex. 1, at R. 7618-19 (em-
phasis added).) By using the "support an inference" language, Judge Medley was clearly 
willing to consider circumstantial evidence. 
Plaintiffs invite the Court to speculate that Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts dis-
honorably and tortiously violated their ethical and legal obligations by using one client's 
confidential information for the benefit of another. As discussed above, however, the law 
will not presume that an attorney has acted dishonestly; rather, such claims must be sup-
ported by evidence. Plaintiffs' claim was not dismissed because their evidence was 
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circumstantial, rather, Plaintiffs' claim was dismissed because the evidence was non-
existent. This part of Judge Medley's ruling should be affirmed. 
2. Plaintiffs did not present evidence that would support a claim for 
misuse of information about the identity of water sellers in Juab 
County or the general market price for water in Juab County. 
Plaintiffs also argue in their brief on appeal that Holme Roberts misused or dis-
closed information about the market for water in Juab County, including "the identity of 
the narrow pool of potential sellers of water rights" and "the range of sale prices that 
Williams had obtained through the research and negotiations she had done while repre-
senting USA Power." (Opening Br. at 68.) Plaintiffs' memorandum below, however, did 
not specify that Plaintiffs were basing a claim on such allegations. (See R. 3977-79 (de-
scribing confidential information Holme Roberts allegedly obtained through its repre-
sentation).) Therefore, Plaintiffs have not preserved this claim for appeal. See Badger, 
966 P.2d at 847. 
Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the matter now, this portion of Judge 
Medley's ruling would still have to be affirmed. 
First, Plaintiffs have cited no evidence that the identity of water rights sellers or 
the market price in the Mona area was confidential. Ms. Williams testified below that the 
identity of water rights owners in any area is publicly available, among other places, on 
the Utah Division of Water Rights website. (Williams Aff, Add. Ex. 2, ^ 5, R. 9817.) 
She further testified that the State Engineer is also conversant with who owns water rights 
and who may be willing to sell. (Id ^ 7.) Mr. Clyde likewise explained, based on his 
thirty-plus years of experience in water law, working in many of Utah's small towns, that 
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"there is a substantial existing water rights market in Juab County and the market value 
of water rights is generally understood by everyone." (Clyde Aff., Add. Ex. 3, at R. 
25/8493-94.) (Like Mr. Clyde's other testimony, this testimony went unrebutted.) 
Indeed, Plaintiffs admitted that they hired Ms. Williams, their "Utah water attorney," 
precisely because of her experience in water law and her knowledge of how to find water 
on the market. (R. 9737-38, 9745.) 
A lawyer's duty to protect a client's information does not extend to "information 
that is generally known." Restatement (3d) The Law Governing Lawyers, § 59 (2000). 
Here, Plaintiffs have cited no evidence to controvert Holme Roberts' evidence that 
information about the Mona water market is not confidential because it is generally 
known to those who are interested. Accordingly, because the undisputed evidence shows 
that this sort of information is not confidential, any claim based on misuse or disclosure 
of this information fails as a matter of law.20 
Second, Plaintiffs have not shown that information about the general market for 
water in Juab County was material to Plaintiffs. There is simply no basis for inferring 
that information about the terms at which sellers other than Mr. Keyte or Mr. Garrett 
were willing to sell water (or other property) constitutes "material confidential infor-
mation" in which Plaintiffs have a right to claim confidentiality. 
20
 As explained above, Plaintiffs assert that Michael Keyte reported to Mr. 
Banasiewicz that PacifiCorp had offered another seller the same price for water rights 
that Plaintiffs paid to Mr. Keyte. If admissible, this testimony would demonstrate that, in 
fact, information about the Juab County water market is not confidential. To the 
contrary, this testimony would show that the unidentified seller was willing to discuss 
PacifiCorp's offer with Mr. Keyte. 
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Third, Plaintiffs have not cited admissible evidence that any of this alleged con-
fidential material information - other than the general price of water rights in the area -
91 
was disclosed to PacifiCorp or used for PacifiCorp's benefit. 
Fourth, Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence that they were harmed by any use by 
Holme Roberts or PacifiCorp of information about the Juab County water market. Once 
again, it is undisputed that PacifiCorp did not purchase water rights from rights holders in 
Juab County, but rather from owners of shares in mutual water companies in other 
counties, and the seller (WW Ranches) set its price based on its own information, not 
information obtained by or through Holme Roberts. As Mr. Clyde explained: 
[Tjhe price of water in Mona was largely irrelevant to the purchase of water 
by PacifiCorp. The water purchased by PacifiCorp was represented by 
shares of stock in two mutual water companies in Utah and Salt Lake 
Counties, not Juab County. The market place in Utah and Salt Lake Coun-
ties is arguably different from that in Mona as reflected by PacifiCorp's 
lower per acre foot price paid for the water. The purchase was for shares 
and not water rights. The change applications filed by WW Ranches for 
PacifiCorp were different and more complicated than the straight forward 
change applications Williams[] filed for plaintiffs. In fact, there is little 
about the plaintiffs9 water rights acquisition and change application pro-
cess that would have been of any value at all to PacifiCorp in pursuing its 
91 
This aspect of Plaintiffs' claim appears to be supported primarily by the docu-
ments at pages 2890 and 7137 of the record. (R. 2890, 7137.) As discussed above, 
however, neither of those documents provides any evidence of any disclosures by Ms. 
Williams. The document reflected at R. 2890 was prepared by PacifiCorp, not Ms. 
Williams. (See Williams Dep. at R. 2553 (discussing R. 2890 as part of the "white 
paper" Mr. Thurgood was preparing; R. 2556 ("It was a document from PacifiCorp and I 
believed it."); R. 2557 ("It was something PacifiCorp wrote and I read.").) Plaintiffs 
have cited no evidence that the information in that document about the general water 
price in Juab County came from Ms. Williams. Page 7137 - which is unauthenticated 
and unsupported by any testimony or other evidence explaining what the document is and 
what the document purports to say - likewise does not suggest that Ms. Williams con-
veyed any confidential information about the Juab County water market to PacifiCorp. 
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course of action, and any such information was commonly known or 
knowable to the community as a whole. 
(Clyde Aff., Add. Ex. 3, at R. 25/8494 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs presented no 
evidence below that would show (or support a reasonable inference) that they were 
harmed in any way by any possible disclosure or use of Ms. Williams' knowledge of the 
Juab County water market. As such, any claim based on such alleged disclosure or use 
also fails as a matter of law. 
B. The Court should reject Plaintiffs' proposed "rule" that if an attorney 
represents adverse clients at the same time, the attorney should be presumed 
to have misused or disclosed confidential information. 
Finally, the Court should reject Plaintiffs' argument, based entirely on two isolated 
out-of-state cases, that if an attorney simultaneously represents technically adverse 
clients, then a jury should be allowed to presume - in the absence of any evidence - that 
the attorney misused his or her clients' confidential information. Plaintiffs are basically 
asking this Court to presume that attorneys are dishonest and should be subject to 
massive liability for disclosing confidential information even when the evidence is 
undisputed that the attorney did no such thing. Fortunately, as explained above, 
Kilpatrick II and Shaw Resources both make clear that mere representation of competing 
clients at the same time does not allow a trier of fact to infer that the attorney disclosed 
one client's confidential information to the other. Even where an attorney simultaneously 
represents adverse clients, a plaintiff may not prevail on a tort claim for misuse of 
confidential information without evidence of such misuse. Plaintiffs have not presented 
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any reason why Shaw Resources and Kilpatrick II should be overruled. Thus, as this 
issue is already settled law, there is no need to look to out-of-state cases for guidance. 
Second, as Plaintiffs themselves admit, the cases on which they are relying did not 
even involve simultaneous representation of adverse clients. (See Opening Br. at 73.) 
Instead, both Chrysler Corp. v. Carey, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (E.D. Mo. 1998), and Bevan v. 
Fix, 42 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2002), involved representation allegedly adverse to & former 
client. It is absurd for Plaintiffs to suggest that in dealing with an alleged simultaneous 
representation case, this Court should disregard Utah case law specifically on point to 
adopt a supposed rule from cases dealing with a different situation. 
Moreover, it is difficult to see how Bevan and Chrysler constitute a "majority of 
jurisdictions" (Opening Br. at 73) when at least seven jurisdictions hold that courts 
should not blindly impute transfer of confidential information without actual evidence 
that a transfer of information occurred. In addition to Kilpatrick II and Shaw Resources, 
see Wilbourne v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Miss. 1996) 
(plaintiff "must establish" defendant attorney "possessed and misused"' confidential 
information) (emphasis added); Oar Lock Land & Cattle Co. v. Crowley, Haughey, 
Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, 833 P.2d 146, 148 (Mont. 1992) (party must show "that the 
disclosures made in the former employment were used prejudicially against appellant") 
(internal citations omitted); North Carolina State ex rel. Long v. Petree Stockton L.L.P., 
499 S.E.2d 790, 800 (N.C. App. 1998) (allegation that an attorney "presumably" drew 
upon a client's information fails to state a cause of action); Richter v. Van Amberg, 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 1255, 1261 (D.N.M. 2000) (no breach of fiduciary duty where, inter alia, there 
was no evidence of use of former client's information against former client); Lazy Seven 
Coal Sales v. Stone & Hinds, P.C., 813 S.W.2d 400, 410 (Tenn. 1991) (requiring 
evidence of a "causal connection between the acts of the lawyer and the alleged 
damages"); City of Garland v. Booth, 895 S.W.2d 766, 772-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1995) 
("We will not substitute a conclusive presumption, which exists for disqualification 
purposes, for real evidence in a malpractice lawsuit. Accordingly, because the presump-
tion does not apply, it cannot raise a fact issue on disclosure of confidences."). See also 
Capital City Church of Christ v. Novak, 2007 WL 1501095 (Tex. App. 2007); 2 Ronald 
E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice, § 18:28 at 1172 ("In looking to the 
duty of confidentiality, the 'substantial relationship' between subject matters of repre-
sentation must be a reality, involve actual adversity and a breach of confidences."). 
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Third, Chrysler and Bevan are factually distinguishable. Most significantly, both 
of those cases involved attorneys who were extensively involved in litigation directly 
against their former clients. In Chrysler, the defendant attorneys had been "intimately 
involved in planning and implementing Chrysler's defense strategy" in class actions over 
alleged product defects. 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1033; see also idL at 1026-27. Then, after 
leaving their firm and taking nearly 1000 pages of documents with them, the defendants 
initiated a product defect class action directly against Chrysler. Id. at 1027-29. In that 
direct adversity context, i.e., attorneys deeply entangled in litigation against a former 
client, and even being involved in the very decision as to whether to file a class action 
against Chrysler, the Chrysler court felt that the jury could find that the attorneys would 
be likely to have used their intimate knowledge of "Chrysler's defense strategy and its 
tactics regarding such things as damages, expert witnesses, class certification, motion 
practice, and defenses" in representing the second client. Id at 1033-34. 
In Bevan, the attorney first defended the plaintiff against a charge of domestic 
violence committed against the plaintiffs girlfriend. 42 P.3d at 1017. Then, after the 
plaintiff married the girlfriend, the attorney represented her in a divorce proceeding 
against the husband. The court did not actually address whether the attorney had 
breached his duty of confidentiality; the court merely set forth what it considered to be 
the fiduciary duties of an attorney to a former client, and stated in dicta that instead of the 
non-rebuttable presumption of disclosure that applies in disciplinary and disqualification 
proceedings, the presumption would be rebuttable. See id. at 1029-32 (following Chry-
sler). The court did not actually apply this rule, however, because the issue of 
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confidentiality had not been adequately briefed. In fact, the court affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the attorney, because the plaintiff had not presented evidence of 
harm. IdL at 1032. 
Here, it is undisputed that Holme Roberts' representation of PacifiCorp (and of 
Plaintiffs) was far more limited than the representation in Chrysler and Bevan, because 
Holme Roberts' only task for PacifiCorp was to help it find water - after Plaintiffs had 
already acquired their own water rights. This is a critical distinction. Litigation places 
parties and their attorneys in direct opposition to one another, so it may be reasonable to 
infer in such situations that the attorney would naturally be expected to use information 
from the first representation for the benefit of the second. In contrast, the act of helping a 
client find water rights does not place the client or the attorney in direct opposition to a 
former (or concurrent) client who is not competing for those water rights - even if in a 
larger sense, the parties may be competitors in their business. And knowledge of how 
much the first client paid for water rights would not give the second client any material 
advantage with respect to the first client. At most, such knowledge might help the second 
client save some money when buying its own water rights; whether this would provide an 
"advantage" over the first client would be speculative at best, especially in the present 
case, since PacifiCorp ended up buying its water from another county. 
The ultimate issue here is when and whether it is reasonable to infer that an 
attorney misused confidential information. The reasonableness of such an inference 
depends in large part on the facts of a particular situation, and the situations in Chrysler 
and Bevan - helping a second client litigate directly against a former client - are very 
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different from the situation here, i.e., helping a client buy property from a third party in 
an arms-length transaction on an open market. Thus, neither Chrysler nor Bevan apply. 
Finally, even if a plaintiff could rely on Plaintiffs' proposed presumption, a jury 
would be unable to appropriately award damages on such a claim. The purpose of the 
presumption Plaintiffs seek is to allow a plaintiff to get to a jury where there is no 
evidence that the attorney actually misused or disclosed confidential information. 
(Where there is such evidence, of course, the plaintiff would not need to rely on such a 
presumption.) In such a situation, without evidence as to what confidential information 
was supposedly misused, a jury would be left to speculate as to effect of such (presumed) 
misuse. Thus, a jury would be left to speculate on two elements of a plaintiff s claim. 
This is a civil claim for damages, not a disciplinary proceeding. Both Ms. 
Williams and Holme Roberts vehemently deny that they violated Rule 1.7, Rule 1.9, or 
any other Rule of Professional Conduct. But if an attorney does violate the conflict of 
interest rules, the proper recourse would be to refer the matter to the State Bar, not to 
subvert the fundamental principle in Utah law that a plaintiff seeking damages in a civil 
case must present evidence on every element of his or her claim. Cf Kilpatrick II at ^ f 68 
n.13, 37 P.3d at 1144 (recognizing that civil claims and ethical proceedings are subject to 
different standards: "If Wiley Rein disclosed information to Northstar that Northstar 
already had from any of the plaintiffs, this cannot be the basis for a claim of breach of the 
duty of confidentiality because there is no harm. However, it may be an ethical viola-
tion.5'); see also 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice § 18:28, at 1168 (2008 ed.) 
("Unlike a motion for disqualification, the past client must show more than the potential 
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for misconduct. There must be an actual fiduciary breach that caused damages") 
(emphasis added); Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d at 1032 (noting that harm may be presumed in a 
disciplinary proceeding, but not in a lawsuit for damages). Holme Roberts therefore 
respectfully submits that there is no reason for this Court to disregard its own clear and 
consistent authority in favor of Plaintiffs' proposal. As such, the Court should affirm the 
portion of the Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim 
for breach of the duty of confidentiality. 
POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY OF 
LOYALTY. 
In attacking Judge Medley's grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claim for 
breach of the duty of loyalty, Plaintiffs, once again, try to bury this Court in a blizzard of 
alleged "facts," without actually explaining how those facts are supported by the 
evidence. Plaintiffs' strategy is obvious: If one side says "the evidence shows X" and 
the other says "the evidence shows Y," it is more likely to appear on superficial review 
that there are material factual disputes. 
But there aren't. Holme Roberts' position here is that there are no genuine issues 
of material fact, because the material facts are undisputed, and to the extent Plaintiffs 
attempt to raise disputes, those attempts fail because the evidence does not support the 
arguments Plaintiffs are trying to make. As Judge Medley pointed out in the Memoran-
dum Decision, Plaintiffs' claims are "highly speculative and are based on conjecture." 
(Mem. Dec, Add. Ex. 1, R. 7621.) 
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It is easy to get lost in Plaintiffs' allegations and accusations, but the record makes 
clear that despite Plaintiffs' best efforts, the dispositive facts are undisputed: 
1. Holme Roberts had completed all of its outstanding work for Plaintiffs by 
January 2003, and in fact performed no work for Plaintiffs, did not talk to 
Plaintiffs, received no material information from Plaintiffs, and provided no 
advice to Plaintiffs after January 2003 (except for responding to the 
Graeber phone call in September 2003).23 
2. Holme Roberts did not begin working for PacifiCorp until March 2003.24 
3. The only work Holme Roberts did for PacifiCorp was to assist PacifiCorp 
in acquiring water.25 
4. PacifiCorp authorized its personnel to pay up to $16.2 million for water 
rights for a possible power plant in Mona (and ultimately committed $343 
million for the project), and if Ms. Williams had not been available to 
represent PacifiCorp, PacifiCorp would have found another attorney.26 
5. There was nothing unique or special about the services Holme Roberts 
performed for PacifiCorp; Williams did nothing more than any other water 
lawyer would have done. 
15
 E&, Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2,1fll 16-19, R. 9819; Williams Supp. Aff., Add. 
Ex. 5, m 2-3, R. 24/8297; Williams Dep. at 243-44, R. 24/8324. 
24
 Williams Aff. f 23; Thurgood Dep. at 209-12, R. 24/8336. 
25
 Williams Supp. Aff. ffl 9-10. 
26
 Jenkins Aff. 1fl[2-3, R. 25/8426; Williams Dep. at 278-79, R. 2577-78; 
PacifiCorp Meeting Agenda, R. 25/8428; PSC Order, Add. Ex. 6, at R. 25/8401. 
27
 Clyde Aff., Add. Ex. 3, at R. 25/8495. 
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6. The water rights PacifiCorp ultimately obtained did not affect the water 
rights options Holme Roberts had helped Plaintiffs acquire a year earlier 
and which Plaintiffs later abandoned. 
7. PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations with Plaintiffs over the possible pur-
chase of the Spring Canyon assets long before PacifiCorp actually obtained 
water rights. 
8. Plaintiffs' bid to provide power for PacifiCorp (in response to the 2003 
RFP) was ranked fourth among the outside bids PacifiCorp received; thus, 
Plaintiffs cannot show that their bid would have been accepted if Pacifi-
Corp had not determined to build the Currant Creek facility.30 
9. Even after PacifiCorp rejected Plaintiffs' bid to provide power under the 
2003 RFP, Plaintiffs still owned all of the Spring Canyon assets and re-
mained free to build a plant and sell power to any willing buyer, including 
PacifiCorp.31 
These undisputed facts establish as a matter of law that (i) Holme Roberts did not 
breach its fiduciary duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs, and (ii) Plaintiffs suffered no harm from 
any alleged breach. Therefore, based on these undisputed facts, the trial court properly 
28
 Id. at R. 25/8491-93. 
29
 R. 24/8409 (terminating negotiations on March 30, 2003; Wangsgard Aff., Add. 
Ex. 8, K 12, R. 10295 (initial PacifiCorp-WW Ranches agreement reached in August 
2003; Williams Supp. Aff. f 6, R. 24/8297 (agreement did not close until April 2004). 
30 Navigant Report, Add. Ex. 7 hereto, R. 24/8495.2-8496. 
31
 T. Banasiewicz Dep. at 878-79, R. 24/8198. 
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concluded granted summary judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' damages claim for breach of 
the duty of loyalty, and this part of the judgment should be affirmed as well. 
A. As a matter of law, Holme Roberts did not breach its duty of loyalty to 
Plaintiffs. 
The facts concerning the duration of Holme Roberts' representation of Plaintiffs 
are undisputed, as are the facts concerning the scope and duration of Holme Roberts' 
representation of PacifiCorp. As a matter of law, these undisputed facts are sufficient to 
establish that Holme Roberts did not breach any duty to Plaintiffs: Rather, the facts show 
that Ms. Williams is a water lawyer who simply obtained water for one client (and did 
some related tasks), and then, after that job was finished, obtained water from a different 
area for a different client. This is not a breach.32 
Plaintiffs' claim is properly analyzed under Rule 1.9 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which addresses representation of a former client. Under the version of Rule 
1.9 in effect during the pertinent time, an attorney may represent a client in a matter that 
is adverse to a former client unless it is either the same matter in which the attorney 
represented the former client, or a matter "substantially factually related to" the former 
matter. Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.9(a) (2003) (emphasis added). To demonstrate a breach of 
this duty, the former client must show that there is a "distinct, factual link" between the 
representations. See Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 P.2d 58, 62 (Utah 1998) 
32
 The trial court ruled that there were genuine issues of fact concerning whether 
Holme Roberts breached a duty to Plaintiffs, but that "the dispositive issue ... is not 
whether Holme Roberts breached its duties to the plaintiffs, but rather whether the plain-
tiffs can establish the element of causation." (Mem. Dec. at R. 7620.) Because Holme 
Roberts is asking that the trial court's ultimate ruling be affirmed, Holme Roberts was not 
required to cross-appeal. See, e.g.. State v. South, 924 P.2d 354, 355-56 (Utah 1996). 
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{overruled on other grounds by Ark. Dept. Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 
268 (2006)). Plaintiffs have not made, and cannot make, such a showing. 
1. Rule 1.9 governs Plaintiffs' claim because when Holme Roberts 
began representing PacifiCorp, Holme Roberts' work for Plain-
tiffs had been completed. 
The evidence is undisputed that Holme Roberts had stopped providing legal 
services to the Plaintiffs before March 3, 2003, when Holme Roberts began representing 
PacifiCorp. Holme Roberts' work in obtaining water rights for Plaintiffs was complete 
by January 2003, when the Division of Water Rights approved Plaintiffs' water use 
change applications. (Williams Aff., Add. Ex. 2, fflf 16-19, R. 9819; Williams Supp. Aff., 
Add. Ex. 5, ft 2-3, R. 24/8297.) The work Holme Roberts performed on other assorted 
matters for Plaintiffs had been completed months earlier, no later than October 2002. 
(Williams Aff. % 19.) In fact, after January 2003, there was no communication at all 
between Plaintiffs and Holme Roberts, except for the single question-and-answer about 
air permits. (Williams Dep. at 243-44, R. 24/8324.) Plaintiffs did not contact Holme 
Roberts to ask for any legal work or advice whatsoever during this time. Instead, it is 
undisputed that Plaintiffs were relying on other lawyers - from Washington, D.C., and 
Dallas - to advise and represent them in negotiating with PacifiCorp and attempting to 
develop Spring Canyon. 
Before the trial court, Plaintiffs attempted to raise a genuine issue of fact on this 
matter by asserting that they "believed" Holme Roberts was still representing them until 
November 2003. (R. 5798.) This is insufficient to raise a genuine issue, however, be-
cause a former client's self-serving after-the-fact testimony about his or her "beliefs" is 
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insufficient to establish a continuing representation. Rather, the putative client's belief 
must be reasonable. See, e.g., Kilpatrick II, 2001 UT 107, If 40, 37 P.3d at 1139. Here, 
the Court can determine as a matter of law that any belief that Holme Roberts continu-
ously represented Plaintiffs until November was objectively unreasonable given that 
Holme Roberts' involvement with Plaintiffs stopped in January, the water rights issues 
had been resolved, and Plaintiffs were relying exclusively on other counsel.33 
Ultimately, Plaintiffs' claim that Holme Roberts represented them until November 
2003 boils down to one fact: Holme Roberts did not send Plaintiffs a formal notice that 
the representation was terminated. However, "[a]n attorney-client relationship does not 
continue indefinitely just because it has not been formally terminated." Hiltz v. Robert 
W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 571 (Wyo. 1996). More importantly, while this formality 
may be relevant in some situations, it should not control the substantive issue of whether 
Holme Roberts committed a tort against Plaintiffs for which Holme Roberts must answer 
in damages. 
Applying a "current client" analysis makes sense where an attorney continues to 
obtain information from one client that can be used for the benefit of another, or con-
tinues to advise a client and thus can influence that client's actions for the benefit of the 
other. However, it is undisputed that after January 2003, Plaintiffs did not provide 
Holme Roberts with any new information, and Holme Roberts did not advise Plaintiffs. 
33
 Plaintiffs insisted below that there was a "constant chain of contact" between 
Plaintiffs and Holme Roberts after January 2003. (R. 5799-5800.) This contact, how-
ever, consisted only of (1) invoices Holme Roberts sent after January (for pre-January 
work), and (2) Plaintiffs' copying Holme Roberts on certain letters. (Id.) 
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It is also undisputed that even if Plaintiffs actually did "believe" that Holme Roberts was 
still representing them after January 2003, Plaintiffs took no material action in reliance 
on that belief. Thus, as a matter of law, Holme Roberts could not have used any ongoing 
relationship with Plaintiffs to benefit PacifiCorp. 
Therefore, the relationship between Plaintiffs and Holme Roberts after January 
2003 was substantively identical to a former client relationship. Therefore, Rule 1.9 
governs Plaintiffs' claim for breach of loyalty based on Holme Roberts' representation of 
PacifiCorp, which began in March 2003.34 
2. The matter on which Holme Roberts represented PacifiCorp 
was not a "substantially factually related" matter. 
Under Rule 1.9, Plaintiffs' claim for breach of loyalty fails as a matter of law 
unless Plaintiffs can cite evidence showing that Holme Roberts represented PacifiCorp on 
either the same matter or a matter that was "substantially factually related to" the matters 
on which Holme Roberts represented Plaintiffs. Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.9(a). Plaintiffs 
cannot meet this standard because, once again, the evidence is undisputed that Holme 
Roberts' representation of PacifiCorp was limited to acquiring water rights, and that 
Plaintiffs also tried to raise a genuine issue of fact by including a report from 
John Morris setting forth his opinion that Holme Roberts represented Plaintiffs into 
November 2003. But Mr. Morris' view is irrelevant. The issue is whether Plaintiffs have 
adduced admissible evidence that would enable a jury to conclude that Holme Roberts 
simultaneously represented Plaintiffs and PacifiCorp in any substantive fashion. And as 
explained in the text, Plaintiffs did not adduce such evidence. Mr. Morris' opinion 
cannot create evidence where none exists. See Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 711 
(6th Cir. 1996) ("The expert witness does not testify as to whether the [attorney] 
relationship has already been formed."). 
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representation was not factually related to Holme Roberts' previously completed work 
for Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs have asserted that Holme Roberts' representation of Plaintiffs involved 
more than water rights. But this is just a straw man. Instead, Plaintiffs' claim fails 
because of the highly limited scope of work Holme Roberts did for PacifiCorp. It is 
undisputed that the only thing Holme Roberts did for PacifiCorp was help find water. 
Holme Roberts did not advise PacifiCorp on any other aspects of its power plant project 
or advise or assist PacifiCorp in negotiating with Plaintiffs. (Williams Supp. Aff., Add. 
Ex. 5, UK 4-5, 9-10.) And Plaintiffs have not shown how PacifiCorp's acquisition of 
water rights was factually related to anything Holme Roberts did for Plaintiffs. Rather, 
the water rights PacifiCorp obtained came from a different water source, in a different 
county, represented by a different method of ownership. PacifiCorp's acquisition of 
these rights did not affect - indeed, could not have affected - Plaintiffs' own water rights. 
(See, e.g., Clyde Aff, Add. Ex. 3, at R 25/8491-95.) 
It is not a conflict of interest for an attorney to represent different clients in ob-
taining water rights from different sources at different times. For example, in Shaw 
Resources, the court held that it would be improper to infer that the attorneys had 
breached their duty of loyalty when they simultaneously represented two clients in the 
same business in the same geographical area. Shaw Resources at \ 44, 142 P.3d at 569. 
Moreover, the Colorado Bar has issued an Ethics Opinion expressly concluding that it is 
not a conflict for a lawyer to represent different parties in obtaining water rights from the 
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same river system. (See Ethics Opinion, Water Rights, Representation of Multiple 
Clients. March 21, 1981, revised October 14, 1995, R. 25/8549-54.) 
If acquiring water rights for one client was held to be "substantially related to" the 
acquisition of water rights for a former client, water law would be a very difficult 
practice. Basically, an attorney would only be allowed to represent one client in any 
given geographical area, because that client would always be able to claim that any sub-
sequent assistance in that area was a conflict under Rule 1.9. Holme Roberts respectfully 
submits that the law does not require such an absurd result. Thus, it cannot be a breach of 
loyalty for an attorney to help one client find water rights, and then help another client 
find water rights after the work for the first client is done. 
That both representations involved potential power projects also does not mean 
that Holme Roberts' work for PacifiCorp was substantially related to the work Holme 
Roberts did for Plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs contend they may have been competing 
with PacifiCorp when it came to selling power, the evidence is undisputed that they did 
not compete for water rights. (Clyde Aff. at R. 25/8495.) Real property provides a use-
ful analogy here. There is simply no reason why an attorney who helps one developer 
close on an apartment building purchase one year should be prevented from helping ano-
ther client close on a different apartment building a few blocks away the next. The first 
owner's business might be economically "harmed" by the other building, but any such 
harm would derive from the existence of the other building itself, not from the fact that 
the competitor is represented by the client's former attorney. See, e.g., Richter v. Van 
Ambers, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1261-62 (D.N.M 2000) ("Merely because both representa-
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tions involved Santa Fe real estate does not establish a substantial relationship.") 
Similarly, if Plaintiffs had been harmed at all by PacifiCorp's acquisition of water rights 
(which they were not), such harm would have come from the fact that PacifiCorp 
obtained water, not from the fact that PacifiCorp's lawyer happened to be Jody Williams. 
Accordingly, as a matter of law it was not a breach of loyalty for Holme Roberts 
to help PacifiCorp find water rights after helping Plaintiffs obtain their own. This is 
enough to justify affirming the part of Judge Medley's ruling dismissing Plaintiffs' claim 
for breach of the duty of loyalty. 
B. As a matter of law, any alleged breach by Holme Roberts did not cause any 
injury or damages to Plaintiffs. 
Finally, even if Plaintiffs could produce evidence that Holme Roberts somehow 
technically breached the duty of loyalty, summary judgment would still be appropriate 
because Plaintiffs have no evidence even remotely suggesting that Holme Roberts' 
alleged breach could have caused Plaintiffs any injury or damages. In their brief, Plain-
tiffs point to a number of alleged "facts" that they contend constitute circumstantial 
evidence of harm they suffered as a result of Holme Roberts' representation of Pacifi-
Corp. (See Opening Br. at 76-78.) Holme Roberts does not believe that a point-by-point 
rebuttal would be fruitful; rather, Holme Roberts can tell the Court that none of these 
facts constitute evidence of any harm that resulted from the mere fact that PacifiCorp 
hired Holme Roberts, as opposed to some other law firm, to find water. 
Instead of providing actual evidence of causation, Plaintiffs invite the Court to 
speculate that because Holme Roberts helped PacifiCorp obtain water, and because water 
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was ultimately necessary for the project, Holme Roberts' representation is to blame for 
Plaintiffs' failure to sell the Spring Canyon assets to PacifiCorp or otherwise profit from 
Spring Canyon. This reasoning fails, however, on several levels. 
1. It is undisputed that Holme Roberts' representation was not necessary 
for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights for Currant Creek. 
Most importantly, while PacifiCorp ultimately needed water for the Currant Creek 
project, the evidence is undisputed that Holme Roberts' services were not necessary for 
PacifiCorp to obtain water. As explained in the Statement of Facts, it is undisputed that 
PacifiCorp committed over $16 million to buy water, the Mona project had a total 
estimated cost of $343 million (See PSC Order, Add. Ex. 6, at R. 25/8401), and 
PacifiCorp's general counsel was prepared to find other water law counsel if Ms. Wil-
liams or Holme Roberts had been unable to help PacifiCorp. It is ludicrous for Plaintiffs 
to claim that PacifiCorp would have given up on a project costing over a third of a billion 
dollars if Ms. Williams had declined to represent PacifiCorp. Yet Plaintiffs' damages 
theory requires them to prove exactly that. 
The evidence is also undisputed that there was nothing unique or special about Ms. 
Williams' services for PacifiCorp; she merely did what any other experienced water 
lawyer would have done. Indeed, in distinguishing between the propriety of conduct 
under a disciplinary rule, as opposed to a civil cause of action, the leading treatise on 
attorney malpractice states, "[UJnless confidential information is used, the lawyer has 
done nothing that another lawyer would not have done and there is no special advantage 
attributable to the prior relationship. Thus, there is a fundamental issue of causation, 
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which is a requirement in a civil damage action." 2 Mallen & Smith, Legal Malpractice, 
§ 18.28, at p. 1172 (2008 ed.) (emphasis added); see also Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d at 1032 
(while harm may be presumed in a disciplinary proceeding, "in a suit for negligence, the 
plaintiff must prove all elements. Without legal injury or damages, for what is he to be 
compensated?") (emphasis added). 
In similar circumstances, the Colorado Court of Appeals recently upheld the 
dismissal of a claim against an attorney alleging breach of fiduciary duty. See AUer v. 
Law Office of Carole C. Schriefer, 140 P.3d 23 (Colo. App. 2005). The attorney first 
represented the plaintiff in a matter involving the termination of a business, and then 
represented the plaintiffs business associate (Gale) in a lawsuit against the plaintiff. The 
attorney was disqualified from that case, and after that case settled the plaintiff sued the 
attorney. The attorney moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from Gale 
and her successor counsel establishing that (i) Gale would have sued the plaintiff regard-
less of who her attorney was, (ii) Gale possessed all pertinent information about the 
plaintiff and would have disclosed it to any attorney representing her, and (iii) any 
reasonable attorney would have brought the same claims against the plaintiff that the 
defendant attorney had brought. See idL at 25. The appellate court upheld the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment: "Under these circumstances, we conclude that attor-
ney's conduct did not cause plaintiff any pecuniary loss or damage she would not have 
also suffered had another attorney represented Gale." Id. at 26. See also Ulico Casualty 
Co. v. Wilson. Ecken et aL 865 N.Y.S.2d 14, 21-22 (App. Div. 2008) (rejecting claim 
because "Plaintiff has not demonstrated that it would not have sustained a loss of busi-
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ness but for defendant's assistance to [Plaintiffs competitor] and has not established its 
entitlement to recover damages against defendant as to this cause of action. Thus, it 
should have been dismissed."). 
The same reasoning applies here, because the evidence is undisputed that the 
services Holme Roberts provided to PacifiCorp were entirely routine and could have been 
done by any other water attorney: 
Plaintiffs also complain that somehow Williams was so expert that 
no one else could have accomplished the approvals and that her 
subsequent representation of PacifiCorp disadvantaged plaintiffs by al-
lowing PacifiCorp to get its water rights approved so that it could proceed 
with its plans. This is again nonsense. The plaintiffs' change applications 
were as routine as they could have possibly been, and with all due regard to 
Ms. Williams, who is a well qualified lawyer, anyone, even a non-water 
lawyer, could have obtained State Engineer approval of plaintiffs' uncon-
tested change applications. 
The more difficult transfer of water was that done by PacifiCorp, 
and while Williams' expertise might have been helpful there, she neither 
prepared the change applications nor represented the applicant before the 
State Engineer. Marc Wangsgard did both, and Marc is himself a very 
accomplished water lawyer. For many years he represented major water 
clients such as the Provo River Water Users Association and the Metro-
politan Water District of Salt Lake and Sandy. His partner in WW 
Ranches, LC, Bill White, is also a skilled water lawyer, having spent his 
years in the practice representing the State Engineer as an assistant Attor-
ney General. These gentlemen did not need Ms. Williams9 assistance to 
gain approval of their change applications. Although she attended the 
State Engineer hearing on these change applications for PacifiCorp, the 
applicant WW Ranches, LC, was represented by Wangsgard. Williams 
made only a minor clarifying comment during the entire course of the 
hearing, as revealed by the hearing transcript. 
Accordingly, Ms. Williams9 subsequent representation of Pacifi-
Corp did not put plaintiffs at a competitive disadvantage. 
(Clyde Aff, Add. Ex. 3, at R. 25/8495 (emphasis added).) 
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Once again, Mr. Clyde's testimony is undisputed. While Plaintiffs assert in their 
brief that "Williams was the only water attorney anywhere who was capable of providing 
the specific services to PacifiCorp in the time frame required to win the RFP" (Opening 
Br. at 79), they cite no evidence to this effect.35 And this is a critical point. For Plaintiffs 
to maintain a claim against Holme Roberts based on the fact that Holme Roberts assisted 
PacifiCorp in obtaining water, Plaintiffs have to show that without Holme Roberts' work, 
PacifiCorp would not have been able to obtain water for the Currant Creek project (and 
thus would have been forced to pay Plaintiffs for the Spring Canyon assets). This con-
tention is patently absurd. 
The Court can take judicial notice that no attorney is so important that his or her 
mere presence is dispositive as to the success of a particular matter. As Charles de 
Gaulle is reported to have said, "The cemeteries of the world are filled with indispensable 
men." Not only do Plaintiffs lack evidence to support their assertion that without Ms. 
Williams' assistance in obtaining water PacifiCorp would have contracted with them, but 
in fact, the uncontroverted evidence discussed above establishes that Plaintiffs cannot 
make the necessary showing. 
The best Plaintiffs can do is to repeatedly cite, out of context, two e-mails from 
the principals of WW Ranches saying that Ms. Williams "saved the day" by mollifying 
potential opposition to PacifiCorp's request to change the point of diversion for the water 
shares it was purchasing. These e-mails merely suggest that Ms. Williams was good at 
her job, not that she was the only attorney who could have obtained water for Pacifi-
Corp's plant. 
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2. Plaintiffs cannot show that even if PacifiCorp had not chosen to pursue 
its own project, PacifiCorp would have bought the Spring Canyon 
assets or accepted Plaintiffs' RFP. 
Finally, for Plaintiffs to establish that Holme Roberts' representation of PacifiCorp 
harmed Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs must provide evidence of a link between Holme Roberts' 
representation and PacifiCorp's decision to terminate negotiations with Plaintiffs over the 
Spring Canyon assets and to reject Plaintiffs' RFP bids. Plaintiffs cite no such evidence. 
First, Plaintiffs have no evidence that Holme Roberts' assistance to PacifiCorp 
contributed in any way to PacifiCorp's decision to terminate negotiations with Plaintiffs 
over the Spring Canyon assets. To the contrary, the evidence is undisputed that Holme 
Roberts had no involvement with PacifiCorp's decision to stop negotiating with Plain-
tiffs. (Thurgood 30(b)(6) Dep. at 29-30, R. 24/8397; Williams Supp. Aff., Add. Ex. 5, 
Tffl 9-10, R. 24/8298.) The evidence is also undisputed that PacifiCorp rejected the Spring 
Canyon proposal for its own business reasons, primarily that PacifiCorp had already 
acquired land and meteorological data from Panda, and that PacifiCorp could not use 
Plaintiffs' air permit at the Panda location. (Thurgood 30(b)(6) Dep. at 29-34, R. 
24/8397-98.) The evidence is also undisputed that Holme Roberts had nothing to do with 
PacifiCorp's decision to conduct an RFP, the RFP process, PacifiCorp's review of bids 
submitted under the RFP, or PacifiCorp's decision to build Currant Creek (all of which 
were conducted pursuant to the PSC's direction, reviewed by Navigant, and ultimately 
approved by the PSC). (Williams Supp. Aff. ffl[ 4-5, R. 24/8297.) 
PacifiCorp did not even have an agreement for water rights in place when it ter-
minated negotiations with Plaintiffs in March 2003 or when it completed the NBA in July 
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2003. When it decided to build Currant Creek in September 2003, PacifiCorp had an 
agreement in place, but WW Ranches had not yet obtained approval to use its mutual 
water company shares to furnish water to PacifiCorp's proposed plant. Indeed, in 
unsuccessfully opposing PacifiCorp's application for a Certificate of Public Convenience 
and Necessity for Currant Creek, Plaintiffs themselves pointed out that PacifiCorp had 
not yet secured water rights for the proposed plant. (R. 6566-67, 6600.) Yet the Public 
Service Commission granted the Certificate on March 5, 2004, without even discussing 
whether PacifiCorp had secured adequate water for the project. (PSC Order, Add. Ex. 6, 
at R. 25/8423.) In other words, the record establishes that PacifiCorp did not need to 
have water rights in hand to complete these steps. Consequently, there is no basis for 
Plaintiffs' argument that Holme Roberts' representation played any meaningful role in 
PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek. 
Second, Plaintiffs cannot show that if PacifiCorp had not decided to build Currant 
Creek after the RFP, PacifiCorp would have chosen Plaintiffs' bid instead. This aspect of 
Plaintiffs' claim rests entirely on Plaintiffs' repeated assertion that Plaintiffs' bid "placed 
second behind Currant Creek." (E.g., Opening Br. at 78.) Plaintiffs are, yet again, trying 
to mislead the Court, because the undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs' bid came in 
fourth in the bidding process that led PacifiCorp to build the Currant Creek plant. The 
only time Plaintiffs' bid came in second was when PacifiCorp considered expanding the 
Currant Creek facility, which did not occur until after PacifiCorp decided to build the 
Currant Creek project. 
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PacifiCorp's RFP review process went through two distinct phases. In the initial 
phase, PacifiCorp reviewed the bids it received for three categories of power production 
(Baseload, Peaker, and Super Peak). (Affidavit of Mark Tallman, Add. Ex. 9, fflf 4-14, R. 
6509-12.) Plaintiffs' bid came in fourth among outside bidders. (See Navigant Report, 
Table J, Add. Ex. 7, R. 24/8496; Tallman Aff. fflf 12-15.) (Plaintiffs' bid came in sixth in 
the Baseload category; they did not bid for the Super Peak category.) This is the review 
process that led to PacifiCorp's choice, in September 2003, to proceed with the Currant 
Creek plant, the choice that was supposedly affected by Holme Roberts' representation. 
(Tallman Aff. im 16-17.) 
However, after PacifiCorp decided to build Currant Creek, PacifiCorp continued 
to evaluate several bids against the new NBA for two reasons: PacifiCorp determined 
that it would need more power than requested in the RFP, and PacifiCorp was not happy 
with the bids it had received in the Super Peak category. (Id H 18.) PacifiCorp therefore 
(1) prepared a new NBA for a potential expansion of the newly approved Currant Creek 
facility to two plants, and (2) gave the top three bidders from the RFP process, including 
Plaintiffs, the opportunity to revise their offers. (Id ffif 19-20; PSC Order at R. 25/8415; 
Navigant Report at 37-38, R. 24/8493-93.2.) Although Plaintiffs' bid came in second 
relative to the new NBA during this second review process, PacifiCorp ultimately deter-
mined that no proposals were found to be economically superior to the second NBA. 
(Tallman Aff. ffl| 21-23, R. 6513; PSC Order at R. 25/8415.) The PSC agreed with this 
conclusion. (See PSC Order, R. 25/8421-23.) 
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Plaintiffs have not claimed - nor can they - that Holme Roberts had anything to 
do with this second-phase review. Instead, Plaintiffs' claim is that Holme Roberts' repre-
sentation of PacifiCorp - assisting PacifiCorp in finding water - caused PacifiCorp to 
decide to build the Currant Creek facility in the first place. 
Thus, Plaintiffs cannot establish causation. Plaintiffs cannot pursue a claim based 
on what happened before PacifiCorp approved the construction of the Currant Creek 
plant, because there were at least three bids rated higher than Plaintiffs' during that part 
of the review process, and Plaintiffs have presented absolutely no reason why, even if 
Currant Creek had not been an option, PacifiCorp would have accepted Plaintiffs' bid 
ahead of those three. And Plaintiffs have not asserted that Holme Roberts did anything 
that would support a claim based on anything that happened after PacifiCorp adopted the 
Currant Creek project because the evidence is undisputed that Holme Roberts had no-
thing to do with that process. Accordingly, Judge Medley correctly ruled as a matter of 
law that Plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding causation. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Medley went to great lengths to review the extensive record in this case and 
held that Plaintiffs' claims were supported entirely by speculation and innuendo instead 
of evidence. Plaintiffs have not presented any reason to conclude that Judge Medley was 
wrong. Holme Roberts and Ms. Williams therefore respectfully request that the Court 
affirm the trial court's judgment. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING CANYON 
ENERGY, LLC, : CASE NO. 050903412 
Plaintiffs, t 
vs. : 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS, and : 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, 
: 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court for hearings on September 24, 2007 
and October 2, 2007, in connection with the following Motions: 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment; PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment with respect to the Claim for Intentional Interference 
with Existing Contractual Relations; Defendants Jody L. Williams and 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP's (Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen are 
collectively referred to as "HRO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment: 
Confidential Information; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: 
Loyalty Claim; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against USA 
Power, LLC/ and USA Power Partners, LLC, for Lack of Standing and 
Speculative Damages; USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit 
of Jody L. Williams; and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File 
• \ < ^ \ < \ 
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Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic. At the conclusion of these 
hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider 
the parties' written submissions, counsels' oral argument and the 
relevant legal authority. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as 
stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The standard for determining Motions for Summary Judgment is 
settled. Summary Judgment is proper only upon a showing "that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
Initially, defendant as the moving party has the burden of presenting 
evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exist and 
that Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) . 
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 must set forth specific 
facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. 
The nonmoving party is required to produce more than just conclusory 
assertions or theories that an issue of material fact exists to establish 
genuine triable issues in order to survive summary judgment. Shaw Res. 
Ltd., L.L.C.. v. Pruitt. Gushee & Bachtell . 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d 
560; Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886. In substance, the 
Court is required to examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
"1U00 
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drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and only 
grant summary judgment when reasonable minds could not differ on the 
facts to be determined from the evidence presented. Olympus Hills 
Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs. , 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, PacificCorp first argues that 
it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' First Count for 
violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("the Act"). In 
assessing whether a violation of the Act has occurred, the Court must, 
as threshold matter, determine whether the plaintiffs had a trade secret 
which PacificCorp misappropriated. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical 
Innovations Assocs. . Inc. . 79 F.Supp.2d 1290, 1311 (D. Utah 1999) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The Act defines the term "Trade secret" to mean: 
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique, or process, that: 
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, 
other persons who can obtain economic value from 
its disclosure or use; and 
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable 
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
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The burden of establishing the existence of a trade secret is the 
plaintiffs' and there is no presumption in plaintiffs' favor. 
Microbiological Research Corp. V. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981); Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., supra. 
The essential elements of a claim for misappropriation of trade 
secrets under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act require a plaintiff to prove 
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade 
secrets to PacifiCorp under an express duty not to disclose or use it, 
and (3) PacifiCorp's use of the trade secret information that injures 
plaintiffs. Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 
1999). Elements (1) and (2) are the focus of this Decision. 
In its Motion, PacifiCorp contends they are entitled to Summary 
Judgment because the information plaintiffs claim were trade secrets were 
actually known within the industry, general public or readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent proper means based upon 
PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry. Significantly, 
PacifiCorp further asserts that based upon the undisputed material facts, 
plaintiffs have produced no evidence that PacifiCorp ever used or 
misappropriated any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. Plaintiffs 
counter that the trade secrets which PacifiCorp misappropriated consisted 
of a combination of details, including tests and evaluations which were 
site specific and which formed the Spring Canyon "vision". Plaintiffs 
contend that PacifiCorp stole their Spring Canyon Power Plant trade 
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secrets in order to build the competing Currant Creek Power Plant, which 
is a replica of the Spring Canyon Power Plant in the same Mona location. 
At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 7 of the Utah R. 
Civ. P. requires that with respect to Summary Judgment Motions, that: 
uEach fact set forth in the moving party' s memorandum is deemed admitted 
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by 
the responding party." Rule 7(c)(3)(A). Throughout plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in opposition, as noted by PacifiCorp, plaintiffs have 
employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of arguing about the 
implication of the facts asserted instead of "specifically controverting" 
them with the factual record. This practice has required the Court to 
engage in the tedious exercise of separating fact from argument 
throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition. In many instances as 
referenced hereinafter, plaintiffs' failure to "specifically controvert" 
defendants' undisputed facts results in those facts being deemed 
admitted. Those facts deemed admitted identified hereinafter are 
incorporated into this Decision by this reference. The Court finds that 
PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1Q and 11 
which are not "specifically controverted" are thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a power 
plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, PacifiCorp's 
knowledge of Panda's development before ever meeting plaintiffs' and 
PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the 
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development of the Currant Creek Power plant in Mona. With respect to 
Panda, it is undisputed that Panda initially had the idea to build a 
combined cycle power plant in Mona, started its development efforts in 
late 2000, secured options to purchase 240 acres of land next to 
PacifiCorp's Mona transmission station, undertaken meteorological and 
other assessments pivotal to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek 
and the publication of Panda's development in the Deseret News 
demonstrate the vision and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power 
Plant in Mona was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as 
defined under the Trade Secrets Act. 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, which identify PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone 
& Webster's'design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek 
Power Plant are not "specifically controverted", thus deemed admitted. 
Again, at their core, plaintiffs' responses to PacifiCorp's undisputed 
facts argues theories and implications of the facts without "specifically 
controverting" the facts. With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is 
undisputed that they built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power 
Plant (Apex 1) , and that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents 
PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek 
Power Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their component parts and 
technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the electric 
power plant industry. Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their 
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response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that "The surface 
characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is not 
a trade secret--it was (and is) visible to the public." The Court finds 
the undisputed material facts establish that the design, engineering and 
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor 
utilized any information from or about USA Power, USA Power Partners, 
Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact 
No. 29). 
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17, 
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an air 
permit, are not "specifically controverted" and thus deemed admitted. 
These undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept, 
vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and 
were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public record. Consequently, the 
information contained therein being generally known and readily 
ascertainable from the public record by PacifiCorp and other persons in 
the field cannot possibly constitute trade secrets as defined by Utah 
Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4). 
The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein, 
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiffs' oral argument, 
that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity or 
precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp allegedly 
misappropriated. Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade secrets as 
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consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," and "test 
data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant. However, these vague and 
conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing those specific 
features of the power plant development, including specific features of 
the data and formula which were not generally known and not readily 
ascertainable by PacifiCorp. Further, with respect to each item or 
document which plaintiffs purport to be trade secrets, including the 
documents plaintiffs claim were not part of their public filings, there 
is no aspect of this information which plaintiffs make any effort to 
demonstrate specifically that PacifiCorp could not have readily 
ascertained either through public information, the plaintiffs' filings 
with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge generally known in the 
industry, the independent analysis and evaluations performed by 
Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp's prior knowledge and purchase of 
the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' identifying and labeling of documents they 
claim contain trade secret information, including the economic and 
technical viability of their project, which at oral argument was stated 
to be the essence of their trade secrets, is insufficient. See, Utah 
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations, supra. 
Plaintiffs, as an essential element of their misappropriation of 
trade secrets cause of action, are required to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact that PacifiCorp used or misappropriated their claimed 
trade secrets information. Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2, states that a 
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defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses 
another's trade secret without that party's express or implied consent. 
This Court acknowledges plaintiffs' general proposition that it may be 
rare to have a * smoking gun" or direct evidence of use or 
misappropriation of trade secrets. Sokol Crystal Prods., v. DSC 
Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs also 
claim that they are only required to "construct a web of. . .circumstantial 
evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince 
him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege 
happened did in fact take place." Citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo 
Trust & Banking Co. , 914 F.2d 556 (4 th Cir. 1990). It should be noted 
that the holding in the Eden Hannon case has nothing to do with 
authorizing plaintiffs to construct a web of circumstantial evidence from 
which a jury may draw inferences which convince a jury that it is more 
probable than not that defendants used plaintiffs' trade secrets. The 
Court in Eden Hannon expressly stated that: "Since our disposition of 
this case does not depend on knowing whether Sumitomo (defendant) 
actually used this information, we will not dwell on this point." The 
dicta relied upon by plaintiffs cited in Eden Hannon is found in 
Greenberq v. Croydon Plastics Co., et al. , 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa. 
1974), a case with remarkably distinguishing facts which will not be 
addressed here. Although the parties have not referred to and I have not 
discovered any Utah cases that hold in a trade secrets cause of action, 
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a plaintiff is only required to construct a web of circumstantial 
evidence from which the jury may draw inferences which convince them that 
it is more 'probable than not that PacifiCorp used plaintiffs' trade 
secrets, for the purpose of this Motion and Decision the Court assumes 
this to be an accurate statement of Utah law. 
Plaintiffs' web of circumstantial evidence consists primarily of (1) 
PacifiCorp's access to the claimed trade secrets and the significant 
similarities between the Spring Canyon Power Plant and Currant Creek; (2) 
that in response to an observation regarding the similarities of the two 
projects, PacifiCorp stated (Thurgood) , "We learned a lot from you guys"; 
(3) that without trade secret information, PacifiCorp could not have 
developed Currant Creek in four months; (4) PacifiCorp deleted emails and 
lost a key notebook relating to plaintiffs and PacifiCorp; (5) that 
PacifiCorp never planned or tested a dry-cooled plant and could have only 
made the decision for dry-cooling after receiving plaintiffs' dry-cooling 
data; (6) PacifiCorp's abrupt stoppage of negotiations regarding purchase 
of Spring Canyon assets; (7) that Mona has only a finite amount of room 
for large scale power plants; (8) that plaintiffs had the only site 
developed that could meet PacifiCorp's 2005 need for electricity; (9) an 
internal memo from PacifiCorp (Ian Andrews) to "stress dry-cooling 
experience and experience with inlet chillers"; (10) that PacifiCorp 
committed to the Currant Creek project without any preliminary 
engineering; and (11) the retention of Jody Williams, plaintiffs' lawyer. 
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Plaintiffs rely heavily on the similarities of Spring Canyon and 
Currant Creek and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to their 
trade secrets and the significant similarities, a "power/full7' inference 
of misappropriation arises for the jury to determine that PacifiCorp 
misappropriated the trade secrets. 3M v. Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 
2001). The dourt finds that no such reasonable inference can be inferred 
from the similarities of the two projects in the present case because the 
undisputed facts establish the design development, construction, location 
and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well 
known in the industry and the similarities can be found in almost every 
combined cycle power plant built in the industry. Plaintiffs' suggestion 
that PacifiCorp's deletion of emails, loss of a key note book, and 
statement that "we learned a lot from you guys" (Thurgood) , is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation is a stretch, no such 
reasonable inference of use or misappropriation can be drawn from these 
facts. Plaintiffs' argument that PacifiCorp could not have developed 
Currant Cre^k in four months without use of their trade secrets, that 
PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made 
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed dry-
cooling trade secrets is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory. 
The undisputed material facts establish that Currant Creek's development 
through Panda was not of short duration. The undisputed facts establish 
that dry-cooling versus wet-cooling at all locations is an economic 
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decision based upon the availability of water, and that the dry-cooling 
and wet-cooling technologies are widely recognized and understood in the 
industry. The fact that an internal memo from PacifiCorp (Andrews) notes 
"stress dry-cooling experience and experience with inlet chillers," 
technologies common and known in the industry, cannot reasonably support 
an inference of misappropriation. Finally, as determined hereinafter, 
plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence that Williams/HRO 
disclosed any confidential information. 
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial, 
that specifically identifies any trade secrets that were used or 
misappropriated by PacifiCorp. This includes the trade secrets 
plaintiffs claim were not publicly disclosed, including plaintiffs' 
performance curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different 
air temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for 
an air permit, plaintiffs' energy penalty and water balances 
calculations, both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's 
engineers and performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs' 
pro formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated 
entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of 
return on i£s capitol investments as a highly regulated entity. It is 
important to note that the design, development, and construction analyses 
prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, independently, 
without any evidence of reliance or use of plaintiffs' claimed trade 
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secrets, is "undisputed. Absent from the record is any comparison of any 
of the independent work performed at PacifiCorp's direction against 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets, and identification with specificity 
of exactly what trade secrets were used. At best, plaintiffs offer 
indirect circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could only 
speculate and could not reasonably conclude that PacifiCorp used 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. Plaintiffs have not presented a web 
of circumstantial evidence from which a jury may draw reasonable 
inferences that it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used 
plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. The fact, if it be a fact, that 
PacifiCorp "must have felt confident that an air cooled condenser 
remained a yiable option" (Micheletti), or that Spring Canyon was Man 
opportunity not contemplated before we gave them our stuff," is pure 
speculation, conjecture and does not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to misappropriation of any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets. 
It may very well be that PacifiCorp was further motivated and encouraged 
to pursue the development of Currant Creek after review of the three 
volumes of claimed trade secrets. However, 1 can find no authority that 
suggests motivation and encouragement are actionable. Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Next, PacificCorp seeks Summary Judgment as to the plaintiffs' 
Second Count, for Breach of Contract, and Third Count, for Breach of the 
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Both of these Counts 
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are premised on the Confidentiality and Non-Disclosure Agreement 
('"Confidentiality Agreement") . 
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments, 
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any specific 
evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable inference that 
PacificCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential information. The 
plaintiffs' suggestion that PacificCorp "must have" used their 
confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek in a short 
time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed facts referenced 
hereinbefore. 
As indicated hereinbefore, PacifiCorp's acquisition of Panda's 
project assets was clearly instrumental to the time frame because it 
provided a foundation for the development of Currant Creek. In addition, 
PacifiCorp's involvement of Shaw/Stone & Webster, with its existing 
database of# information and experience, also created advantages and 
assisted PacificCorp in moving the project forward more quickly. Since 
the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that PacificCorp used 
its confidential information, in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement 
and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, PacifiCorp's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to Counts Two and Three is granted. 
Finally, the Court determines that unjust enrichment is not 
available to plaintiffs because of the existence of the enforceable 
written Confidentiality Agreement. Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 
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19 P.3d 392 (UT App 2001). Further, based upon the decision set forth 
hereinbefore, the plaintiffs have not presented any facts upon which a 
reasonable jury could conclude that PacifiCorp used any of the 
plaintiffs' confidential information, plaintiffs cannot establish a 
genuine issue of material fact that plaintiffs conferred a benefit upon 
PacifiCorp, that PacifiCorp appreciated or has knowledge of the benefit, 
or that the benefit was accepted or retained by PacifiCorp under 
circumstances as to make it inequitable for PacifiCorp to retain without 
payment of its value. Accordingly, PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Count Seven of plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint is 
granted. 
PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Claim for Intentional 
Interference with Existing Contractual Relations). 
In the case of Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court outlined the three requirements for 
a plaintiff to establish a claim for intentional interference with 
economic relations. Under Leigh, "the plaintiff must prove w(l) that 
the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper, 
means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id. at 304. 
In this case, the plaintiffs' Sixth Count alleges that PacificCorp 
intentionally interfered with their contractual relationship with HRO by 
hiring them to represent it in the development of its Currant Creek 
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project. PacifiCorp seeks Summary Judgment on this claim, arguing that 
Rand Thurgood, who was then PacifiCorp's Director of Resource 
Development, specifically inquired of Ms. Williams whether she had a 
conflict of interest in representing PacificCorp and whether there was 
any reason that she could not represent PacifiCorp in acquiring water for 
Currant Creek. According to Mr. Thurgood's deposition testimony, Ms. 
Williams indicated that her work for the plaintiffs was complete and that 
she was free to represent PacifiCorp. Based on these facts, PacificCorp 
argues that no reasonable jury could find that by engaging Ms. Williams, 
PacifiCorp intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual 
relationship with HRO. PacifiCorp adds that the plaintiffs also cannot 
establish the wimproper purpose" element of their intentional 
interference claim. 
The Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any 
actual evidence that in engaging HRO, PacifiCorp acted with the requisite 
intent necessary to establish a claim of intentional interference. 
Indeed, there is no evidence which would suggest that in engaging HRO, 
PacifiCorp had any purpose other than to simply acquire water rights for 
its Currant Creek power plant. In addition, the uncontroverted evidence 
is that Ms. Williams specifically informed Mr. Thurgood that her work was 
complete and that there would be no conflict of interest. At the same 
time, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Thurgood was informed 
by USA Power that it had already acquired the necessary water rights. 
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The plaintiffs argue that Mr. Thtfrgood's and Ms. Williams' 
testimony 'is wpretextual," "concocted' and "fabricated" or, 
alternatively, that Mr. Thurgood inquired simply to give the appearance 
that he was acting ethically. These arguments and theories are without 
factual support and amount to conjecture and speculation, rather than 
evidence capable of supporting reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' 
favor. In addition, the plaintiffs have not presented any facts 
specifically controverting this testimony. 
In addition, it cannot be overlooked that Ms. Williams had been 
PacifiCorp's water lawyer continuously since 1982. Further, it is 
undisputed that by the time PacifiCorp engaged HRO in connection with 
Currant Creek, Ms. Williams had already acquired water rights for the 
plaintiffs'
 fSpring Canyon project. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that no reasonable jury 
could draw the necessary inference that PacifiCorp intended to interfere 
with the plaintiffs' contractual relationship or that it had the 
knowledge that interference was substantially certain to occur as a 
result of it. engaging HRO. Mxmford v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., &5B 
P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1993). 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs have not presented any evidence that 
PacifiCorp's predominant purpose in engaging Ms. Williams was to injure 
the plaintiffs. Rather, the undisputed facts can only support the 
conclusion that PacifiCorp, having acquired Panda's project assets, 
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turned to Ms. Williams, as it had done in the past, to acquire the water 
it needed. These facts demonstrate that PacifiCorp engaged Ms. Williams, 
its water lawyer, for the legitimate purpose of acquiring water relative 
to its planned development of a power plant. 
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determines that PacifiCorp 
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' Sixth Count as a 
matter of law. Therefore, PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Claim for Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual 
Relations) is granted. 
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re; Confidential Information 
The plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action against HRO: Breach 
of Fiduciary Duty and Breach of Duty of Confidentiality. HRO's Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment concerning confidentiality asserts that the 
plaintiffs have failed to show that HRO breached its fiduciary duties to 
the plaintiffs by obtaining and communicating or using the plaintiffs' 
confidential information to their detriment. In making this argument, 
HRO primarily relies on Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & 
Bachtell, 142 P.3d 560, 565 (UT App. 2006). 
In Shaw Resources, the plaintiffs asserted that their former counsel 
obtained certain confidential maps showing possible gas formations and 
confidential drilling locations and thereafter sought to develop that 
area, in competition with the plaintiffs. The Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court stated: 
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When a law firm represents clients in the same business and 
geographic area, it owes great caution to clients in 
maintaining their confidentiality and loyalty. That is even 
more true when attorneys in the law firm have personal stakes 
in clients' businesses or in similar businesses. Nonetheless, 
the evidence here does not allow us to conclude that 
Defendants breached their duty of loyalty to Plaintiffs 
because Plaintiffs have failed to specifically identify 
material facts and have provided arguments based only on 
speculation or "conclusory assertions." 
Id. at 569. Relying on Shaw Resources, HRO argues that the plaintiffs 
have similarly failed to provide any evidence which is vvnonspeculative 
or nonconj eqtural." 
HRO also relies on Kilpatrick v. Wilev, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 
1130 (Utah 2001), for the proposition that the plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that PacifiCorp had confidential information that could have 
come from HRO (i.e. information beyond what PacifiCorp obtained directly 
from the plaintiffs). The defendants point out that the information 
which the plaintiffs allege was disclosed to PacifiCorp had already been 
disclosed by the plaintiffs themselves to PacifiCorp. 
In opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they need only present 
evidence that would allow a jury to infer that HRO used and/or disclosed 
confidential information. 
At the outset, the Court determines that there are genuine issues 
of material fact concerning the scope of the information acquired by Ms. 
Williams in her representation of the plaintiffs. As a corollary, it is 
unclear whether this information was truly confidential or generally 
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known. The Court also cannot determine whether this information was 
indeed virtually identical to the information previously provided to 
PacifiCorp by the plaintiffs themselves, as HRO claims. 
Notwithstanding the factual disputes surrounding the type of 
information allegedly acquired by Ms. Williams, the dipositive issue for 
the purpose of this Motion is whether the plaintiffs have presented 
actual evidence that HRO communicated their confidential information to 
PacifiCorp. Shaw Resources, 142 P.3d at 567. The Court finds that 
simultaneous representation (assuming such occurred in this case), 
without more, is not sufficient alone to support an inference that an 
attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential information. 
Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on legal authority to the contrary 
(including cases which suggest that simultaneous representation actually 
gives rise to a presumption) is unpersuasive. Therefore, the plaintiffs' 
suggested inferences that HRO must have used or disclosed their 
confidential information simply by virtue of the simultaneous 
representation or the fact that both the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp sought 
to acquire water rights or that they had similar projects is 
insufficient. 
Further, the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence which 
would support a reasonable inference that HRO used or disclosed 
confidential information. Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere 
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argument based on speculation and conclusory assertions, without any 
material factual support. Id. at 569. 
Accordingly, the Court grants HRO's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: Confidential Information. 
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re; Loyalty Claim 
In this Motion, HRO is seeking Partial Summary Judgment as to 
plaintiffs' Count Four for Breach of Fiduciary Duty. HRO argues that it 
has not breached any duty of loyalty to the plaintiffs and that the 
plaintiffs cannot establish causation. 
In their opposition, the plaintiffs contend that they were in direct 
competition with PacifiCorp and that HRO's representation was a conflict 
of interest and a breach of the duty of loyalty. The plaintiffs further 
contend that HRO's breach of its duties was the legal cause of PacifiCorp 
terminating negotiations with the plaintiffs, resulting in the 
plaintiffs' failure to sell the Spring Canyon assets to PacifiCorp and 
ultimately causing the rejection of the plaintiffs' RFP bid. 
At the outset, the Court notes that there are genuine issues of 
material fact concerning the duration of HRO's representation of the 
plaintiffs, the scope of that representation and the scope of HRO's 
representation of PacifiCorp with respect to Currant Creek. Therefore, 
the Court cannot determine whether the duty owed to the plaintiffs by HRO 
was the duty owed to a former client under Rule 1.9 or the duty owed 
under Rule 1.7, pertaining to concurrent representation. Since it is 
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unclear which of these Rules applies, the Court will not engage in an 
either-or analysis, but instead rules that there are genuine issues of 
material fact which preclude it from determining, as a matter of law, 
whether HRO did or did not breach its obligations to the plaintiffs. 
However, the Court determines that the dispositive issue presented 
by this Motion is not whether HRO breached its duties to the plaintiffs, 
but rather whether the plaintiffs can establish the element of causation. 
Under Kilpatrick, 990 P.2d at 1291 and Shaw Resources, 142 P.2d at 569, 
in order to establish the element of causation, plaintiffs must present 
evidence that but for HRO's breach of its obligations, the plaintiffs 
would have been benefitted. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not 
presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation 
and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs. 
Instead, the plaintiffs merely hypothesize without any evidence to 
support that if HRO had not represented PacifiCorp with respect to 
Currant Creek, PacifiCorp would have certainly purchased their Spring 
Canyon assets and signed a Joint Development Agreement with USA Power, 
LLC. The plaintiffs alternative scenario is that if HRO had not assisted 
PacifiCorp in securing water, PacifiCorp would have accepted their bid 
on the RFP and entered into a power purchase agreement with plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations 
with plaintiffs "as a direct result of HRO's representation of 
PacifiCorp". As HRO points out, there is a complete absence of evidence 
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to support these various scenarios. Clearly, these scenarios are highly 
speculative and are based on conjecture that HRO's representation 
influenced PacifiCorp's decision with respect to its negotiations with 
the plaintiffs or affected the outcome and decision-making process 
involved in the RFP. Each of the plaintiffs' scenarios of what could 
have been is based entirely on speculation unsupported by any record 
evidence. 
The undisputed material facts establish that HRO's representation 
was not necessary for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights based upon the 
availability of equally capable water rights lawyers in Salt Lake City 
and PacifiCorp's budget commitment of $16.2 million for water rights in 
connection with the Currant Creek Power Plant. It should be noted here 
the Court previously determined that plaintiffs have failed to produce 
any evidence that HRO used or disclosed any of plaintiffs' confidential 
information to PacifiCorp. Further, the undisputed material facts 
demonstrate plaintiffs' negotiations with PacifiCorp were terminated 
prior to PacifiCorp's acquisition of water rights for the Currant Creek 
project. Accordingly, HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to 
plaintiffs' Loyalty claim is granted. It is important to note that 
plaintiffs' claim for Disgorgement for breach of the duty of loyalty 
survive this decision, because this claim does not require evidence of 
causation for disgorgement purposes. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 
(Tex. 1999) . 
1(wU 
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HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing 
and Speculative Damages 
HRO/Williams, by this Motion, seeks an Order dismissing all claims 
asserted by USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for lack of 
standing and alternatively, for speculative damages. The law is settled 
in Utah that to establish standing, USA Power Partners and USA Power, 
LLC, need only demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that gives 
[them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute'7 to establish 
standing. Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 148 P.3d 975 (Utah 2006). 
The Court finds that USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, have 
stated a distinct and palpable injury that gives both a personal stake 
in the outcome of the case, particularly in the form of attorney fees 
related to the remedy of disgorgement. Accordingly, HRO/Williams' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of 
standing is denied. HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
dismissing plaintiffs' claims alternatively as speculative damages has 
been rendered moot based upon decisions in favor of HRO/Williams' Motions 
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information and Re: Loyalty 
Claim. 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and 
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jodv L. Williams 
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Jenkins' Affidavit and paragraphs 
7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied in 
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full. The Court finds both Affidavits have adequate foundation, are based 
upon personal knowledge, and are therefore admissible. 
USA Power7 s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. 
Tomsic 
USA Power's Motion to File Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic 
is granted. 
Counsel for defendants PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO are instructed 
to submit Orders consistent with the Court's Memorandum Decision and Rule 
7(f), Utah R. Civ. P. 
Dated this _day of October, 2007. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
im 
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m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER ; 
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING ] 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. 
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and ; 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF JODY L. WILLIAMS 
) Civil No. 050903412 
I The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jody L. Williams, being first duly swom, deposes and states as follows: 
Eiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii IIIIIII iiiiiimniiiiii EXHIBIT J 
1. I am now, and have been since the fall of 1978, licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. Since becoming a lawyer, my practice has focused primarily on issues and matters 
relating to water rights. 
3. On May 7, 2001, I sent an engagement letter for my then firm, Kruse Landa & 
Maycock, LLC, to "USA Power." Subsequently, that engagement letter was returned to me by 
USA Power Partners, LLC with USA Power Partners, LLC's retainer check of $10,000.00. I 
was retained to assist USA Power Partners, LLC in obtaining water rights for use at one or more 
potential power generation sites in Utah. 
4. By that time, I had over 20 years of experience in water law and had knowledge 
of water rights in Utah including, the general price of such rights, where to go to find out the 
identity of water rights owners and who may be interested in selling water rights. 
5. Among other places, the identity of Utah water rights owners is publicly available 
on the Utah Division of Water Rights website. 
6. The State Engineer is also conversant with who owns water rights and who may 
be willing to sell their water rights and freely supplies such information to interested persons. I 
have discussed such matters with the State Engineer's office on many occasions. 
7. Power Partners initially focused on Vernal and Nephi as potential sites for a 
power plant project. Accordingly, I initially investigated potential water rights for use in Vernal 
and then Nephi, Utah. 
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8. Thereafter, in the fall of 2001, Power Partners identified for potential purchase 
certain real estate owned by Michael Keyte near Mona, Utah. Dave Hansen of Hansen Allen & 
Luce, engineers, and I then investigated water rights for use near Mona, Utah. 
9. Michael Keyte and Blake Garrett were then identified from public information as 
owners of water rights near Mona in Juab County, Utah. The fact that Keyte and Garrett owned 
water rights in Juab County was, as is the identity of all water rights owners in Utah, a matter of 
public record. 
10. On May 30,2002, Spring Canyon Energy and Michael Keyte entered into a Water 
Right Option and Purchase Agreement, a copy of which is attached here to as Exhibit A. 
11. In July of 2002, I left Kruse Landa and joined Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
("Holme Roberts"). 
12. I informed Power Partners of my move to Holme Roberts and it requested that 
Kruse Landa transfer its files to Holme Roberts. See letter attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
13. At the time, associate Steve Vuyovich and I were negotiating a water rights option 
agreement with Blake Garrett's attorney, Warren Peterson, 
14. After months of negotiation, on August 5, 2002, Spring Canyon Energy and Blake 
Garrett entered into a Water Right Option Purchase Agreement. 
15. Once the Spring Canyon Energy/Garrett Water Right Option Purchase Agreement 
was completed, Spring Canyon Energy and Michael Keyte entered into a new agreement on 
August 14, 2002, to mirror the terms of the Water Right Option Purchase Agreement with Blake 
Garrett. 
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16. After the Water Right Option Purchase Agreements with Messrs. Keyte and 
Garrett were finalized in August of 2002, Holme Roberts' remaining outstanding assignments for 
Power Partners consisted of the limited tasks of filing change applications to change the water 
rights' point of diversion, place of use and nature of use and finalizing a letter regarding the 
Keyte and Garrett water rights and transactions (the "water letter") and memoranda addressing 
the due diligence undertaken regarding the Keyte and Garrett water rights. 
17. The water letter and the due diligence memoranda were completed on September 
18,2002 and September 30,2002, respectively. 
18. The change applications were also completed and filed with the Utah Division of 
Water Rights in September, 2002. 
19. With the completion of the water letter and due diligence memoranda and the 
filing of the change applications, as of the end of September, 2002, our work for Power Partners 
was complete, except for isolated follow-ups concerning the status of the change applications, 
20. Change applications are a matter of public record and notice of the Keyte and 
Garrett change applications were each published twice in the Nephi Times News. 
21. The Utah State Engineer approved the Spring Canyon Energy/Garrett change 
application on December 13, 2002. 
22. The Utah State Engineer approved the Spring Canyon Energy/Keyte change 
application on January 22,2003. 
23. In March of 2003, Rand Thurgood, then Managing Director of Resource 
Development for PacifiCorp, contacted me to assist PacifiCorp in obtaining water rights for use 
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at a potential power plant. Mr. Thurgood inquired about my previous representation of Power 
Partners. Other than informing Mr. Thurgood that my work for Power Partners was complete, I 
did not discuss Power Partners with Mr. Thurgood. 
24. I treated all information I received from Power Partners as confidential, did not 
disclose "any information~I"received~from-them-to PacifCorp-and did not-use-any-information 
obtained from Power Partners in any subsequent water rights work. 
25. After Mr. Thurgood called me in March of 2003, over a five month period I 
reviewed various potential water rights sources for potential acquisition by PacifiCorp. My 
review did not include water rights belonging to Keyte or Garrett. 
26. During my career, I have become acquainted with most of the other water law 
practitioners in the State of Utah. Included among those lawyers are Bill White, who worked 
with me for a time at Kruse Landa and Maycock, LLC ("Kruse Landa") and Marc Wangsgard. 
Mr. Wangsgard and Mr. White were experienced water lawyers. 
27. In late July of 2003,1 became aware of a potential water rights source through 
WW Ranches, LLC, a water right acquisition and sale business co-owned by Marc Wangsgard 
and Bill White. I was aware that Mr. Wangsgard and Mr. White were in the business of buying 
and selling water rights and informed them of PacifiCoip's water needs for a potential power 
plant in Juab County. 
28. In response, on August 6, 2003, on behalf of WW Ranches, Marc Wangsgard sent 
me a proposal to sell water to PacifiCorp for consumptive power generation use near Mona, 
Utah. 
5 
29. WW Ranches conceived the idea of taking water rights originating in a different 
county, a different water right area and from a different source, and changing the location and 
use of those water rights to that needed by PacifiCorp near Mona, Juab County, Utah. I had no 
role in coming up with the concept or finding the specific water rights WW Ranches sold to 
PacifiCorp. 
30. WW Ranches set the price for the water rights it sold to PacifiCorp. I never 
discussed with WW Ranches the price that Spring Canyon Energy had agreed to pay for the 
Keyte and Garrett water rights or any aspect of Spring Canyon Energy's agreements with Keyte 
and Garrett. 
31. I never attempted to acquire water rights from Keyte or Garrett on behalf of 
PacifiCorp. 
32. In February, 2004 at Rand Thurgood's request, I prepared a memorandum of the 
actions taken by PacifiCorp to acquire water for the Currant Creek project. A copy of that memo 
is attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
33. The memo is simply a factual chronology of the actions taken by PacifiCorp to 
acquire water. The memo does not mention Plaintiffs, Keyte or Garrett or any aspect of Spring 
Canyon's water rights transactions with Keyte and Garrett. 
6 
DATED this day of January, 2007. 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
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Steven E. Clyde, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. 
2. I have been retained by Anderson & Karrenberg, attorneys for Holme Roberts & 
Owen, LLP ("Holme Roberts") and Jody L. Williams ("Williams") (collectively "Defendants") 
to provide opinions regarding Plaintiffs' allegations of unethical conduct of Defendants in this 
action. 
3. In connection with that engagement, I have issued an expert report dated January 
19,2007, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. The expert report sets forth my background and qualifications, the materials I 
have reviewed in this matter, the substance of the facts and the opinions which I have formed and 
a summary of grounds for each opinion. 
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Mr. Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Expert Report USA Power et al v. PacifiCorp, Jody L. Williams and 
Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP. 
Dear Mr. Karrenberg: 
You have engaged my services as an expert in Utah water law to provide an opinion 
regarding plaintiffs' allegations of unethical conduct of attorney Jody L. Williams (Williams) 
and her employer, Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP (HRO) in the above referenced action. 
You have agreed to compensate me at the hourly rate of $285.00 per hour. 
By way of background, I am a 1975 graduate of the University Of Utah College of 
Law and throughout my 31 years of practice, my primary emphasis has been water law. I 
have extensive experience in assisting clients in the buying, selling and converting water 
rights, water rights title examination, and have practiced extensively before the Division of 
Water Rights (State Engineer). A considerable portion of my career has involved working 
with residential, commercial and industrial developers in the acquisition of water rights 
(primarily from irrigation water users) and converting those water rights to domestic, 
municipal or industrial use. I have performed this work in every corner of the State and have 
a sound working knowledge of the water rights regime on every major stream system in the 
State of Utah. 
I am a frequent lecturer at CLE programs on water law topics. I am a contributing 
editor to the Western Water Law & Policy Reporter, a monthly reporter with a national 
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circulation published by Argent Communications Group. I am also a contributing author to a 
highly regarded water law treatise, Water and Water Rights, LexisNexis. I am also an 
adjunct faculty member of the University of Utah, S. J. Quinney College of Law teaching 
water law. 
For the past 16 years, I have been general counsel to the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District, the local sponsor of the Central Utah Project, (CUP) a 3 billion dollar 
federal reclamation project. The CUP spans nine counties of the State and is developing a 
portion of Utah's allocation from the Colorado River. Prior to my becoming general counsel 
to the district, I assisted my father, Edward W. Clyde, in his representation of the district. 
My work for the district has entailed all aspects of the appropriation, conversion and other 
acquisition of water rights for the CUP and other district purposes, environmental 
compliance work, and construction of approximately three billion dollars worth of 
infrastructure required to develop, store and deliver this Colorado River drainage water to 
growing communities along the Wasatch Front A more detailed description of my 
background is contained in my attached curriculum vitae. 
In this action, plaintiffs assert that the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp were directly adverse 
to each other giving rise to a concurrent conflict that precluded Williams and HRO from 
representing PacifiCorp in its efforts to acquire water rights for its Current Creek Project. 
Williams and HRO dispute that any such directly adverse relationship existed or that 
Williams' subsequent representation of PacifiCorp in some way materially limited her 
representation of plaintiffs. From a water law perspective, I agree with Williams and HRO's 
position. 
Rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (PRC) prohibits representation where a 
concurrent conflict of interest exists, absent informed, written consent by both clients. A 
concurrent conflict exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another 
client, or if there is a significant risk that the representation will be materially limited by the 
lawyer's ethical responsibilities to the other client. Even where a concurrent conflict exists, a 
lawyer may represent both clients where both clients have given informed, written consent. 
First, it is clear that no conflict exists simply because plaintiffs and PacifiCorp may 
both be engaged in the same economic activity. This principle is clearly recognized in 
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Comment 6 to Rule 1.7, PRC.1 Although Williams' work for both clients involved acquiring 
water rights for use in connection with an electrical generating facility, her work was no 
different from a lawyer representing two real estate developers in the same county who both 
need water rights for development approval. Both developers will have building lots in 
inventory to sell in the same general market area, making them economic competitors. 
However this relationship does not make the representation directly adverse. A directly 
adverse relationship would not likely exist unless the developers were both attempting to 
purchase the same land or the same water rights, the water development and use by one of 
the developers would impair the water rights of the other developer, or the development of 
one client's land would physically damage the other client's parcel. Mere economic 
competition between clients alone is not sufficient to create an ethical conflict. 
Williams' representations of plaintiff and PacifiCorp were similar only in the sense 
that they both involved the acquisition and conversion of water rights for two clients who 
both happen to be in the same business. That is where the similarity ends. Water rights are a 
species of real property and are as unique from each other as one parcel of land is from 
another. Each water right has its own unique attributes: Date of priority; source of supply; 
place of use; purpose of use; point of diversion; and, season of use. Water rights are 
distinguishable further from each other in that the available water supplies, whether surface 
or ground water, differ in each locale. Stream conditions vary radically from location to 
location in terms of reliability or availability of supply and in water quality. Aquifer 
conditions at the intended new point of diversion and place of use will also vary from those 
at the historic place of use and point of diversion. These differences make each water right 
unique and a determination of impairment requires a case by case evaluation. The 
differences in water rights are readily apparent in comparing the plaintiffs' water rights and 
the change applications it filed to water rights acquired and change applications filed for 
PacifiCorp. 
Plaintiffs' Water Rights and Change Applications: 
With Williams' assistance, plaintiffs entered into two option agreements to purchase 
individually owned and appropriated ground water rights in the Mona, Utah area. One of the 
water rights involved (53-1431) was owned by Michael Keyte. This was a diligence right to 
1 [Simultaneous representation in unrelated maters of clients whose interests are only economically advene, 
such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a 
conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients. 
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ground water for the irrigation of 40 acres of land in the Mona area. The right had an 1879 
priority, and allowed the diversion of 163.22 acre-feet (ac-ft) per year. Keyte was offered 
$4,000 per ac-ft or a total of $652,880 for his water right. Plaintiffs paid 1% of this price to 
secure its option. The balance would be paid only if the State Engineer approved the 
plaintiffs' change application so that it could deplete at least 50% of the historic diversion 
right, and if plaintiffs exercised the option. Blake Garrett owned the second water right (53-
97). This was a certificated ground water appropriation with a priority of 1955. The water 
was used to irrigate 96 acres in Mona, and had a diversion right of 384 ac-ft per year. Garrett 
granted plaintiffs an option to purchase his water rights at $4,000 per ac-ft or a total purchase 
price of $1,536,000. Plaintiffs paid him l%ofthe price to secure the option. Thebalanceof 
the purchase price would be paid upon approval of plaintiffs' change application at a level 
that allowed depletion of 50% of the diversion right, and if plaintiffs exercised the option. 
Plaintiffs then filed change application 53-1431 (a27051) on the Keyte right on 
September 3, 2002. They filed change application 53-97 (a27090) on the Garrett right on 
September 17,2002. Both change applications sought to change the points of diversion to a 
new well, the purpose or nature of use from irrigation to industrial, and the place of use from 
the farms in the Mona area to the proposed generation plant site, also near Mona in Juab 
County. The Keyte change application 53-1431 (a27051) was approved on January 22,2003. 
The Garrett change application 53-97 (a27090) was approved on December 13,2002. Both 
change applications, as approved, allowed 50% or more depletion of the historic diversion 
quantity. The decisions were not appealed and become final 30 days after their approval. 
Williams' work for plaintiffs regarding their water rights acquisition and conversion 
was essentially completed by October of 2002, following the filing of the two change 
applications. Only the United States Bureau of Reclamation filed a letter of concern and it 
was inconsequential. No formal protests were filed. The State Engineer did not hold a 
hearing, and simply issued his decisions approving the change applications. Approval of 
these change applications was all but guaranteed the day they were filed. All Williams had to 
do was monitor their progress through the administrative process. The State Engineer 
approved the applications and his decision became final by the end of February of 2003. 
Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to proceed with their water development efforts and were 
legally protected by their respective dates of priority against any more junior change 
applicant who sought to move water into this area under a later-filed change application. No 
further legal work was required regarding these water rights acquisition and conversion, and 
Williams' work for plaintiffs was completed at that time. 
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PacifiCorp Water Rights and Change Applications: 
In February of 2003, PacifiCorp purchased certain assets of Panda Energy including 
an option to purchase 240 acres of land adjacent to PacifiCorp's existing Mona substation. 
Although PacifiCorp had engaged in negotiations with plaintiffs regarding the possible 
purchase of power generated at plaintiffs' proposed power plant, or the purchase of the assets 
themselves, they did not reach an agreement. Negotiations terminated on or about March 20, 
2003. It does not appear that Williams or HRO were involved in these negotiations on behalf 
of either client. PacifiCorp retained Williams in March of 2003 to assist PacifiCorp in 
acquiring water rights for its proposed project. 
PacifiCorp explored many options for water. In March of 2003, PacifiCorp received 
a solicitation from Geneva Steel, LLC, a debtor in possession, regarding the possible 
purchase of some of its water rights from its steel making plant in Vineyard, Utah. 
PacifiCorp seriously explored that option. It would have required the piping of water from 
Utah Lake to its proposed power plant site in Juab County. PacifiCorp also explored 
purchasing water from the LDS church and from various other individuals in the Mona area. 
v_ 
In August of 2003, PacifiCorp received an offer from WW Ranches, LC, to purchase 
800 acre feet of water for diversion (400 acre feet depletion). WW Ranches, LC is 
comprised of Marc Wangsgard and Bill White. Their proposal entailed the purchase of 
shares of stock in two mutual water companies, the Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company and 
the Utah lake Distributing Company. Both companies held storage rights in Utah Lake. The 
water had been used to irrigate farm land in the Salt Lake Valley. The proposal was to move 
800 acre feet of diversion right (400 acre feet depletion) to the proposed PacifiCorp well, and 
to also drill a replacement well above the point of diversion of Goshen Irrigation and Canal 
Company, the next large down stream water user in Utah County, to provide replacement 
water to Goshen to avoid any interference with its vested water rights. 
Wangsgard proposed that he take full responsibility for preparing and filing the 
required change application and committed that he would get it approved by the State 
Engineer within 5 months of its filing. If it was not approved in that time frame, PacifiCorp 
could terminate the contract with no liability to Wangsgard and White. The proposal 
involved the purchase of shares of stock in two mutual irrigation companies, rather than the 
purchase of individually owned and appropriated water rights. As shareholders, they would 
be entitled to their proportionate share of the water available to the companies each year 
under each company's respective water rights. Title to the water rights would remain in the 
irrigation companies. Wangsgard and White would then file a change application based 
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upon the shares in accordance with UCA §73-3-3.5. Upon receipt of State Engineer 
approval, PacifiCorp would acquire the shares and the approved change application. 
Wangsgard and White, rather than Williams or HRO, negotiated their deal with PacifiCorp. 
Wangsgard altered his proposal to include the purchase of shares from Goshen 
Irrigation and Canal Company and Utah Lake Distributing Company. This revised plan 
required a complicated two-step change application approach to provide the water PacifiCorp 
needed at its plant and to avoid impairing the shareholders of the Goshen Irrigation and 
Canal Company or other water users in Utah Lake and beyond. It involved the purchase of 
shares of stock in two mutual water companies rather than individually appropriated and 
owned water rights. It necessitated the filing and approval of two change applications, (and 
the deal would collapse if either of the change applications were rejected). No down 
payment was received. PacifiCorp would pay WW Ranches the $2,769,846 purchase price 
only if the State Engineer approved both change applications. 
Therefore, this proposal by Wangsgard and White was a radically different 
transaction from the simple options and change applications negotiated by Williams for 
plaintiffs. WW Ranches LC, entered into its initial contract with PacifiCorp on September 2, 
2003. They amended the contract on October 6,2003, to substitute Utah and Salt Lake Canal 
shares for Utah Lake Distributing Company shares. The only way this transaction could have 
created a conflict under Rule 1.7 RPC, was if the clients attempted to purchase the same 
water rights, or if proposed use of water by PacifiCorp would impair the water rights of 
plaintiffs under plaintiffs' prior, approved change applications. There was simply no risk of 
that occurring. 
The physical water supply involved was very different Plaintiffs purchased water 
rights from land owners in Mona. The groundwater involved had been appropriated for use 
in the Mona area and the new place of use and point of diversion was within a mile or two 
from their historic place of use and points of diversion. The water acquired by PacifiCorp 
was surface water tributary to Utah Lake that had already flowed out of the Juab Valley 
(Mona area) and had never been used in that area. The historic water use was in Utah County 
on farms near the community of Goshen. The return flow from this irrigation use was to 
Utah Lake. The other component of the water supply was water stored in Utah Lake and 
historically used for irrigation in Salt Lake County. Return flow from this use was to the 
Jordan River. In essence, this was an entirely different water supply from that relied on by 
plaintiffs in satisfaction of their water rights. This fact eliminated one possible element of 
impairment and an ethical conflict; direct competition for the same water supply. 
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Hansen, Allen & Luce Engineers (HAL) reviewed the other possible area of impact; 
that of localized interference between PacifiCorp's proposed wells and those existing wells 
in the area. In its preliminary report dated September 29,2003, HAL concluded that draw 
down in the aquifer caused by pumping of PacifiCorp's proposed wells would be 2 feet or 
less. HAL revised its report in December of 2003 in anticipation of the State Engineer 
hearing on PacifiCorp's change applications. The revised report indicated that draw down 
would be 1 foot or less. A reduction in the level of the water table of 1 or 2 feet is legally 
insignificant and non-actionable. Thus, PacifiCorp's water development would cause no 
localized interference, eliminating the other potential area for conflict between PacifiCorp 
and plaintiffs. 
WW Ranches filed its change applications 53-1530 (a28303) and 53-1532 (a28304) 
on September 29, 2003. The applications attracted many protests and the State Engineer 
conducted a lengthy hearing on December 11, 2003. Wangsgard, and not Williams, 
represented the applicants at the hearing. The State Engineer approved both change 
applications on February 3, 2004. The WW Ranches change applications have a date of 
priority of September 29,2003, making these change applications junior in priority to those 
of the plaintiffs (September of 2002). Consequently, even if PacifiCorp's proposed wells 
actually interfered with plaintiffs' proposed wells once they were all in production, plaintiffs 
were protected by the senior priorities of their change applications. Armed with their senior 
priorities, plaintiffs could have enjoined PacifiCorp from pumping its wells or otherwise 
forced mitigation to off-set any interference if it occurred in the future. 
Accordingly, Williams' and HRO's subsequent representation of PacifiCorp was not 
directly adverse to plaintiffs, nor was there a significant risk that Williams and HRO's water 
rights representation of plaintiffs, which had concluded in February of 2003 before their 
engagement by PacifiCorp began, would have been materially limited by Williams and 
HRO's subsequent representation of PacifiCorp. No conflict existed in this context that 
required disclosure or the informed consent of the clients involved. 
Similarly, I see no violation of Rule 1.9 RPC, which prevents an attorney from 
representing a new client in the same or a substantially related matter in which the new 
client's interest would be materially adverse to the former client. In this instance, the 
representations did not involve the same matter. PacifiCorp and plaintiffs were not 
attempting to purchase the same water rights or even competing for the same source of water 
for their respective projects. The mere fact that both clients may be involved in a similar 
economic activity or that they had engaged in negotiations that did not come to fruition, does 
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not create a materially adverse situation that would preclude Williams' subsequent 
representation of PacifiCorp. 
By way of plaintiffs' reasoning, a water lawyer could represent only a single client in 
a given river system, because in theory any activity in the hydrologic system by one water 
user may have an impact on every other water user in the same hydrologic system making 
them potentially adverse. Without question there are times where a proposed appropriation 
or use of water will have a significant impact on a basin-wide basis. In those situations, a 
lawyer would clearly have a conflict if another former or current client would be adversely 
affected. The lawyer would need informed consent to continue or decline the conflicting 
representation. However in most cases, the impacts, if any, are localized, and are attenuated 
from the river basin as a whole by time, distance, in-flows from tributaries, intervening 
diversions and natural discharges (springs and accretions to streams), and aquifer 
characteristics that tend to isolate impacts to a very small area. Consequently, the vast 
majority of changes of use in a given river system will have no adverse affect on any other 
water user beyond that local area of potential interference. Such was the case here, where the 
water rights PacifiCorp purchased came from a different water source from those of 
plaintiffs'. 
The water PacifiCorp purchased had been used in other counties down gradient from 
plaintiffs' proposed place of use and point of diversion, and the localized impacts were 
legally negligible. Further, plaintiffs' change applications were prior in time to PacifiCorp's 
change applications, and that priority gave plaintiffs legal security against any actual 
interference if it occurred in the future. Armed with this information, Williams could 
rationally conclude that her subsequent representation of PacifiCorp was not directly adverse 
to plaintiffs. No actual or potential conflict existed in the water law context that would have 
required informed consent to proceed. 
Nor does it appear, as plaintiffs complain, that Williams or HRO used any 
confidential information gained in the course of their representation of plaintiffs in 
connection with the water rights acquisition and change applications that were filed for 
PacifiCorp. Comment 8 to Rule 1.9 PRC states that information gained by an attorney while 
working for a client, may not be subsequently used by the attorney to the disadvantage of the 
former client. However, prior representation of a client will not preclude an attorney from 
using generally known information in the course of subsequent representation of another. 
In connection with the water rights transactions, there was certainly no information 
involved that was not readily known or at least knowable by the community at large. There 
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is a substantial existing water rights market in Juab County and the market value of water 
rights is generally understood by everyone. Mona is a very small town. Based on my 31 
years experience in water law, working in many of Utah's small towns, the sale of water 
rights is big news; the exact terms and conditions of plaintiffs' option contracts with Keyte 
and Garrett would have been common coffee-shop gossip within hours of signing the 
documents. Neither Keyte nor Garrett was bound to silence by their agreements with 
plaintiffs. The local title company had documents in escrow including a copy of the option 
contracts. I am unaware of any document that would have barred the escrow company from 
disclosing the terms of the contracts. It is reasonable to assume that the entire community 
knew the purchase price and the terms of payment. Certainly other knowledgeable people 
would have also known the approximate market value of water rights in the Mona area. 
However, the price of water in Mona was largely irrelevant to the purchase of water 
by PacifiCorp. The water purchased by PacifiCorp was represented by shares of stock in two 
mutual water companies in Utah and Salt Lake Counties, not Juab County. The market place 
in Utah and Salt Lake Counties is arguably different from that in Mona as reflected by 
PacifiCorp's lower per acre foot price paid for the water. The purchase was for shares and 
not water rights. The change applications filed by WW Ranches for PacifiCorp were 
different and more complicated than the straight forward change applications Williams' filed 
for plaintiffs. In fact, there is little about the plaintiffs' water rights acquisition and change 
application process that would have been of any value at all to PacifiCorp in pursuing its 
course of action, and any such information was commonly known or knowable to the 
community as a whole. 
The USGS and the State have studied the aquifer characteristics in Mona, and there is 
abundant technical literature available in the public domain regarding the ground water 
system in this area. Expert testimony was offered at the State Engineer hearing on 
PacifiCorp's change applications by a hydrologist employed by Mona City. He testified at 
length based upon these publicly available technical publications. HAL testified on behalf of 
PacifiCorp's applications and relied to large extent on that same publicly available data in 
formulating its opinions. The State Engineer's water rights files are public documents and 
anything filed by plaintiffs with the Division of Water Rights is readily available to the 
public. The State Engineer hearings are also open to the public and hearing tapes and/or 
transcripts are public documents. PacifiCorp did not need to rely on any confidential 
information of plaintiffs to acquire its shares of water stock, or to file and successfully 
prosecute its change applications to approval. There has simply been no violation of Rule 
1.9 by Williams or HRO. 
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Plaintiffs have argued that somehow Williams' subsequent representation of 
PacifiCorp eroded some strategic advantage it felt it had in the market place. This is utter 
nonsense. Plaintiffs filed their change applications in 2002 and approval came many months 
prior to PacifiCorp even filing its change applications. Plaintiffs' change applications had 
priority, and unless they were less than diligent in perfecting their use of water, their priority 
would always be ahead of PacifiCorp's. That put plaintiffs in a position to protect itself 
legally against any impairment caused by PacifiCorp's wells. 
Plaintiffs also complain that somehow Williams was so expert that no one else could 
have accomplished the approvals and that her subsequent representation of PacifiCorp 
disadvantaged plaintiffs by allowing PacifiCorp to get its water rights approved so that it 
could proceed with its plans. This is again nonsense. The plaintiffs' change applications 
were as routine as they could have possibly been, and with all due regard to Ms. Williams, 
who is a well qualified lawyer, anyone, even a non-water lawyer, could have obtained State 
Engineer approval of plaintiffs' uncontested change applications. 
The more difficult transfer of water was that done by PacifiCorp, and while Williams' 
expertise might have been helpful there, she neither prepared the change applications nor 
represented the applicant before the State Engineer. Marc Wangsgard did both, and Marc is 
himself a very accomplished water lawyer. For many years he represented major water 
clients such as the Provo River Water Users Association and the Metropolitan Water District 
of Salt Lake and Sandy. His partner in WW Ranches, LC, Bill White, is also a skilled water 
lawyer, having spent his years in the practice representing the State Engineer as an assistant 
Attorney General. These gentlemen did not need Ms. Williams' assistance to gain approval 
of their change applications. Although she attended the State Engineer hearing on these 
change applications for PacifiCorp, the applicant WW Ranches LC, was represented by 
Wangsgard. Williams made only a minor clarifying comment during the entire course of the 
hearing, as revealed by the hearing transcript. 
Accordingly, Ms. Williams' subsequent representation of PacifiCorp did not put 
plaintiffs at a competitive disadvantage. Plaintiffs' change applications were already 
approved before PacifiCorp retained Williams and long before PacifiCorp acquired the water 
shares from WW Ranches. There simply has been no apparent use of confidential 
information or other disadvantage to plaintiffs by Williams and HRO's subsequent 
representation of PacifiCorp, and therefore, no breach of duty to plaintiffs under either Rules 
1.7orl.9RPC. 
C L Y D E S N O W S E S S I O N S & S W E N S O N 
Mr. Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
January 19,2007 
Page 11 
In preparing this report, I have relied on the materials listed below. If I become aware 
of additional information or am otherwise furnished with other materials I will supplement 
my report as necessary. I reviewed the following documents: 
• The State Engineer's files for the various water rights referenced in this letter; 
• Document Titled Chronology of Actions to Acquire a Water Source for the Current 
Creek Project 
• Rules 1.7 and 1.9 and the comments thereto, Rules of Professional Conduct; 
• Preliminary Report of Hansen, Allen & Luce Engineers of September 29,2003; 
• Final report of Hansen, Allen & Luce Engineers of December 10,2003; 
• Letter containing Proposal for 800 acre feet of water dated August 6, 2003 from Marc 
Wangsgard, addressed to Jody L. Williams; 
• Water Rights Purchase Agreement dated September 2,2003 between WW Ranches LS 
and PacifiCorp; 
• Revised and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement dated October 6,2003, between 
WW Ranches LC and PacifiCorp; 
• Expert Witness Report of John K. Morris prepared for this litigation; 
• Copy of email dated November 6,2003 from Dave Graeber to Jody L. Williams; 
• Memorandum from Marc Wangsgard to Jody William summarizing the various protests 
filed against WW Ranches change applications; 
• Ethics Opinion #58 Water Rights, Representation of Multiple Clients, 03/21/81, Revised 
10/14/95, Colorado Bar Association; 
• Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint; 
• Defendants HRO and Williams' Answer to Second Amended Complaint; 
• Defendants HRO and Williams' Answers and Objections to Plaintiffs' First set of 
Interrogatories; 
• Defendant PacifiCorp's Answers to Plaintiffs' First Set of Interrogatories; 
• Supplemental Due Diligence Information To Preliminary Offering Memorandum, Vol 2, 
from USA Power Partners LLC, dated September 2002; 
• Copy of Statement from HRO to USA Power Partners, LLC Dated February 11,2003; 
• Copy of Statement Details regarding Williams' review of Geneva Water Rights for 
PacifiCorp, dated April 8,2003; 
• Copy of internal PacifiCorp memo dated April 1,2003, regarding the possible purchase 
of Geneva Steel water rights; and, 
• Transcript of State Engineer hearing of WW Ranches change applications held December 
11,2003. 
• Email dated March 20, 2003 from Rand Thurgood to USA Power Partners 
m% 
C L Y D E S N O W S E S S I O N S & S W E N S O N 
Mr. Thomas R. Karrenberg, Esq. 
January 19,2007 
Page 12 
Although I have testified as an expert witness on a number of occasions, none of 
them have been within the past four years. I have also published several articles, but none 
within the past 10 years. 
Very truly yours, 
g^raz^jzw SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C. 
Enclosure 
STEVEN E. CLYDE 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 





SHAREHOLDER AND DIRECTOR OF 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & S WENSON, P.C. 1975 - 0 7 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Education 
B.S. POLITICAL SCIENCE YEARS ATTENDED 1969-72 
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 
J.D. YEARS ATTENDED 1973 - 75 
University of Utah College of Law, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Experience 
• He is admitted to practice before the courts of the State of Utah, the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, and the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
• Throughout his 31 years of practice, he has specialized in the practice of natural 
resources law, including oil and gas, public land law, mining law and with a primary 
emphasis in water law. 
• He has represented many clients in the buying and selling of water rights and in the 
conversion of water rights from agricultural irrigation use to domestic, municipal and 
industrial use for development of real property, particularly in the resort areas of 
Summit County, Utah. Development projects for which he handled the water rights 
acquisition and conversion include the Jeremy Ranch, Park Meadows Golf Course and 
Development, Glenwild Golf Resort, Ranch Place, Landmark Plaza, Mountain Regional 
Water Special Service District, Summit Park Special Service District, Park City 
Mountain Resort and many others. He is general counsel to the Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District, the sponsor of the Central Utah Project and is knowledgeable 
regarding federal reclamation law. 
• He has represented many individuals and entities before the State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, both as applicants and as protestants to water rights applications, and has 
litigated water rights appeals in the district courts and Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah and in the federal courts. 
• He also has experience in local government law, and has represented many clients in 
planning and zoning activities before city and county planning and zoning authorities. 
He has served in many capacities in both the Utah State Bar Association and the 
American bar Association's Section on Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental 
Law. He served on the governing Council of ABA Section on Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environmental Law from 1989-1991, and as Chair of the Water Resources 
Committee of that section 1985-1988. Mr. Clyde was Chair of the Utah State Bar 
Section of Natural Resources, Energy and Environmental Law 1989-1990; and as Chair 
of the Water Law Committee of that section from 1983 to 1986. 
He is current member and former Chairman of the University of Utah College of Law 
Alumni Association, former Vice-Chair, Chair and current Board member of Utah Open 
Lands Conservation Association (a state-wide Land Trust), and previously served on the 
Board of Trustees of the Utah Water Conservation Forum. 
• He is a contributing editor to Western Water Law & Policy Reporter, a nationally 
published water law periodical, and a contributing author to the water law treatise Water 
and Water Rights. He served as an adjunct faculty member of the S.J. Quinney College 
of Law at the University of Utah, 2001-2004,2007 - teaching water law. 
Representative Clients 
• Central Utah Water Conservancy District; Granger-Hunter Improvement District; Salt 
Lake City Corporation; Murray City Corporation, Sinclair Oil Company. 
• Park City Mountain Resort; Deer Valley Ski Resort; Snowbasin Ski Resort and Brian 
Head Ski Resort 
• Gunnison Irrigation Company; Henefer Irrigation Company; Smithfield Mutual Water 
Company* Bear River Canal Company; Bear River Water Users Association 
Interests 
• Equestrian Competition and Trail Riding 
• Mountain Biking and Road Biking 
• Alpine and Cross Country Skiing 
• Hiking 
• Co-Owner and Operator of the Diamond Bar X Ranch in Woodland, Utah. 
Personal 




Michael 0 . Leayitt 
Governor 
Robert L. Morgan 
Executive Director 
Jerry D. Olds 
State Engineer 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
1594 West North Temple. Suite 220 
PO Box 146300 
Salt Lake City. Utah B4114-6300 
(B01) 536-7240 telephone 
(B01)53B-7467!ax 
www.nrujlah.gov 
Spring Canyon Energy L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 774000 #359 
Steamboat Springs, CO 80477 
53-97 
MULTIPLE APPLICANTS 
START CARDS SENT TO 
ANOTHER APPLICANT 
December 13, 2002 
Dear Applicant: RE: APPROVED CHANGE APPLICATION 
NUMBER 53-97 (a27090) 
This is your authority to develop the water under the above 
referenced application which under Sections 73-3-10- and 
73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, must be diligently 
prosecuted to completion. The water must be put to beneficial 
use and proof of beneficial use be made to the State Engineer on or 
before December 31, 2005; otherwise, the application will be lapsed. 
Proof of beneficial use. is evidence to the State Engineer that the wate 
has been placed to its £ull. intended beneficial use. By law,-it 
must be prepared by a registered engineer or land surveyor, who 
will certify to the location and the uses for. the water. Your proof 
of change .will become the basis for the extent of your.water right. 
Utah water law provides that to maintain a water right's validity,, 
the water must be benefically used. The filing of a change applica-' 
tion does not excuse placing the water to beneficial, use or protect 
the right from challenge of partial or total forfeiture. 
Pai'lure on your part to comply with the requirements of the statutes 
may result in forfeiture of this application. It is the applicant's 
obligation to maintain a current address with this office, .Please 
notify this office immediately of any change. 
Also enclosed are two post cards. You must give the Driller (Start) 
Card to the licensed driller with whom you contract to construct 
the well(s) . The other card is the Applicant Card which is your 
responsibility .to sign' and return to this office immediately after 
final completion of the well. CAUTION: There may be local health 
department requirements for the actual siting of your well. Please 
check with the proper local authority before construction begins. 
Your contact .with this office, should you need it, is with the 
Utah,'Lake/Jordan .River Regional Office, The -telephone number .is 
(B0l)53'i"-7421.' 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Utah! 
<z>. OU-
ferry D. Olds , P.E. 
S t a t e Engineer 
E n c l . : Memorandum Decision P1112 (Oi03V, 
BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NUMBER 53-97 (a27090) ) 
Change Application Number 53-97 (a27090), in the names of R. Blake Garrett and 
Spring.Canyon Energy L.L.C., was f i l e d on September 17. 2002, to change the point 
o f diversion, place of use. and nature o f use of 3.0 cfs of water. Heretofore, 
the water has been diverted from a well located North 1354 feet and West 48 feet 
from the SVA Corner of Section 31. T12S, R1E, SLB&M. and used for the i r r i ga t i on 
of 107.00 acres from Apri l 1 to October 31 in the: WJjNWJf o f Section 31.T12S; 
R1E. SLB&M.; S^NB( of Section 36. T12S. R1W. SLB&M. 
Hereafter, i t " i s proposed to divert 3.0 cfs of water from an existing 8-inch well 
and four proposed 16-inch well 100 to 1000 feet deep. Although eight locations 
are described, only four wi l l be dr i l led. These are to be located: (1) North 
2000 feet and East 1300 feet from the SW Corner of Section 30, T11S. R1E. SLB&M.; 
(2) North 2615 feet and West 660 feet: '(3) North 2615 feet and West 25 feet: (4) 
North 1980 feet and West 25 feet; (5) North 1345 feet and West 25 feet; (6) North 
1345 feet and West 660 feet; (7) North 2615 feet and West 1295 feet; (8) North 
1980 feet and West 1295 feet; and (9) North 1345 feet and West 1295 feet., a l l 
eight from the SE Corner of Section 23. T11S, R1W, SLB&M. The water is to be 
used for steam generation at the Spring Canyon Project with a rated capacity of 
530 megawatts and other incidental uses at the Spring Canyon Energy Project 
including domestic and other uses in the HEUSEX of Section 23, T11S, RlWf SLB&M. 
The application was advertised in The Nephi Times-News on October 9 and 16, 2002, 
and was protested by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. In the written 
protest concern is expressed that no increase in depletion should be allowed by 
th is change application. 
The State Engineer has reviewed the change application, the underlying water 
r ight , the protest, and the extant l i terature on groundwater in the area. The 
histor ic water right is for the i rr igat ion of 107 acres; however. 96 acres are 
solely supplied under this right. The balance-is covered by shares of stock in 
the Nephi Irrigation Company. This use would require a diversion of 384 acre-
feet of water (96 acres X 4.0 acre-feet per acre) and would have consumed a total 
of 210.24 acre-feet of water (96 acres X 2.19 acre-feet per acre). The remainder 
of the water returned to the hydrologic system. The proposed use, basically 
industrial steam power generation and industrial use. has not been quantified for 
the amount of water that would be depleted from the hydrologic system. The 
applicants have enumerated a total of nine wells sites; however, from the 
comments submitted in the application, only four wells w i l l be dr i l led. The 
applicants have met all of the cr i ter ia governing change applications, and i t 
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appears i f conditions are imposed, th i s change*application can be approved. 
In evaluating the various elements of the underlying r igh ts , i t is not the 
intent ion o f the State Engineer to adjudicate the extent of these r ights, rather 
to provide su f f i c ien t de f in i t ion of the rights to assure that other vested rights 
are not impaired by the change and no enlargement occurs. I f . in a subsequent 
act ion, the court adjudicates that t h i s r ight is en t i t led to ei ther more or less 
water, the State Engineer w i l l adjust the figures accordingly. 
I t i s . therefore. ORDERED and Change Application Number 53-97 (a27090) is hereby 
APPROVED subject to pr ior r ights and the following condit ions; 
1. This change application is l im i ted to a to ta l diversion o f 384 acre-feet 
annually and to the.depletion of 210.24 acre-feet annually. 
2! Upon submittal of proof of change, in addftion to a l l other information 
required at that time, the applicants shall provide evidence that the 
diversion and depletion l i m i t s have not been exceeded and that the 
h i s to r i c uses have been eliminated. 
3. The applicants shall i n s t a l l permanent to ta l i z ing meters on a l l wells and 
on a l l water that is being allowed to recharge the groundwater or being 
placed back to the natural stream environment. The'applicants shall keep 
at least monthly records of a l l water diverted from the wells and water 
being returned. The meters and the records shall be available to the 
State Engineer or his representative at a l l reasonable times as may be 
required t o regulate th is change application. 
4. The applicants are responsible for obtaining a l l other permits from the 
appropriate ent i t ies that w i l l be required fo r th is type of water use. 
This Decision i s subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6-17 of the Division of 
Water Rights and to Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
1953. which provide for f i l i n g e i ther a Request for Reconsideration with the 
State Engineer or an appeal wi th the appropriate D is t r i c t Court. A Request for 
Reconsideration must be f i l e d wi th the State Engineer wi thin 20 days of the date 
of th i s Decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a prerequisite 
to f i l i n g a court appeal. A court appeal must be f i l e d within 30 days after the 
date of th i s Decision, or i f a Request for Reconsideration has been f i l ed , within 
30 days a f ter the date the Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for 
Reconsideration is considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the 
Request is f i l e d . 
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Dated t h i s 13 t h day o f December. 2002. 
# W CD. OJA 
ffiry D.^Olds. P.E.. State Engineer 
JDO:JER:kkh 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 13th day of December. 
2002. to: 
R. Blake Garrett 
North Airport Road 
Mona.- UT 84648 
Spring Canyon Energy L L C . 
P.O. Box 774000 #359 
Steamboat Springs. CO 80477 
Jody Williams 
Holme, Roberts and Owen LLP 
229 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City. UT 
Bureau of Reclamation 
c/o Jonathan 8. Jones 
302 East 1860 South 
Provo, UT 84606-7317 
Division of Water Quality 
P0 Box 144870 
Salt Lake City. UT 84116 
Water User Program 
Division of Water Rights 
BY: ™(l^&,nrn/M-
Kelly K. HoHie. Secretary 
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Michael O. Leavitt 
Governor 
Robert L. Morgun 
Executive Director 
Jerry D. Olds 
State Engineer 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS 
1594 Wesl North Temple, Sulle 220 
PO Box 146300 
Sad Lake Ctty, Utah 84114-6300 
{B01} 538-7240 telephone 
{801)538-7467 lax 
v/ww.nr.utah.gov 
Spring Canyon Energy L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 774000 #359 
Steamboat Springs, CO 80477 
January 22, 2003 
53-1431 
Dear Applicant: RE: APPROVED" CHANGE APPLICATION 
NUMBER 53-1431 (a27051) 
This is your authority to develop the water1 under the above 
referenced application which under Sections 73-3-10 and 
73-3-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, must be diligently 
prosecuted to completion. The water must be put to beneficial 
use and proof of beneficial use filed with the State Engineer, as 
provided in" the original application, a21754, with the proof-due 
date of March 31, 2007, as amended by this approved change 
application. 
Failure on your pa,rt to comply with the requirements of the statutes 
may result in forfeiture of .this application. It is the applicant's 
obligation : to* *maiiir.ta-i:a: a-current ..add.:E\es.s with this office.. Please . 
notify this "office immediately of any change.' 
Also enclosed are two post cardsi You must give the Driller (Start) 
Card to the licensed driller with whom you contract to construct 
the well(s) . The other card is the Applicant Card which is your 
responsibility to sign and return to this office immediately after 
final completion of the well. CAUTION: There may be local health 
department requirements for the actual siting of your well. Please 
check with the proper local authority before construction begins. 
Your contact with this office, should you need it, is with the 
Utah Lake/Jordan River Regional Office. The telephone number is 
(801)538-7421. 
Sincerely, 
%AsUj/ 7). Qstdk 
cry D. Jer Olds, P.E 
State Engineer 
JDS ret 
E n d . : Memorandum Decis ion 
Utah! 
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BEFORE THE STATE ENGINEER OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE HATTER OF CHANGE APPLICATION ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
NUMBER 53*1431 (a27051) ) 
Change Application Number 53-1431 (a27051), in the names of Michael S. Keyte and 
Spring Canyon Energy L L C , was filed on September 3, 2002, to change the point 
of diversion, place of use. and nature of use of 163.22 acre-feet of water. 
Heretofore, the water'has been diverted from three wells located: (1) North 2300 
feet and East 1300 feet; (2) North 2010 feet and East 1300 feet; and (3) North 
2000 feet and East 1300 feet all from the SW Corner of Section 30. T11S. R1E, 
•SLB&M. The water has been used for the irrigation of 40.00 acres from April 1 
to October 31, the watering of 83 cattle or equivalent, and the domestic purposes 
of two families in the S W 4 . and the N » of Section 30. T11S. R1E. SLB&M. 
Hereafter, it is proposed to divert 163.22 acre-feet of water from four wells, 
although nine wells are described only four will be drilled, located: (1) North 
2000 feet and East 1300 feet from* the SW Corner of Section 30. T11S, R1E. SLB&M. ;•• 
(2) North 2615 feet and West 660 feet; (3) North 2615 feet and West 25 feet; (4) 
North 1980 feet and West 25 feet; (5) North 1345 feet and West 25 feet; (6) North 
1345 feet and .West 660\feet;.,(7) Jortb.2615 %et and .West 1295 feet; (8) North 
1980 feet and West 1295'feet; and (9) North 1345 feet and West 1295 feet'air 
eight from the SE Corner of Section 23, T11S, R1W. SLB&M. The water 1s to be 
used for steam generation at the Spring Canyon Project with a rated capacity of 
530 megawatts and other incidental uses at the Spring Canyon Energy Project 
including domestic and other uses in the NBfSEK of Section 23. T11S, R1W. SLB&M. 
The application-Was advertised* in The Nephi Times-News on .September 25 and 
October 2. 2002, and was protested by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, 
In the written protest concern 1s expressed that no increase in depletion should 
be allowed by this change application. 
The State Engineer has reviewed the change application, the underlying water 
right, the protest, and the extant literature on groundwater in the area. The 
historic water right is for the irrigation of 40 acres, livestock water for 83 
cattle or equivalent, and for the domestic use of two families. These uses 
require a diversion of 163.22 acre-feet of water (40 acres X 4.0. acre-feet per 
acre + 83 livestock X*0.028 acre-foot per head + two families X 0.45 acre-foot 
per family). These same uses would have consumed a total of 90.1 acre-feet of 
water (40 acres X 2:19 acre-feet per acre + 83 livestock X 0.028 acre-foot per 
head + two families X 0.45 acre-foot per family X .20* depletion).' The proposed 
use. basically industrial steam power generation and industrial use. has not been 
quantified for the amount of water that can be depleted from the hydro!ogic 
system. The applicants have enumerated a total of nine well sites, however, from 
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the comments submitted in the application, only.four wells w i l l be dr i l led. The 
State Engineer is of the opinion that, i f appropriate conditions -are imposed, 
this change can be approved without impairing rights of others. 
In evaluating the various elements of the underlying-rights, i t is not the 
intention of the State Engineer to adjudicate the extent of these rights, rather 
to provide sufficient definition of the rights to assure that other vested rights 
are not impaired by the change and no enlargement occurs. I f , in a subsequent 
action, the court adjudicates that this right is entitled to either more or less 
water, the State Engineer wi l l adjust the figures accordingly. 
I t is , therefore, ORDERED and Change Application Number 53-1431 (a27051) is 
hereby APPROVED subject to prior rights and the following conditions: 
1. This change application is limited to a diversion of 163.22 acre-feet 
annually and the depletion of 90.1 acre-feet annually. 
2. Upon submittal of proof of change, -1n. addition to al.l other information 
required at that time, the applicants shall provide evidence that the 
diversion and depletion limits have not been exceeded and that the 
historic uses have been eliminated. 
3. The applicants shall instal l permanent totalizing meters on al l wells and 
shall keep at least monthly records of all water diverted from the wells. 
The meters and the records shali be available to the State Engineer or his 
representative at a l l reasonable times as may be required to regulate this 
change application. 
This Decision is subject to the provisions of Rule R655-6-17 of the Division of 
Water Rights and to Sections 63-46b-13 and 73-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
•1953, which provide for f i l i ng either a Request for Reconsideration with the 
State Engineer or an appeal with the appropriate District Court. A Request for 
Reconsideration must be f i led with the State Engineer within 20 days of the date 
of this Decision. However, a Request for Reconsideration is not a prerequisite 
to f i l i ng a court appeal. A court appeal must be fi led within 30 days after the 
date of this Decision, or i f a Request for Reconsideration has been f i led, within 
30 days after the date the Request for Reconsideration is denied. A Request for 
Reconsideration is considered denied when no action is taken 20 days after the 
Request is f i led. 
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Dated this 22nd day of January. 2003. 
Mrry D^Olds. P.E.. State Engineer 
JDO:JER:kkh 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision this 22nd day of January, 
2003. to: 
Michael S. Keyte 
P.O. Box 274 
Mona, UT 84645 
Spring Canyon Energy L.L.C. 
P.O. Box 774000 #359 
Steamboat Springs, CO 80477 
Jody Williams 
Holme, Roberts and Owen LLP 
229 South Main Street. Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Bureau of Reclamation 
c/o Jonathan B. Jones 
302 East 1860 South 
Provo. UT 84606-7317 
BY: - K ) A K K. f i/WW 
Kelly K. tforne. Secretary 
m&i 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
tkarrenberg@aklawflrm.com 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER 
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and ] 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
) JODY L. WILLIAMS 
I Civil No. 050903412 
) The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Jody L. Williams, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am now, and have been since the fall of 1978, licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. 
2. From July, 2002 forward, I was the partner at Holme Roberts & Owen, LLC, who 
was in charge of the USA Power Partners' matter. As of January, 2003, the Utah Division of 
Water Rights had approved both the Michael Keyte ("Keyte") and Blake Garrett ("Garrett") 
water change applications and Holme Roberts' work with respect to the water rights was 
complete. From January 25, 2003 through September 9, 2003, neither I nor anyone else at 
Holme Roberts performed any legal services for any Plaintiff. 
3. After September 17, 2003, Holme Roberts did not perform any further or other 
legal services for any Plaintiff. 
4. I did not represent Plaintiffs in any negotiations with PacifiCorp. Similarly, I did 
not represent PacifiCorp in any negotiations with Plaintiffs. 
5. I had no involvement in PacifiCorp's decision to conduct RFP 2003-A, in 
evaluating the bids received in response to RFP 2003-A, in PacifiCorp's decision to build 
Currant Creek or in PacifiCorp's decision to seek approval from the Utah Public Service 
Commission to do so. 
6. On April 26, 2004, PacifiCorp and WW Ranches closed the purchase of 
PacifiCorp's acquisition of stock in the Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company and Goshen 
Irrigation Company, which then gave PacifiCorp the right to use water owned by those irrigation 
companies. 
2 
1. None of the water rights work that Holme Roberts performed for PacifiCoip had 
any impact on the water rights options that Spring Canyon Energy had previously acquired from 
Keyte and Garrett. 
8. The water rights options Spring Canyon Energy acquired from Keyte and Garrett 
were not pertinent to, and had nothing to do with, the irrigation company stock PacifiCoip 
purchased from WW Ranches. 
9. I did not advise PacifiCorp regarding any aspect of the Currant Creek project 
other than with respect to its water rights acquisition. 
10. Neither I nor anyone else at Holme Roberts advised PacifiCoip concerning any 
potential transaction with Plaintiffs. 
DATED this of April, 2007. 
]Q&I L. Williams 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this U^L day of April, 2007. 
Residing at: 
My Commission B x ^ e ^
 gmm 
T mmL££T """ ""Notary Public ~* "J 
I /$mSk^ JEFFREYC. WILLIAMS I 
I &&ZBkX& 2W Souft Main Street Su»«l800| 
H i t m f i l n ! } Salt Uke City. Utah 84111 I 
Ix&VSwM My Corranfcston Expires i 
• NqgJ?^ state of Utah j 
w 
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tin the Matter of the Application of 
OPacifiCorp for a Certificate of 
Convenience and Necessity 
Authorizing 







DOCKET NO. 03-035-29 
REPORT AM) ORDER 
ISSUED: March 5.2004 
SHORT TITLE 
PacifiCorp Currant Creek Certificate Case 
SYNOPSIS 
The Commission grants a certificate of public convenience and necessity 
authorizing PacifiCorp to construct a staged 280 megawatt natural gas-fired simple cycle 
combustion turbine for service in the summer of 2005 with conversion to a 525-megawatt 
combined cycle combustion turbine in 2006 at the Currant Creek plant site. 
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L PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 24,2003, PacifiCorp ("Company") filed its Integrated Resource 
Plan 2003 ("IRP 2003"). This filing was required under the Commission's Standards and 
Guidelines for Integrated Resource Planning for PacifiCorp established in Docket No. 90-
2035-01. 
On March 6, 2003, the following parties filed a joint request asking the 
Commission to adopt open bidding requirements for competitive acquisition by 
PacifiCorp of electric generating resources and affiliate transaction requirements for 
certain investor owned utilities: Utah Association of Energy Users ("UAE"), IHC Health 
Services, Hexcel Corporation, S F Phosphates, Swift & Company-Utah, American Pacific 
Corporation, May Foundry and Machine, American Foundry Society Utah Chapter, 
Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company, U S Executive Agencies, Tooele County, 
Grantsville City, US Magnesium LLC and Desert Power. The Commission opened 
Docket No. 03-035-03 for this request On March 11,2003, the Commission issued a 
Notice of Proposed Scheduling Order and also set a scheduling conference for March 18, 
2003. On March 20,2003, the Commission issued a Scheduling Order setting three 
technical conferences and a further scheduling conference. 
On April 18, 2003, pursuant to an April 9,2003 Commission Notice, a 
technical conference was held on PacifiCorp's IRP 2003. After considering filed 
comments, the Commission, on May 30,2003, issued an order acknowledging that 
PacifiCorp's IRP 2003 and Action Plan conform to applicable guidelines. 
On June 4, 2003, a Stipulation Regarding Outside Evaluator for PacifiCorp's 
RFP 2003-A (Appendix I) ("Stipulation") was filed with the Commission. The 
Stipulation was signed by all of the original petitioners, except Tooele County, in the 
open bidding requirements Docket No. 03-035-03 in addition to PacifiCorp, the Division 
of Public Utilities ('Division*'), the Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee") and 
Salt Lake Community Action Program ("SLCAP"). The Stipulation states parties intend 
to hold additional discussions regarding development of open bidding and/or affiliate 
rules, and the Commission will be notified to the extent further technical conferences or 
proceedings are requested In the Stipulation, parties agree to guidelines for evaluating 
PacifiCorp's processing of its RFP 2003-A for east-side resources. The Stipulation 
provides for and specifies the duties of an outside evaluator and the criteria to be used in 
evaluating the Request For Proposals ("RFP") process. The Stipulation further states the 
guidelines are to be used for future supply-side solicitations contemplated by the 
Company's 2003 Integrated Resource Plan when PacifiCorp considers a self-build option 
or allows an affiliate to bid. The Stipulation states the parties' agreement that no further 
Commission action is necessary with respect to establishing guidelines or requirements 
for PacifiCorp's processing of the 2003-A RFP. 
On August 1, 2003, Navigant, the independent evaluator selected pursuant to 
the Stipulation, filed its report, Review and Audit of PacifiCorp's Next Best Alternative 
dated July 22, 2003. This was-the first process report from the independent evaluator, as 
required by the Stipulatioa 
On October 30,2003, PacifiCorp filed its update to the IRP 2003, resulting in 
a revised load and resource balance, concluding that resource requirements in the Eastern 
control area, which includes Utah, are accelerated. 
On November 3, 2003, PacifiCorp filed an Application asking the 
Commission to grant a certificate of convenience and necessity authorizing the 
construction of a 525 megawatt (tcMW") resource addition, known as the Currant Creek 
Power Project ("Currant Creek"), adjacent to the Company's Mona Substation in Juab 
County, Utah. Phase one of the Currant Creek Power Project consists of two natural gas-
fired simple cycle combustion turbine ("SCCT") generators, each with a nominal 140 
MW capacity, for a total of 280 MW with planned commercial operation by June 2005. 
In the second phase of the project planned for completion by March 2006, the plant is 
converted to a combined-cycle combustion turbine ("CCCT') with a total capacity of 525 
MW and a total estimated installed cost of $343 million. The Application was supported 
by the testimony of J. Rand Thurgood, Managing Director of Resource Development and 
Project Management, on the selection, timing and cost of the resource addition; Jon 
Cassity, Manager Resource Planning (testimony later adopted by Melissa Seymour, 
Manager of Planning and Financial Analysis), on the Company's load and resource 
balance and the need for additional resources; Mark Tallman, Managing Director of 
Trading & Origination, on how bids received in response to the Company's RFP 2003-A 
compare to the cost of the Currant Creek Project; and Bruce Williams, Treasurer of 
PacifiCorp, on financing the resource additioa A Motion for Entry of Protective Order 
was also filed by PacifiCorp on this date. 
On November 3,2003, the Commission issued a Notice of Scheduling 
Conference in the Currant Creek docket, setting the conference for November 12,2003. 
At the conference, parties indicated they were unable to reach agreement on a schedule. 
On November 12, 2003, the Commission issued the Protective Order. On November 14, 
2003, the Commission issued a Scheduling Order setting a Technical Conference on 
November 24, 2003. At the conference, PacifiCorp discussed the goals of the RFP and 
the status of bid categories. Navigant discussed its role and responsibilities in the RFP 
process followed by a question and answer session. Parties met to discuss scheduling on 
December 1,2003. No agreed schedule was reached 
On November 10,2003, Navigant filed its report, Review and Audit of 
PacifiCorp' Screening Review Process dated November 7,2003. This was the second 
process report from the independent evaluator as required by the Stipulation. 
Pursuant to the December 2, 2003 Notice by the Commission, a scheduling 
conference in the Currant Creek docket was held on December 9, 2003. Parties were still 
unable to reach an agreed upon schedule. On December 16, 2003, the Commission issued 
a Third Scheduling Order providing for direct testimony from the Division, Committee 
and interveners on February 4,2004, Rebuttal on February 11,2004 and Hearings on 
February 18-19, 2004. 
On January 29, 2004, Spring Canyon Energy LLC ("Spring Canyon Energy") 
filed with the Commission a motion to compel PacifiCorp to respond to data requests and 
to continue the hearing schedule in the Currant Creek docket for two weeks. On January 
30,2004, PacifiCorp filed a response to Spring Canyon Energy's motion and also filed its 
own motion to compel Spring Canyon Energy to respond to PacifiCorp's data requests. 
On February 2,2004, the Commission held a hearing on Spring Canyon Energy's motion. 
The Commission, in a bench ruling, denied Spring Canyon Energy's motion, kept the 
scheduled hearing and testimony dates and shortened discovery turnaround to four days. 
We further set February 6, 2004 to hear PacifiCorp's motion. The Commission ruled that 
Counsel will have access to all the complete documents and that expert witnesses or 
designated employees will have access to redacted versions subject to the protective 
order. 
On February 11,2004, Navigant filed its Final Report on PacifiCorp's RFP 
2003-A in Docket No. 03-035-03. This was the detailed report by the independent 
evaluator regarding all aspects of the RFP process and its conclusions and 
recommendations as required by the Stipulatioa 
Following a February 13,2004 notice, the Commission held a scheduling 
conference in the Currant Creek docket on February 17, 2004. After hearing from the 
parties, the Commission determined that the original schedule would not allow sufficient 
time and added to the schedule, hearings on February 20, 25,26, and 27, 2004. Hearings 
were held February 18,19,20,25,26,27 and March 1, 2004, at which time testimony 
and evidence were received, and witnesses cross-examined 
Parties to this case are PacifiCorp, the Division, Committee and the following 
interveners: Utah Energy Office, Spring Canyon Energy, Calpine Corporation 
("Calpine"), Deseret Generation & Transmission, Utah Association of Counties, Western 
Resource Advocates, US Magnesium LLC and the UAE Intervention Group which . 
includes: UAE, Alliant Aerospace Propulsion Company, American Pacific Corporation, 
Central Valley Water Reclamation District, ChevronTexaco ERTC, Hexcel Corporation, 
IHC Health Services, S F Phosphates, Swift & Company-Utah and Tesoro Refining and 
Marketing Company. Testimony was presented by the following parties: PacifiCorp, 
Division, Committee, Spring Canyon Energy, UAE Intervention Group and Calpine. 
n. POSITION OP THE PARTIES 
PacifiCorp states that the present and future public convenience and necessity 
requires construction of the proposed resource addition. The Company explains that the 
past decade of retail load growth in Utah in conjunction with declining resources require 
the addition of new resources. The Company has determined that the phased construction 
of a 525-MW plant consisting of two natural gas-fired generating units at the Currant 
Creek location is the most cost effective alternative available to meet the Company's 
needs for a daily dispatchable resource by the summer of 2005. The Company testifies it 
is finalizing a contract with Stone & Webster for plant construction, has obtained or will 
obtain all necessary permits, such as air quality, to both construct and operate the plant, 
and is fully capable of properly financing the project The Company states that the 
Currant Creek Project will not conflict with, adversely affect the operations of, or 
constitute an extension into the territory of any existing certificated fixed public utility 
providing retail electric service to the public. The Company further states that without the 
Currant Creek Project, the Company and its customers would be exposed to the volatility 
in the wholesale power market, high transmission costs associated with delivering power 
to Utah customers and potential adverse impacts on service reliability. 
Based upon its analysis of the Application, the Division recommends issuance 
of the certificate of convenience and necessity conditioned by receipt of evidence that all 
required permits have been secured The Division testifies the RFP bid process was fair, 
Currant Creek is the most economic alternative and the economics of the Currant Creek 
project are so superior that changes to the bidding or evaluation processes would not alter 
the relative ranking of the alternatives. The Division accepts that the Company needs 
additional capacity identified through the IRP process and states that Currant Creek is 
consistent with those identified needs. The Division represents that PacifiCorp has the 
capability to finance the Currant Creek project The Division indicated it found no 
evidence to refute Navigant's conclusions that the RFP process was fair and consistent 
and managed in a manner that led to unassailable results. The Division believes the risk 
to ratepayers of building the first phase of the Currant Creek project is $5 million which 
represents the incremental cost of building Currant Creek as a phased project The 
Division recommends using a forum to discuss ways to improve the RFP process. 
The Committee testifies to a system capacity deficiency in the summer of 
2005. From its analysis, the Committee concludes that because of perceived problems 
with the modeling used to evaluate bids, together with other problems with the RFP and 
bid evaluation process, it is impossible to determine that Currant Creek is the most 
economical resource available. The Committee recommends a separate docket be opened 
to consider a number of recommendations it makes to improve the RFP and bid 
evaluation process going forward The Committee testifies it would have difficulty 
finding fault with a Commission order to grant the certificate for Currant Creek if the 
Commission concludes that there is not a reasonable way to acquire adequate resources to 
meet summer 2005 needs, or that the cost of acquiring those resources would put 
customers at risk of high prices. 
Spring Canyon Energy testifies it concurs with the need for new generation 
resources based on its own independent study of PacifiCorp's forecasted demand/load 
growth. It believes the Spring Canyon project is lower cost than PacifiCorp's Currant 
Creek project. Spring Canyon Energy states the bid evaluation process was unfair as its 
bids were not evaluated properly and that PacifiCorp did not negotiate in good faith. 
Spring Canyon Energy recommends the Commission deny a certificate to PacifiCorp, and 
instead award Spring Canyon Energy the 2005 peak bid. It states that if the Commission 
accepts that the resource deficit is 1,000 MW, then both Currant Creek and Spring 
Canyon projects should be built 
The UAE Intervention Group testifies the RFP process was not demonstrated 
to be fair or reasonable. It testifies that PacifiCorp's evaluation process is fundamentally 
flawed because of an inappropriate comparison of peaking bids to Currant Creek and a 
failure to evaluate combinations of peaking and baseload alternatives to Currant Creek. It 
recommends reopening the bid process for the peak bid category with the condition that 
bids meet the summer of 2005 resource needs. If the RFP 2003-A peak category is not re-
bid, it recommends that a combination of peaking, base load and super-peaking bids be 
evaluated against the Company's next best alternative (NBA) which is the Currant Creek 
Project 
Calpine recommends the Commission allow the RFP process for the base load 
bid category to continue unaffected by the decision in this proceeding. Calpine further 
recommends that the base load RFP process should be concluded before approval of any 
subsequent phases of development at Currant Creek 
m . DISCUSSION, FUNDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. NEED 
It is the statutory duty of PacifiCorp to provide adequate electric service in its 
franchise service territory [USC 54-3-1]. To this end, and as required by this 
Commission in Docket No. 90-2035-01, the Company engages in a public resource 
planning process. The purpose of this planning process is to identify the optimal set of 
resources, given the expected combination of costs, risks and uncertainties, over the long-
run to provide safe and reliable electric service for customers. The Company's Integrated 
Resource Plan 2003 filed January 24,2003 and acknowledged by this Commission on 
May 30,2003, is the primary source cited by witnesses as the basis upon which to 
detennine the need for the Currant Creek resource in 2005. We are well aware of the time 
spent, a full two year process, by the Company, regulators and interested parties, in the 
development of IRP 2003. Further, we note the positive reception the IRP process and 
final report generated. The Company also relies upon its IRP 2003 Update, filed October 
30, 2003, although the Committee points out that this is an information filing only and 
not the result of public review and Commission acknowledgment 
The capacity deficiency in the summer of 2005 noted in IRP 2003 and cited 
by Company and Committee witnesses is 1,283 megawatts assuming a 15% planning 
margin. This deficit grows persistently for the next 10 years. The Division testifies that 
even under the more conservative assumption of a 10% planning margin, IRP 2003 
shows a capacity deficiency exceeding 800 megawatts over the next five years, 
increasing to over 1,700 megawatts in 2009. 
PacifiCorp additionally provides its analysis of load and resource balance in 
the eastern portion of its integrated system. This analysis differs from IRP 2003. It is 
based on the revised load forecasts used in the IRP 2003 Update, uses a calculation of 
operating reserve and an estimate of forced plant outage in place of a target planning 
margin, and is based on a subset of PacifiCorp system loads and resources and firm 
transmission rights. Although neither the Division nor the Committee relies upon or 
refutes this analysis of resource need, it too shows capacity deficiency. This deficiency is 
expected to be 1,049 megawatts in summer 2005 and increases to over 1,900 megawatts 
in 2009. 
Spring Canyon Energy relies upon its own studies of load growth to support 
the conclusions reached by PacifiCorp that there is a genuine need for additional 
resource. Neither UAE Intervention Group nor Calpine support or refute the timing or 
magnitude of capacity deficiency. 
We find the magnitude of deficiency considerable, and as the Division 
testifies, we realize this is not new. The Company's reliance on the wholesale market for 
meeting this need since the time it filed its IRP "RAMPP-5" in 1997, has placed the 
Company and its customers at considerable risk of the high cost for purchases or reduced 
reliability. We commend the Company for changing its planning strategy, for producing a 
viable plan and for moving forward on filling the capacity deficit created by past 
planning policy and business decisions. 
The Company and Division also testify, and we so find, that Currant Creek is 
generally consistent with the ERP 2003 least cost portfolio, "Diversified Portfolio F 
which identifies both long-term and short-term firm capacity additions. The type, size and 
timing of resources requested by the Company in its Request for Proposals T^RPP 2003-
A") follows directly from the IRP 2003 Action Plan to implement Diversified Portfolio I 
long-term firm capacity resource additions. This includes a request for 225 megawatts of 
super peak hour resource and 200 megawatts of peak hour resource. The Company 
testifies that the configuration and size of Currant Creek, a staged 280 megawatt simple 
cycle to 420 megawatt combined cycle combustion turbine with 105 megawatt duct firing 
for a total of 525 MW, is the economic choice for its next best alternative given higher 
gas price expectations and greater combined cycle equipment flexibility than assumed in 
IRP 2003 and given higher peak demand expected in its IRP 2003 Update. 
Several witnesses express concern that bids in the peak bid category of RFP 
2003-A are measured against a cost based resource that is typically characterized as a 
baseload unit, that is, a resource that operates economically for most hours of the year 
rather than just for peak hours of demand. However, the record shows that this 
configuration is an appropriate design when gas prices are high and when the equipment 
can effectively dispatch daily. No party presented evidence that the gas price assumptions 
used by PacifiCorp are unreasonable nor disputed the ability of combined-cycle 
equipment to provide cost-effective peaking capacity. Navigant testifies that ten bids in 
the 2005 category are based on combined cycle technology and that two include duct 
firing and PacifiCorp testifies that four of these made the short list. Indeed, Spring 
Canyon Energy witnesses testify that they did not consider bidding a simple cycle 
combustion turbine because a combined-cycle facility has a much better heat rate and a 
much lower cost to the rate payer. Further, they state that the only reason for considering 
a simple-cycle facility is to meet an online date not possible for a combined-cycle 
facility. Calpine testifies that an economic way to provide peaking power in 2005 is to 
stage construction of a combined cycle by starting with a simple cycle in the first year. In 
fact, no party in this case testifies that a simple cycle combustion turbine without staged 
conversion to combined cycle is least cost to fill the need identified in IRP 2003 for the 
resource added in 2005. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Currant Creek power project 
addresses a genuine need for additional resource in the summer of 2005. Further, we find 
reasonable, the type and size of generation facility proposed to address the projected need 
identified in IRP 2003. 
B. REP PROCESS 
On June 4, 2003, the Stipulation Regarding Outside Evaluator For 
PacifiCorp's RFP 2003-A was submitted to the Commission (Appendix I) This 
Stipulation describes the role, duties and process of an outside evaluator with respect to 
implementing and administering the Company's RFP to obtain generation resources 
located in the East control area. On June 6, 2003, the Company issued RFP 2003-A, in 
which resources were sought in super peak, peak and baseload bid categories. In addition 
to delivery into the Company's East control area, the most important resource 
characteristics were date of delivery and dispatchability. 
In the super peak bid category, the Company requested a firm resource of 
approximately 225 MWs, with delivery beginning in the summer of 2004 through the 
summer of 2007, dispatchable daily during specific hours. In the peak bid category, 
approximately 200 MWs were requested, with deliveiy beginning in June 2005 for up to 
twenty years, and also dispatchable daily. In the baseload category, approximately 570 
MWs were requested, with delivery beginning in June 2007 for up to twenty years. 
As detailed in the RFP, the bids were to be compared on an economic basis 
against the Company's Next Best Alternatives ("NBA"). For the super peak bid category, 
the NBA was assumed to be forward market purchases delivered to the Company's East 
control area. In the peak and baseload bid categories, the Company's proposal to build 
the Cureant Creek plant served as the NBA. The Company provided Navigant with the 
detailed information regarding its Currant Creek proposal, and Navigant began its review 
of the Company's proposal on June 19,2003. This review concluded with a July 22, 2003 
report, "Navigant Consulting Ina's Review and Audit Of PacifiCorp's Next Best 
Alternative," submitted to the Commission on August 1,2003, as set forth in the 
Stipulation. 
Thirty seven entities responded to the RFP, submitting ninety four specific 
proposals (termed indicative "blind" bids, as the identity of the bidder was unknown to 
the Company), plus some subsequent offers that were variations of original offers. 
Differences among the bids included types of bidding companies, contract duration, MW 
commitments, heat rates, delivery points, fuel sources, equipment configurations, and 
pricing. On July 22,2003 the bids were received by Navigant, and subsequently 
PacifiCorp began screening the bids. This involved identifying the bid category to which 
an offer belonged, then documenting the price and terms of the offers, resulting in a 
financial valuation of the offers by means of models. Bids were then scored and ranked 
on three criteria: price, dispatchability, and environmental characteristics. Navigant's 
review of the Company's screening process concluded with a November 7, 2003 report, 
"Navigant Consulting Inc/s Review and Audit Of PacifiCorp's Screening Review 
Process for RFP 2003-A," submitted to the Commission on November 10,2003, as set 
forth in the Stipulation. 
Following the scoring and ranking of offers, a preliminary short list of bidders 
was identified. The identity of these bidders was then made known to the Company, and 
clarifying discussions were undertaken with these bidders to arrive at their definitive 
proposals. Once clarified, the economic valuation of these definitive proposals were 
again modeled, and a final short list of bidders was derived in order to identify with 
whom the Company would enter into more detailed negotiations. 
Thirteen specific proposals were submitted in the super peak bid category, all 
of which were some form of a purchase power agreement There were six bids short-
listed in the super peak bid category. None was found to be attractive, primarily due to 
economics and transmission or point of delivery issues. 
Twenty eight specific proposals were submitted in the peak bid category. Of 
these, seventeen were power purchase agreements, involving a pricing structure based on 
power/gas spread options. Eight of the bids involved turnkey offers, in which an entity 
constructs a facility which is then transferred to the Company at the date of commercial 
operation. Two bids involved the sale of equipment for use at a site of the Company's 
choosing, and one bid was a lease arrangement 
Ten bids from five entities were short-listed in the peak bid category. 
Clarifying discussions were then held with these five bidders. As a result of subsequent 
discussions, no offer was found to be more economic than the Company's NBA. 
However, with no viable offers forthcoming in the super peak bid category, and greater 
expected need than initially requested, the Company wished to explore further the 
opportunity of obtaining resources from the peak bid category. A new NBA was 
determined consisting of forward market purchases for two years followed by an 
expansion at Currant Creek. The Company resumed discussion with three of the entities 
who had made the short-list in the peak bid category. Another round of clarifying 
discussions were held with these three bidders, offers were revised and compared to the 
new NBA None of these offers was found to be economically superior to the Company's 
new NBA, and discussions in the peak bid category ceased. 
Fifty three specific proposals were initially submitted in the baseload bid 
category, eleven of which were found to be more economic than the Company's NBA for 
this category. Clarification discussions were held with bidders, resulting in twenty offers 
from eight entities. Assuming that the Currant Creek proposal in the peak bid category 
were built by summer of 2005, an expansion of Currant Creek by summer of 2007 was 
developed as a new baseload MBA against which these offers were then compared This 
identified three entities with whom the Company began detailed discussions. Discussions 
with two entities remain on-going as of February, 2003. 
The Company complied with the June 5, 2003 Stipulation between the 
Company and signatory parties to use an outside evaluator to oversee the entire RFP 
process to ensure that the Company's approach to evaluating offers was fair, consistent 
and reasonable. In the July 22,2003 report on its review and audit of the Company's 
NBA, Navigant concluded that Currant Creek as the NBA appears to be a viable project 
and consistent with the RFP, the expected cost assumptions are fair and reasonable, and 
the modeling is sound. In the November 7,2003 report on its review and audit of the 
Company's screening review process, Navigant concluded the process to be consistently 
applied to all proposals, bidders were given a fair, equal and ample opportunity to present 
their proposals, and the assumptions, modeling, and treatment of the proposals were 
reasonable. In its February 11, 2004 final report, Navigant concluded that the RFP 
process satisfied the primary criteria of equal opportunity, analytical objectivity, 
reasonableness, and objectivity. These criteria are essentially the requirements oudined in 
the July 5,2003 Stipulatioa Navigant stated it "unequivocally supports the RFP process 
as having been managed in an effective manner with results that are unassailable.B The 
conclusions made by Navigant are also supported by the Divisioa Navigant also testifies 
that during the entire time it was involved in the 2003 REP, its focus was satisfying the 
requirements as laid out in the Stipulatioa 
C. ALTERNATIVES 
Based on the record in this case, we examine five alternative courses of action 
proposed by parties for PacifiCorp to meet the resource deficiency intended to be filled 
by the 2005 summer peak bid category of the 2003-A RFP: 1) Rely exclusively on 
wholesale market power purchases, 2) Re-bid the peak bid category of the 2003-A RFP, 
3) Re-analyze the bids already received, 4) Restart negotiations with bidders, or 5) 
Proceed with building a new resource. We discuss each alternative in turn. 
Rely exclusively on wholesale market power purchases 
Although the Company testifies that firm transmission might be available to 
help meet the 2005 summer needs, it has been unable to acquire firm power purchases 
sufficient to meet the expected deficiency. There are risks to relying exclusively on the 
wholesale market, including the risk of high prices, inadequate supplies or transmission 
capacity for delivery. No definitive evidence is presented to demonstrate the availability 
of adequate power supplies at the time and location needed and at reasonable prices. We 
know from experience that the cost of market exposure is real. In 2001, PacifiCorp stated 
that Utah's share of the cost of market exposure was $102 million for the four summer 
months alone. We approved a stipulation that allowed the Company to collect a portion 
of this cost from ratepayers. This alternative is also inconsistent with IRP-2003 
conclusions that the least cost/risk strategy is to fill a portion of the capacity deficit with 
long-term firm capacity rather than exclusively with short-term firm purchases. We 
conclude that this alternative is unacceptable. 
Re-bid the peak bid category of the 2003-A RFP 
Based on its view that the bid process was unfair due to an inappropriate 
comparison of peaking bids to the NBA and a failure to evaluate combinations of peaking 
and baseload alternatives to the NBA, the UAE Intervention Group recommends that the 
peak bid category of the 2003-A RFP be re-bid 
We accept that there are multiple ways of accomplishing the bid evaluation 
task. We are not persuaded by the testimony that a superior outcome would result from a 
different method. Arguments presented are not accompanied by definitive evidence that 
clearly shows an alternative method is superior. We are persuaded by the Company, 
Division and Navigant testimony that the RPP process and evaluation methods are fair 
and reasonable for the task of screening for competitive bids. The same process and 
evaluation tools are being used in the 2007 bid category without apparent issue. Calpine 
testifies that a re-bid of the 2007 bid category is a bad idea because it is unfair to previous 
bidders who have incurred costs, because confidential information about the earlier bids 
is now known to PacifiCorp and because it would take eight to twelve months to 
complete. These concerns apply as well to the 2005 peak bid category. 
A re-bid would delay the ability for any alternative to meet the summer 2005 
need resulting in risk of higher cost and less reliability. Navigant testifies that the RFP in 
this case had to be submitted to the Oregon Commission for approval. A revision to the 
RFP for a re-bid would need to be submitted to Oregon to determine whether a re-bid 
must be approved by that jurisdiction. Additional time would be needed to resolve this 
issue and to obtain any additional Oregon approval. Navigant testifies, based on its 
experience with RFP's, a re-bid of the peak bid category would take from six to ten 
months to complete and would not preclude the type of process dissatisfaction present in 
the current bid Navigant lists the steps needed in a re-bid: get Commission guidance on a 
revised solicitation, prepare the revised RFP, issue the RFP, hold explanatory sessions 
with bidders, allow time for bidders to prepare and submit bids, review and model bids, 
screen, rank and short list bids, clarify bids and complete negotiations. 
Based on evidence in the case, this length of delay would not leave sufficient 
time for plant construction to meet the 2005 summer resource needs. The Company 
testified its Currant Creek project would not be an alternative in a re-bid, since the 
estimated cancellation costs incurred due to the additional delay would preclude 
expanding the risk the Company is willing to take. We conclude that the significant re-
bid delay would reduce the possibility of finding a reasonable alternative to meet the 
2005 summer needs. Because of this and the other concerns discussed, we find the re-bid 
alternative unacceptable. 
Re-analyze the bids already received 
The UAE Intervention Group recommends that if no re-bid is desired, then 
existing bids should be re-analyzed using combinations of bids to make a better 
comparison against the Company's next best alternative of a simple cycle combustion 
turbine phased into a combined cycle combustion turbine plant. The Company testified 
that the number of combinations in a re-analysis of existing bids is significant and would 
be impractical. Any permutation of re-analyzed bids that might show an attractive 
combination would still require negotiations with multiple bidders to reach final 
agreements. As evidenced by the time being expended to negotiate a potential agreement 
with Calpine, this could take a lengthy period of time. We conclude that re-analyzing the 
bids would cause additional delay, would not preclude bidder dissatisfaction and is 
unnecessary for the purposes of this case. 
Restart negotiations with bidders 
Spring Canyon testifies PacifiCorp was unwilling to negotiate with them. 
They believe negotiations can and should resume. PacifiCorp testifies that negotiations 
can take many months as evidenced by the four months of negotiating with Calpine in the 
base load bid category, which is still on-going. Given the estimated construction times on 
the record, restarting negotiations with the short listed parties in the peak bid category is 
likely to preclude completion of a new plant in time to meet the 2005 summer capacity 
requirements. We are also concerned that restarting negotiations after a bidder's best and 
final offer is made and found to be uneconomic would be unfair to other bidders and 
impair the credibility of the process. We conclude that this alternative is unacceptable. 
Proceed with building a new resource 
Spring Canyon Energy testifies that its build bid, if evaluated using its 
approach, would be lower overall cost than the Company's Currant Creek Project The 
Company, Navigant and the Division dispute this claim They contend that Spring 
Canyon Energy's bids were fairly evaluated with the overall cost being substantially 
more than Currant Creek. As we have previously stated, we are not convinced that any 
alternative evaluation is superior to that used by the Company. Spring Canyon Energy's 
evaluation relies on terms that were never formally bid in writing to the Company. Spring 
Canyon Energy testifies it thought negotiations started after announcement of the short 
list, while Navigant and the Company stated this was not the process spelled out 
previously. Because of this, Spring Canyon Energy did not put forth a specific bid 
regarding plant residual value ownership at the end of the contract term before being 
eliminated from the RFP process, PacifiCorp testifies that Spring Canyon Energy's bids 
reflected an unwillingness to accept the risk of law changes, interest rates or terminal 
value, which together with other aspects of its bids, made it not competitive. Spring 
Canyon Energy was one of only two bidders to provide testimony in this case, and the 
only one of thirty seven who complained about the process. 
The Division testifies that the value of bids must be taken into account from 
the ratepayers' perspective. This means that any power purchase agreement with a term 
less than the useful life of the associated plant, to be competitive, must be priced to 
account for this difference. We agree: it is a long standmg ratemaking principle to match 
costs with benefits. Calpine's competitive bid in the base load category of the 2003-A 
RPP took this into account since Calpine testifies its bid with a twenty year power 
purchase agreement was competitive with the Company's NBA. PacifiCorp 
acknowledges that they continue to negotiate with Calpine in this bid category. This 
demonstrates that a power purchase agreement can be competitive. 
The Company's Currant Creek resource addition is fully described on the 
record PacifiCorp testifies that it has received a building permit from Juab County and 
that it fully expects to receive other necessary permits to both construct and operate the 
Currant Creek plant and that it is fully capable of properly financing the project The 
Division agrees that the Company has the ability to finance the Currant Creek Project and 
other parties do not dispute this. The Division testifies of many benefits to Utah 
customers of the Currant Creek Project including cycling ability to meet peak hour needs 
and reduced water cost risk due to the air-cooled design. The Company testifies that the 
Currant Creek Project is the lowest overall cost and most likely to meet the necessary 
time requirements. Navigant, the independent RFP and bid evaluator hired pursuant to the 
requirements of the June 4, 2003 Stipulation, testifies that the Currant Creek Project is the 
best alternative in the peak bid category. The Division, after its own review, supports 
Navigant's conclusions. 
We conclude that review of the alternative actions discussed above, shows no 
better alternative at the present time than proceeding with building a new resource. We 
further conclude and find that the CurTant Creek resource addition as proposed by the 
Company is required by the public convenience and necessity, and that a certificate to 
that effect should be issued. 
IV, ORDER 
Wherefore, pursuant to our discussion, findings and conclusions made herein, 
we order 
1. The Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity is granted 
2. The Company will file with the Commission all permits required for 
construction and operation of the Currant Creek resource addition as soon as possible 
following receipt thereof, or will timely file an explanation of the reasons for and 
consequences of delay. 
This Report and Order constitutes final agency action on PacifiCorp's 
November 3, 2003, ApplicatioiL Pursuant to U.C.A. §63-46b-13, an aggrieved party may 
file, within 30 days after the date of this Report and Order, a written request for 
rehearing/reconsideration by the Commission. Pursuant to U.C.A. §54-7-15, failure to 
file such a request precludes judicial review of the Report and Order. If the Commission 
fails to issue an order within 20 days after the filing of such request, the request shall be 
considered denied. Judicial review of this Report and Order may be sought pursuant to 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (U.C.A. §§63-46b-l et seq.). 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 5th day of March, 2004. 
/s/ Ric Campbell Chairman 
/s/ Constance B. White. Commissioi 
/s/ Ted Bover. Commissioner 
Attest 
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Navigant Consulting, Inc. ("CI") has prepared this report for PadfiCorp regarding its RFP 2003-A 
process. Information contained herein is privileged and confidential and is intended for review only 
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[Rejects] 
Basis for Selecting the NBA 
ParifiCorp's NBA, the development and construction of a 525 MW gas-fired combustion turbine 
combined-cycle generation plant located adjacent to the Mona Substation 75 miles south of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was" determined to be the lowest cost resource option within the context of the RFP 
process. It will meet the Company's IRP identified need for a firm resource that is located within 
!" PacifiCorp's Eastern system. From the perspective of the RFP, this resource also met all of 
PacifiCorp's stated requirements, which included: 
» On-line and available by June 2005; 
» Daily dispatchability during heavy load and/or super peak hours; and, 
» Delivery in or to PACE. 
NCI not only validated the reasonableness of all the material costs associated with the NBA, but also 
ensured that they were appropriately reflected both in the model prepared by PacifiCorp's Resource 
Development group (cost-based) and the one prepared by the Commercial and Trading group 
(reflecting economic dispatch). This was a rigorous assessment involving the review of primary data 
and cost estimates as well as direct interviews with the personnel engaged in the preparation of the 
figures and the models. Furthermore, NCI reviewed and certified the economic analyses that were 
prepared for every one of the offers submitted and considered in the RFP's peakerbid category. 
After the initial bid screening, in each round after bid clarification, the NBA consistently came out on 
top as the least cost alternative for the Company (See Table J). Also, as noted earlier in this report, 
all of the material changes that were made to the NBA, from its initial lock down through the period 
of offer clanfication with bidders, were reviewed and validated by NCI as being reasonable and not 
arbitrarily advantaging one alternative over another. 




UP&L Exhibit (HLF-3R) 
IV. RESULTS OF THE PROPOSAL REVIEW PROCESS 
— t 
It is with this background that the decision was made to conclude discussions with the peaker bid 
category bidders and proceed forward with permitting and developing the Company's cost-based 
alternative, the NBA at Currant Creek. 
Bid 122-4 
Bid 135-Spring Canyon 
Bid 263-^BBB 
Bid 940d 
181 MW turnkey plant sale oi 
site 
203 MW turnkey on NBA site 
407 MW PPA for physical gas toiling. 
Unit located in Utah ac|)acent to Mona. 
20-years 
181 MW facility lease of 
20-years 
150 MW PPA for physical gas tolling. 
20-years 
o provide 10-year O&M 
agreement. Limited to 3,200 
hours/yr. 
Spring Canyon proposes a CCCT 
unit to be online by summer 2005 
(a very aggressive timeline) 
| o provide 10-year O&M 










150 MW consisting of one GE 7EA unit 
coupled with a 90 MW GE steam 
'turbine 
250 MW consisting of two GE 7EA 
units 
90 MW. consisting, of four LM 6000s 
and select ancillary equipment 
1S8 MW consisting of 3 GE 7EA units Bid 877 ~,j 
[1] Peaking NBA less bid on a net PVRR/1 OOMW-month basis. 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
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Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER ] 
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING ] 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and " 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF MARC T. 
) WANGSGARD 
\ Civil No. 050903412 
) The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I SS. 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
Marc T. Wangsgard, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a lawyer licensed to practice law in the State of Utah, having been admitted 
in October, 1988. 
2. From the onset of my legal career, and until I ceased the full-time private practice 
of law in May, 2000, ninety percent (90%) of my practice focused on water rights and related 
property issues. 
3.. During the course of my water law practice, I became acquainted with another 
Salt Lake lawyer, Bill White, whose practice also focused on water rights issues. 
4. Around 1999, Mr. White and I began a business of buying and selling water 
rights, primarily in Salt Lake County, Wasatch County and Utah County. 
5. Our specialty was acquiring one type of water from one location, and changing 
the use and location of the water right to make it more valuable. 
6. In late July/August, 2003, I became aware of the potential of our selling water 
rights to PacifiCorp for industrial use in Juab County. 
7. Jody Williams, another water lawyer with whom Mr. White and I both had 
previously worked on other water rights issues and transactions, advised us of PacifiCorp's water 
needs for a potential power plant to be located in Juab County. It was left entirely up to Mr. 
White and me to figure out how to supply the quality of water needed by PacifiCorp at the 
specific location. 
8. At this time, Mr. White and I were conducting our water rights business through a 
Utah limited liability company, WW Ranches, LLC ("WW Ranches"), which is solely owned by 
Mr. White and myself. 
2 
9. Based on my understanding of PacifiCorp's water rights needs, and after meeting 
with Jim Riley at the State Engineer's office, I prepared and sent to Jody Williams, on August 6, 
2003, a proposal to sell PacifiCorp a firm water supply for 800 acre feet to use near Mona, Utah. 
10. Mr. White and I conceived the idea of taking water rights originating in a 
different county, a different water right area, and from a different source and changing the 
location and use of those water rights to that requested by PacifiCorp near Mona, Juab County, 
Utah. We had previously accomplished numerous similar transactions. Jody Williams played no 
role in coming up with the idea or in finding the water rights we sold to PacifiCorp. 
11. The package of water rights that WW Ranches put together for PacifiCorp 
included water rights WW Ranches already owned in water coming from Utah Lake and also 
included shares of irrigation water from Utah County that WW Ranches acquired to sell to 
PacifiCorp. 
12. On September 2, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered into a Water Rights 
Purchase Agreement. Subsequently, on October 6, 2003, WW Ranches and PacifiCorp entered 
into a Revised and Restated Water Rights Purchase Agreement. A copy of that agreement is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
13. The price that WW Ranches charged PacifiCorp for the water rights was based on 
Mr. White's and my consideration of several factors, including, the price we had paid for the 
water, how long it had held it, how risky the transaction was, the opportunity to market the water 
somewhere else and what the market would bear. 
3 
14. The price set by WW Ranches was not based on any pricing information provided 
to WW Ranches by Jody Williams. 
15. Jody Williams never discussed with us the price that Spring Canyon Energy had 
agreed to pay for the Keyte and Garrett water rights or any aspect of Spring Canyon Energy's 
agreements with Keyte and Garrett. 
DATED this / / ^ day of January, 2007. 
Marc T. Wangsgard 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this / D*"day of January, 2007. 
•\\J\XV. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: Su-Anmii" CU-u^dOU 





PO Box 981748 
My Commission Expires 
March 15,2009 
STATE OF UTAH 
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REVISED AND RESTATED WATER RIGHTS PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
This Agreement is entered into this j^r^day of (vPAirWA . 2003 between 
WW Ranches, LC, a Utah limited liability company ("Seller'*), and PacifiCorp, an 
Oregon Corporation doing business as Utah Power ("Buyer"). 
RECITALS 
A. Seller owns water rights evidenced by shares of stock in Goshen Irrigation 
. and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company, both Utah corporations 
(collectively, the "Shares'*). The Goshen irrigation and Canal Company water rights are 
identified as Water Right Nos. 53-988, 53-1089 and 53-1094 with priority dates of 1858, 
1859 and 1858 respectively. The Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company water right is 
identified as Water Right No. 59-3499 with a priority date of 1870. 
B. Buyer desires to acquire the right to divert and totally consume 400 acre-
feet of water annually from one or more groundwater wells to be located in north Juab 
County. The water will be used for industrial purposes for cooling, and for domestic uses 
in Buyer's proposed power generating facility (hereinafter the "Plant") to be located near 
Mona'in Juab County, Utah. 
C. In addition to the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water, Buyer desires to 
acquire from Seller sufficient water to provide return flow owed to Utah Lake and 
downstream users as a result of the consumptive use of the 400 acre feet and provide any 
required carrier water to the remaining shareholders of Goshen Irrigation and Canal 
Company and other water users in the Currant Creek system. The return flow and carrier 
water requirement may be as high as 400 acre-feet but will be set out definitively in the 
State Engineer's Memorandum Decision authorizing the use of the water as described in 
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this Agreement This return flow water and carrier water are collectively referred to in 
this Agreement as the "Return Flow Requirement" 
D. Seller intends to file companion "Applications for Permanent Change of 
Water" (the "Change Applications") which are described in detail in paragraph 3, with 
the Shares to be assigned new Water Right numbers by the Utah State Engineer. The 
Change Applications will request approval of the Utah State Engineer for Buyer annually 
to totally consume 400 acre-feet of water for power generation and domestic uses at the 
Plant and provide the Return Flow Requirement designated by the State Engineer as" a 
condition to approval of the consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water. The Change 
Application to be filed on the Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company Shares will also 
provide for Buyer's annual leaseback of that portion of water Buyer does not intend to use 
in any given year to Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company. Seller intends to prosecute 
the Change Applications to final approval, as set forth in this Agreement, The combined 
Shares and the Change Applications approved for the annual diversion from Buyer's 
groundwater wells of the 400 acre feet of consumptive use water at the Plant together 
with the annual Return Flow Requirement are referred to hereinafter as the "Water 
Rights." 
E. Buyer desires to purchase and Seller desires to sell the Water Rights 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of this Agreement 
AGREEMENT 
In consideration of the covenants and promises contained herein, the parties agree 
as follows: 
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1. Quantity of Water to be Purchased. Buyer agrees to purchase from Seller 
and Seller agrees to sell and deliver to Buyer the Water Rights sufficient for the annual 
diversion and total consumptive use of 400 acre-feet of water at the Plant together with 
the annual Return Flow Requirement 
2. Purchase Price. The purchase price for the Water Rights is Two Million 
Seven Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand, Eight Hundred and Forty Six Dollars 
($2,769,846.00), to be paid as set forth in paragraph 4 of this Agreement. 
3. The Change Applications. 
A. Utah Code Ann. section 73-3-3 controls the Change Application process. 
As a condition precedent to the purchase and sale of the Water Rights, Seller shall obtain 
State Engineer approval of companion Change Applications that will 
(i) entitle Buyer to the right to annually divert and consume 400 acre-feet of 
water made available from the Water Rights from one or more groundwater wells 
for the purpose stated in Recital B of this Agreement; and 
(ii) provide the annual Return Flow Requirement sufficient to insure the right to 
the annual diversion and use of the 400 acre-feet of consumptive use water. 
B. The Change Applications, when approved by the State Engineer, shall 
authenticate the annual consumptive use of the 400 acre-feet of water at Buyer's Plant 
and the satisfaction of the annual Return Flow Requirement from water made available 
by the Water Rights. The forms of the Change Applications are attached to this 
Agreement as Exhibit "A." 
C. At its sole expense, Seller shall diligently and continuously prosecute the 
approval of, and complete all tasks necessary to obtain the State Engineer's approval of, 
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the companion Change Applications. Buyer will consult and cooperate with Seller to 
prepare and file the Change Applications to insure that they meet Buyer's approval. Each 
party will bear its own attorney's fees and other costs in the Change Application process. 
Seller will keep Buyer fully informed of all proposals, correspondence and developments 
that occur during the administrative proceedings related to the Change Applications. 
Buyer may, at its sole discretion, participate in the proceedings in support of the approval 
of the Change Applications to insure that such approval meets its needs, including 
appearing at public hearings and submitting pleadings and evidence in support of the 
Change Applications. 
D. The Change Applications shall be considered final 30 days following the 
date of the State Engineer's written Memorandum Decision consistent with Buyer's 
requirements, unless a timely request for reconsideration is filed with the State Engineer 
or a judicial review action is filed in the Utah District Court. If a request for 
reconsideration or a judicial review action is filed challenging the approval of one or both 
of the Change Applications, at Buyer's request both parties will pursue the defense of 
such action with each party to be responsible for its own costs, expenses and attorney's 
fees. The date on which the. Change Applications shall be considered final will be 
extended for the period of the reconsideration or the court proceedings, including any 
appeals, until such time that all appeals to the State Engineer's written Memorandum 
Decisions have been decided in favor of the terms of the Change Applications. If the 
Change Applications have not received final approval, including the expiration of all 
rights of appeal, by March 1, 2004, either party may terminate this Agreement without 
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penalty upon notification to the other party. Alternatively, the parties may extend the 
March 1,2004 date by mutual agreement 
E. Each party shall use its best efforts to timely satisfy all of the conditions of 
this paragraph 3 and to obtain the approval of the Change Applications, 
F. Seller shall pay all assessments against the Shares existing as of the date 
of Closing. Buyer will assume responsibility for all assessments that may be levied 
against or upon the Shares after the Closing. 
4. Closing. The Closing of the purchase and sale transaction described in 
this Agreement shall occur on or before 10 days after the date of final approval of the 
Change Applications described in paragraph 3 D of this Agreement. Prior to the Closing, 
Seller shall instruct Buyer to whom the payment is to be made and in what amounts the 
check(s) should be written. At the Closing, Seller shall deliver assignments to Buyer of 
Seller's interest in the Change Applications and appropriate certificates for the Shares 
issued in Buyer's name-evidencing the Water Rights, together with any agreements 
obligating Buyer to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing, including 
agreements described in paragraph 5 below with Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company 
and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company. At the Closing, Buyer shall deliver to Seller the 
total purchase price payable in funds acceptable to Seller and the executed assumption 
agreements. The parties do not expect there to be any costs associated with the Closing; 
however, any closing costs shall be shared equally. 
5. Agreements to be Assumed by Buyer, Including Agreements with 
Irrigation Companies. Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake 
Canal Company may require Seller to enter into various agreements as conditions of 
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gaining such companies' consents to the filing of the Change Applications. Buyer shall 
have 10 days to review and approve said agreements prior to Seller's execution of such 
agreements. Seller does not anticipate executing agreements which will obligate Buyer 
to meet certain requirements subsequent to the Closing other than those with Goshen 
Irrigation and Canal Company and Utah and Salt Lake Canal Company. However, prior 
to executing such agreements, if any, Buyer shall have 10 days to review and approve 
said agreements prior to Seller's execution of them. 
6. Seller's Representations. The Parties acknowledge that it is essential to 
Buyer's business that the Water Rights are available to Buyer as contemplated hereby, 
and that Buyer is relying upon Seller's commitments, agreements and covenants 
contained herein. Based upon this reliance, Seller represents and warrants to Buyer as 
follows: 
A. Seller is a limited liability company that is duly organized, validly existing 
and in good standing under the laws of the State of Utah. It possesses the authority and 
power to execute and deliver this Agreement and perform all acts and obligations 
required of it by this Agreement. The Water Rights, consisting of the Shares and the 
approved Change Applications, will be transferred free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances and security interests and all other obligations other than those set forth in 
the State Engineer's Memorandum Decisions approving the Change Applications, or 
such agreements described in paragraph 5 of this Agreement. 
B. Seller is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority to which it 
is subject and is not in breach of any lease, mortgage, and other agreement to which it, 
*
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the Water Rights or any portion thereof is or might be subject, or with respect to any 
matter which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby or affect the right, title and interest or condition of the Water Rights. 
The execution and delivery of this Agreement, and the performance by Seller of its 
obligations hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or 
constitute a default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Seller is a 
party, (ii) result in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the 
Water Rights, or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental 
entity. 
C. Each person who executes this Agreement on behalf of Seller has all 
necessary legal right, power and authority to enter into this Agreement and to 
consummate the transactions contemplated hereby. The execution and delivery of this 
Agreement by or on behalf of Seller and the consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby have been duly and validly authorized by Seller, have been duly 
executed and delivered by it, and all instruments and documents executed and delivered 
by or on behalf of Seller will constitute legal, valid and binding agreements of Seller, 
enforceable in accordance with their terms. 
D. Seller is not in default in respect to any judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance or regulation of any court or governmental authority or under 
any lease, order or other agreements to which Seller is or might be subject, or which 
might prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transaction contemplated 
hereby. 
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B. Seller has not received any notice of and is not otherwise aware of any 
claim, action, suit or other proceeding, pending or threatened, that would constitute a 
basis for any claim or litigation which might prohibit, delay or interfere with the 
consummation of the transactions contemplated hereby. 
F. Except as contemplated hereby, there is no requirement applicable to 
Seller to make any filing, declaration of, or registration with, to obtain any permit, 
authorization, consent or approval of, any governmental entity as a condition to the 
consummation by Seller of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
G. The Water Rights to be transferred pursuant to this Agreement are and will 
be owned by Seller, free and clear of any mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, 
encumbrance or claim of any third party. Upon consummation of the transactions 
contemplated hereby, Buyer will acquire good and marketable title to the Water Rights 
free and clear of any restrictions, liens, or adverse claims. No person or entity other than 
Seller has any right or interest in Water Rights. 
H. There are no claims, actions, suits, inquiries, proceedings or investigations 
against Seller which are currently pending or, to the best of Seller's knowledge, 
threatened at law or in equity by or before by any court, administrative body or 
governmental entity. Seller is not in default under or with respect to any judgment, order, 
writ, or decree of any court or any governmental entity which could reasonably be 
expected to have a material adverse effect on the use of the Water Rights or the 
transactions contemplated hereby. 
I. Seller is not aware of any facts pertaining to the Water Rights or the 
transactions contemplated hereby which it believes may affect or are likely in the future 
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to affect the Buyer's business. The statements, representations and warranties of Seller 
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they 
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and 
warranties contained herein not misleading. 
7. Buyer's Representations. Buyer represents and warrants to Seller as 
follows: 
A. Buyer is a corporation duly organized, validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Oregon and is duly qualified to do business in the 
State of Utah. It possesses the corporate authority and power to execute and deliver this 
Agreement and perform all acts and obligations required of it by this Agreement. 
B. Buyer is in compliance with each judgment, order, writ, injunction, 
decision, law, ordinance and regulation of any court or governmental authority to which 
it is subject that relates in any way to the Water Rights, and is not in breach of any lease, 
mortgage or other agreement to which it, the Water Rights, the Change Applications or 
any portion thereof, is or might be subject, or with respect to any matter which might 
prohibit, delay or interfere with the consummation of the transactions contemplated 
hereby. The delivery of this Agreement and the performance by Buyer of its obligations 
hereunder will not (i) result in the breach or termination of or violate or constitute a 
default under any lease, mortgage or other agreement to which Buyer is a party, (ii) result 
in the creation or imposition of any lien, charge or encumbrance upon the Water Rights, 
or (iii) violate any law, regulation, judgment or order of any governmental entity. 
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C. The operation of its business by Buyer has been conducted in all material 
respects in accordance with all applicable laws, regulations and other requirements of any 
governmental agency. 
D. Buyer is not aware of any facts pertaining to the transactions contemplated 
hereby which it believes may affect or is likely in the future to affect the Buyer's 
purchase of the Water Rights. The statements, representations and warranties of Buyer 
herein taken together do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact, nor do they 
omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the representations and 
warranties contained herein not misleading. 
8 Assignment. This Agreement may be assigned by Buyer prior to the 
Closing upon the full payment of the Purchase Price and the consent of Seller, which 
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. 
9. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence regarding the dates and 
time constraints set forth in this Agreement. 
10. Entire Agreement This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement 
between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representation, understanding, or. contracts, including that certain "Water Rights Purchase 
Agreement" relating to the purchase and sale of Goshen Irrigation and Canal Company 
and Utah Lake Distributing Company shares, between the parties with respect to the 
Water Rights to be purchased and sold hereunder. 
11. Default. An "Event of Default" shall occur under this Agreement if either 
party fails to perform any of its obligations hereunder when those obligations are due and 
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the defaulting party has not cured or satisfied the delinquent obligations within 10 days 
following delivery to the delinquent party of written notice of such delinquency. 
12. Remedies. 
A. Seller shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Buyer, and each of its 
shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from any and 
all liabilities, losses, damages, claims, costs and expenses, interest, awards, judgments 
and penalties, (including legal costs and expenses and interest on the amount of any loss 
from the date suffered or incurred) (a "Loss") arising out of or resulting from or caused 
by (i) any failure by the Seller to perform its obligations under this Agreement; or (ii) any 
inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or warranty made by or covenant or 
agreement of Seller contained in this Agreement. 
B. Buyer shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Seller, and each of its 
members, managers, officers, directors, employees, agents, successors and assigns, from 
any and all Losses arising out of or caused by (i) any failure by Buyer to perform its 
obligations under this Agreement, or (ii) any inaccuracy in or breach of any 
representation or warranty made by, or covenant or agreement of Buyer contained in this 
Agreement. 
C. In addition to its other rights hereunder, either party may avail itself of all 
remedies provided in law or in equity, including specific performance. The parties agree 
that the obligations under this Agreement may not necessarily be compensated by 
monetary damages. In addition to Buyer's other remedies, it may sue to rescind this 
Agreement and retain any monies previously recovered by it, may claim title to the 
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portions of the Water Rights not released and conveyed pursuant to this Agreement and 
may utilize the Water Rights. All of these rights and remedies are cumulative. 
13. Notice. Any and all notices, demands or other communications required 
or desired to be given hereunder by Buyer and Seller shall be in writing and shall be 
validly delivered to the other Party if served either personally or if delivered by a 
reputable courier firm such as Federal Express or UPS to the following addresses: 
To Buyer: PacifiCorp 
201 South Main Street, Suite 2200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
with a copy (which shall not constitute notice) to: 
Jody L. Williams 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
To Seller: WW Ranches LC. 
206 Seemore Drive 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Either Party may change its address for the purpose of receiving notices, demands and 
other communications as herein provided by written notice given in the maimer set forth 
above. 
14. Further Assurances. Each of the parties hereto shall execute and deliver 
any and all additional papers, documents and other assurances and shall do any and all 
acts and things reasonably necessary in connection with the performance of their 
obligations hereunder and to carry out the intent of the parties hereto. 
15. Knowledge. The parties have read this Agreement and executed it 
voluntarily after having been apprised of all relevant information and risks and having 
had the opportunity to obtain legal counsel. 
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16. Drafting Party. This document has been and shall be deemed to be a 
product of joint drafting by the parties and there shall be ho presumption otherwise. 
17. Authority. Each party warrants that the signatory to this Agreement is 
executing it with full authority on behalf of the party. 
18. 1031 Exchange. Seller intends to apply the proceeds of the sale of the 
Water Rights to purchase property that will qualify for an exchange of like property 
under Section 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code. So long as Buyer does not incur 
additional expense, Buyer will cooperate with Seller by executing the documents 
normally required to fulfill the 1031 Exchange requirements. 
EXECUTED on the date written above. 
PACIFICORP WW RANCHES, LC 
Its: 5 k $U<-lfre*iJ.e.>Jr Its: S0fq.*umjr+^ 




ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
Scott A. Call (#0544) 
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155) 
700 Chase Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Facsimile: (801) 364-7697 
tkarrenber gffiaklawfirm. com 
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER 
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING 
CANYON ENERGY, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and 
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK R TALLMAN 
Civil No. 050903412 
Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
EXHIBIT 
~W3f$\ 
STATE OF OREGON ) 
} ss. 
COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH ) 
Mark R. Tallman being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am presently Managing Director of Renewable Resource Acquisition for 
PacifiCorp. I have held this position since approximately April 2006. 
2. From September 2003 to April 2006,1 was Managing Director of Front Office for 
PacifiCorp. At the time I held this position the Front Office was part of PacifiCorp's 
Commercial & Trading Group. Specifically, the Front Office was the commercial portion of 
PacifiCorp's business as it related to wholesale transactions, including trading, bilateral 
negotiations, contract administration, demand side management, and hydrothermal scheduling. 
3. From September 2000 to September 2003,1 was Director of Origination, also 
within PacifiCorp's Commercial & Trading Group. My responsibilities included bilateral 
wholesale sales, purchases of other wholesale transactions, dispute resolution, special retail sales 
contracts and qualifying facility negotiations. 
4. In early 2003, the Commercial & Trading Group was given the task of soliciting 
proposals to supply PacifiCorp with new power supply resources (i.e., power purchase 
agreements and/or leased or owned power plants) to meet PacifiCorp's customer's growing 
needs for electricity that had been identified in PacifiCorp's 2003 Integrated Resource Plan. 
5. That solicitation of proposals, which I authored for internal review, was titled 
"PacifiCorp's Request for Proposals Electric Resources" (RFP 2003-A). As Director of 
Origination and then as Managing Director Front Office, RFP 2003-A was primarily my 
responsibility. 
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6. RFP 2003-A solicited proposals for three resource categories that were designated 
as "Baseload," "Peaker" and "Super Peak." The Baseload category was to provide power supply 
resources beginning in 2007. The Peaker category was to provide power supply resources 
beginning in 2005. The Super Peak category was to provide power supply resources during peak 
summer months for certain years. 
7. In June 2003, PacifiCoip retained Navigant Consulting, Inc. ("Navigant") to serve 
as an independent monitor to review/audit RFP 2003-A and PacifiCorp's cost based alternatives. 
Navigant's charge was to ensure that the RFP process followed by PacifiCorp was reasonable, 
fair, unbiased, and comparable. 
8. Prior to analyzing bids received in response to RFP 2003-A, Navigant reviewed 
and audited PacifiCorp's cost based alternatives for new generating resources known as the 
"Next Best Alternative" (NBA). The NBA was intended to be used as benchmarks against 
proposals that PacifiCorp expected to receive in response to RFP 2003-A. PacifiCorp's NBA for 
the Peaker category was a 525 MW 2x1 combined cycle plant named Currant Creek that was to 
be located near the Mona switching station in Juab County, Utah. Navigant's review/audit of 
PacifiCorp's NBA is documented in a confidential July 22,2003 report entitled ''Navigant 
Consulting Inc. 's Review and Audit of PacifiCorp's Next Best Alternative (NBA) ". 
9. Navigant's responsibilities included receiving bidder responses to RFP 2003-A. 
When Navigant received these bidder responses, Navigant concealed the identification of the 
bidder so that the proposals were "blinded." Each proposal was then issued a bid number by 
Navigant for reference during the RFP process. 
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10. After the bids were blinded they were given to PacifiCorp, which then scored and 
ranked the blinded proposals based on screening criteria that PacifiCorp had developed. 
Navigant validated PacifiCorp's scoring criteria and confirmed that the scoring criteria had been 
applied appropriately to the blinded proposals. This phase of the process became known as 
Round I. 
11. When Round I was concluded, Navigant recommended that PacifiCorp create a 
Round I short list of de-blinded bids for each of the three categories - Baseload, Peaker and 
Super Peak - based initially on the RFP screening criteria, to enable PacifiCorp to conduct 
clarifying discussions with the short listed bidders to determine the specific qualities of their 
bids. 
12. A Round I short list was created for each category based on the RFP screening 
criteria. Out of the 28 offers received in the Peaker category, 10 were short listed. Spring 
Canyon's Bid No 135 was ranked fourth on the Round I short list for the Peaker category based 
on the RFP screening criteria. Navigant documented the Round I results on page 34 (Table F) of 
its confidential February 11,2004 report entitled "Navigant Consulting's Final Report on 
PacifiCorp's RFP 2003-A " (the "Final Report"). 
13. On Navigant's recommendation, PacifiCorp held clarifying discussions with the 
five bidders behind the top ten ranked offers in the Peaker category. This process was referred to 
as Round II. 
14. During Round II, PacifiCorp performed an analysis on each bid as the respective 
bidder clarified its proposal. As a result, a multitude of intra-Round rankings emerged. 
However, it was the final rankings at the end of Round II that PacifiCorp relied on to make its 
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decision regarding the construction of Currant Creek. Spring Canyon's Bid No. 135 in the 
Peaker category was ranked fourth in the final Round II rankings. Navigant documented the 
final Round II results on page 43 (Table J) of the Final Report. 
15. Spring Canyon's Bid No. 135 in the Peaker category was never ranked higher 
than fourth at the end of both Round I and Round II. 
16. As described in Section IV.a.ii (page 37) of the Final Report, PacifiCorp made its 
determination to construct Currant Creek following the completion of Round II. 
17. On September 12,2003, PacifiCorp determined that none of the offers in the 
Peaking category to provide electric generation in 2005 was more economical than its NBA in 
that category (i.e. Currant Creek). I made a recommendation to PacifiCorp's board of directors 
that Currant Creek should be built. The recommendation was accepted. 
18. At that point PacifiCorp could have chosen to cease any further discussions with 
the bidders in the Peaker category and simply moved forward with Currant Creek. However, 
two intervening factors led PacifiCorp to continue its discussions with Spring Canyon and two 
other bidders. First, the bids that PacifiCorp had received in the Super Peak bid category did not 
look promising. Second, PacifiCorp had issued a revised load forecast indicating a load and 
resource imbalance in the Utah portion of PacifiCorp's system in 2005 that was projected to be 
nearly two times as large as identified in PacifiCorp's Integrated Resource Plan. 
19. Under the assumption that the revised load forecast was accurate, PacifiCorp 
decided that a "New NBA" was needed for benchmarking purposes (since the Currant Creek 
Peaker NBA was going to be built and it was, therefore, no longer a future alternative) and that 
PacifiCorp would go back to the three top ranked bidders, including Spring Canyon, to see 
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whether or not another opportunity to revise their offers would result in something more 
economical relative to the "New NBA." 
20. Because the Currant Creek site was large enough for two projects, PacifiCorp's 
"New NBA" consisted of market purchases of electricity for two years and an expansion at the 
Currant Creek site with a second 525 MW 2x1 combined cycle block for the remaining eighteen-
year period. 
21. PacifiCorp continued its clarifying discussions with the three top bidders in the 
Peaker category, including Spring Canyon. This was referred to as Round III. A Round III list 
was created based on the receipt of additional information from the bidders. On the Round III 
list, Spring Canyon's Bid No. 135 was ranked second relative to the New NBA. Navigant 
documented the Round III results on page 38 (Table H) of the Final Report. 
22. PacifiCorp then provided additional feedback to the bidders who responded with 
slight permutations of their offers. A Round IV list was created and Spring Canyon's Bid No. 
135 without and with duct firing was ranked second and third relative to the New NBA, 
respectively. Navigant documented the Round IV results on page 38 (Table I) of the Final 
Report. 
23. Ultimately, upon review of each bidders' best and final offer, no final offers were 
found to be economically superior to the New NBA. 
Further affiant sayeth not. 
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DATED this 3tH day of July, 2007. 
Mark'R. Tallman. 
2007. 





*w COMMISSION NO. 417520 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES MAY 17,2011 
Notary Public 
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